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This dissertation summarizes the methodological views of each
of the major participants in the Nineteenth Century British Method-
enstreit in Political Economy and isolates those currents in Nine¬
teenth Century economic methodology which have persisted into the
Twentieth Century. Among those involved in the British Methodenstreit
I have examined the relevant writings of Walter Bagehot, John E.
Cairnes, J. K. Ingram, Richard Jones, T. E. C. Leslie, Alfred
Marshall, David Symes, and William Whewell.
Three major conclusions arise from this study. First, each of
the writers considered possessed a somewhat ideosyncratic conception
of the scope and procedures appropriate to economic inguiry. In
this respect, then,it is misleading to speak simply of Historical and
Orthodox "schools," since these labels have freguently been inter¬
preted as denoting homogeneous points of view.
Second, those fundamental characteristics which were shared in
common by writers within each of the two methodological traditions
are not the characteristics which have frequently received the
attention of the intellectual historian. The Historical School, for
example, has often been associated with its German counterpart and
portrayed as a reaction against all economic theorizing. Instead of
disposing of economic theory, however, the typical British Historicist
of the period prior to the 1890's was interested in tying the exist¬
ing theory to specific institutional contexts, thus integrating into
economic analysis some important behavioral constraints. So far as
this attempt was successful it resulted in economic theories yield¬
ing definite predictions and testable consequences, as opposed to a
theory which was nebulous enough to explain everything but which
predicted only ex post.
Third, the Historical and Orthodox orientations toward the mean¬
ing of and justification for economic studies have persisted, in
somewhat mutated forms, to the present day. Frank Knight, Fritz
Machlup and, to a lesser extent, Milton Friedman have emphasized
the role of economics as a way of viewing the world and organizing
our perception of social events. While prediction is granted a role
in most versions of neo-Orthodoxy, the certainty of the theory is
still guaranteed by our introspective inspection of our own motives
and by the intuitive appeal of economic reasoning. Prediction on
the basis of economic analysis is still limited by the reputed
inaccessibility of controlled experimentation in social science and
by the "partial" character of economic motives in the direction of
human action. Opposed to the neo-Orthodox tradition have been
writers such as T. W. Hutchison, Fugene Rotwein and, to some degree,
Paul Samuel son. These neo-Historicists have demanded that theories
be clearly specified, tested by comparison with existing data sources
and either modified or rejected if found to be contradicted by test
results. Although many neo-Historicists, like their Nineteenth
Century counterparts, have been more concerned with generalized con¬
sideration of what is to be done, rather than with the mechanics and
experimental techniques required to carry through their proffered
research programs, they do represent a recognizable and distinct
alternative to the neo-Orthodox methodology.
The Nineteenth Century conflict between Historical and Orthodox
economic methodologists is thus found to have a close parallel in
recent economic discussions. The case of the British Methodenstreit
is instructive not only as a premature and abortive "scientific
revolution," but also as the historical background for concerns of
more immediate interest to modern economists.
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CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION AND A REVIEW OF
PREVIOUS RESEARCH CONCERNING THE
BRITISH HISTORICAL SCHOOL
The development of Nineteenth Century economics in Britain has
been documented by scores of books and articles, and it has long been
believed that the central issues and major figures connected with the
period were well-known. Only a few accounts of the development of eco¬
nomics during the last two hundred years have, however, concerned them¬
selves with an issue which virtually dominated the discipline during
the later decades of the Nineteenth Century: The Methodenstreit be-
tween "Orthodox" and "Historical" economists.^ Those few sources
which have sought to examine and explain the clash of methodologies
have portrayed it as a passing fit of professional infighting, of
little real importance to the "pure theory" of economics, or as a de¬
bate involving issues long since settled in the modern age.
The traditional limitations placed on the history of economics,
though, have to a great extent reinforced this neglect of the British
Methodenstreit, as have the prohibitions against extensive methodologi¬
cal discussions popularized by Marshall. The "proper" study of the
history of economics has been variously interpreted as a history of
economic analysis, as a history of political economy or as a history of
the filiations between economic and "non-economic" ideas. All major
The citations in this dissertation follow the style and format
of The American Economist.
2forms of past historical studies have, however, ignored the scientific
goals and explicit methodological statements of previous economic
writers as matters of little concern to the present day. The research
methods advocated and practiced by the Classicals and early Neoclassi¬
cal, the questions which they posed concerning the scope and signifi¬
cance of economic inquiry, and the changes which they suggested in the
overall reorientation of economic problem solving have been viewed as
issues of little historical importance. Yet the admittedly erroneous
views of past authors concerning matters of "theory" or their dis¬
cussions of policy issues long since extinct have been the subject of
meticulous probing and detailed evaluation.
The inherent traditionalism of many historians of economic thought
has, of course, had its good side. Their endorsement of the theorist's
view of methodological controversies as an unproductive and devisive
2
pursuit has undoubtedly aided in the rapid and reasonably unfettered
development of economic theory, especially neoclassical micro-theory,
along pre-established paths. This same surrender to the "mainstream
of economic thought" has, however, distorted the historian's own per¬
spective on past events and caused him to ignore many rich sources of
"original" and important ideas.
While a perpetual search for "anticipations" of contemporary
theories could not fail to flatter the theorist's ego and thus raise
his estimate of the "Study of Dead Men," the eventual consequences of
limiting intellectual history to such a pandering approach are less
than pleasing. There are only a limited number of "anticipations" to
be found in the writings of truly scholarly social thinkers, no matter
3how strained the interpretation of sources may become. The historian
of economics who limits himself to "anticipations" may thus run short
of relevant material or be forced to exhume progressively less sophis¬
ticated writings. In order to gain any long-run worth, the history
of economic thought must make contributions of its own to the contin¬
uing development and improvement of the discipline; and in order to
accomplish that task the historian must become something more than a
perennial sycophant.
It is only to the extent that the intellectual historian concen¬
trates his efforts and attention on the "heterodox" notions of past
writers and on the uniqueness of their suggestions for the improvement
of both theory and policy that he is able to provide a fresh perspec¬
tive on present controversies as an aid to the development of new
patterns for economic speculation. This is especially true in matters
concerning economic methodology and in those other areas in which the
present practices and forms of economic research and of "economic ex¬
planation" have yet to be fully developed into universally agreed-
upon and readily defensible modes. This dissertation is devoted to
just such a re-examination of certain key methodological issues, which
were considered at length in the writings of the British Historical
economists and the writings of their "Orthodox" antagonists. While I
believe that the study of these authors supplies important background
for a consideration of more contemporary contributions to the litera¬
ture of economic methodology (e.g., the methodological writings of
o
Kmght, Friedman, Machlup, Coats and Hutchison) , and that this study
constitutes a rather different interpretation of the significance of
4previously neglected authors, the lesson which I have hoped most of
all to illustrate in the following pages is the importance of reread¬
ing past writers for their own insights into the process of economic
analysis, rather than viewing them as mere forerunners of contemporary
’’innovations" in our theories.
The Scope of This Inquiry
In this study I have not and could not attempt an exhaustive
interpretation of the world-wide methodological debate which ravaged
economic inquiry during the Nineteenth Century. A task of that mag¬
nitude would run to several volumes and would be many years in com¬
pletion. I have, however, examined the major contributions of the
central figures in the British Methodenstreit and traced the effects
of their methodological views to the present day. Germany and France
each had their own methodological controversies and conflicts, but
the insularity of British economics during much of the later Nineteenth
and early Twentieth Centuries provides a reasonable justification for
the separate consideration of authors in that environment. Although
many of the early Historical writers in Britain had contact with for¬
eign sources, their views and the issues they debated were mainly
indigenous to their native lands. It was only in the immediate pre-
Marshallian period that influences from France (Comte) and Germany
(Roscher and Schmoller) became recognizable as the source inspiring
British methodological controversy. Even during this period, however,
the issues considered were not those so hotly debated on the Conti¬
nent.
5The Methods of this Study
There are two major alternative methods which may be pursued in a
study of intellectual history. The historian may choose to consider
past writers as evolutionary steps in a process culminating in the
views of his own period, or he may attempt to probe an author's beliefs
and theories from "the inside," making sense of that which is obscure
and searching for the common thread which binds together the separate
pieces of an author's work.
The "Whig theory" of intellectual history views the development of
a discipline as a steady progression from ignorance to knowledge, with
each worker in a "tradition" building upon the foundations left by his
predecessor. The "Revisionist" historian, on the other hand, asks the
question "What went wrong, and how may the damage be repaired?"
While Whig historians are interested in their subjects only as cogs in
a developmental machine, Revisionists consider them as creative and
original forces, both acting upon and being acted upon by the social
context. Although these methodological perspectives on historical
research are neither proscriptive nor definitive, they do provide a
means for defining extreme points in the spectrum of possible ap¬
proaches. As such they act as an aid in the formation of more defi¬
nite judgments concerning the methodology appropriate to any particular
historical study.
In actuality, of course, few studies could be cited which are
paradigms of either of these approaches. Historians who choose to em¬
phasize the "history of economic analysis," and who are thus primarily
Whigs in their historical methodology, have frequently concerned them-
6selves with certain anomalous ideas or individuals, and have even been
driven to comment upon the "tone of the times" and its impact upon the
discipline. Alternatively, historians with a more Revisionist orienta¬
tion have sometimes chosen to emphasize those doctrines which would
later gain professional acclaim or to criticize the "errors of the
past" from the perspective of the present. Although the distinction
between the Whig and Revisionist approaches is a valid one, it is per¬
haps more applicable to the aspects (or component questions) compos¬
ing any historical study than it is to the study as a whole. It is
with this in mind that we turn to a description of the methods of
this study.
Positions on economic methodology are nearly as varied today as
they were in the Nineteenth Century, even though they now occupy a
less central place in economic discussions. This lack of a stable
consensus concerning the types of questions with which we are pri¬
marily interested in this dissertation seems to decisively rule out
a purely Whig interpretation of the British Methodenstreit and of the
echoes and secondary impacts of it on Twentieth Century economic
writings. There are, however, certain requirements which should be
met in order to establish the continuity of influences from the past
on the present, and in this respect something like the Whig inter¬
pretation of historical causality is inescapable. As a compromise,
then, I have considered each of the major authors in both the early
Historical camps as original if not autonomous thinkers, often aware
of the contributions or blunders of their immediate contemporaries but
just as frequently striking out on new and unexplored paths. I have
7also, at the same time, made use of the concluding chapter of the
dissertation to summarize and organize the views of the opposing
Schools, to criticize both of their basic methodological positions
from the standpoint of more modern research and to indicate how many
of the basic issues they debated and the basic stances which they
assumed on these issues are mirrored in "modern" writings on economic
methodology. The "smooth-flow" of an issue-oriented approach to the
Nineteenth Century Methodenstreit would surely have improved the liter¬
ary qualities of this study, but the more accurate and appropriate
way to approach the methodological views of such diverse authors as
Symes and Whewell is surely a case-by-case consideration of their own
meta-economic writings.
The unity and overall development of the "Historical School" in
England are matters discussed in more detail in the subsequent chap¬
ters, but the somewhat related question of the temporal and philo¬
sophic scope of this inquiry requires additional clarification at the
outset. By the early 1880's the meta-economic orientation of the
early British Historical School had been virtually forgotten, although
pseudo-methodological controversies would continue to disturb the
peace of British economics until well into the next century. The
efforts of Jones, Whewell, Bagehot, Symes and Leslie which had aimed
at the reconstruction of economics along institutional and empirical
lines were gradually and almost imperceptibly supplanted by three
divergent trends operating under the "Historical" label: the growth
of economic history in the writings of Ashley, Cunningham, Rodgers
and Toynbee, the evolutionary and biological analogies of the Comtists
8and English organicists, and the reduction of economics to moral phi¬
losophy and "common sense" at the hands of social philosophers and
rabid ideologues. Despite the initial burst of enthusiasm which had
greeted the extension of biological and scientistic methods to economic
inquiry, none of these later trends represented a viable alternative
to the prevailing orthodoxy. By the "Nineties" or the early decades
of the Twentieth Century these pseudo-alternatives to Marshallian
neoclassicism had either collapsed under the weight of their own
rhetoric or had been absorbed into the "mainstream" of the discipline
as specialized fields of somewhat dubious worth. Through the criti¬
cisms of Sigwick, J. N. Keynes, and the more subtle asides of Alfred
Marshall, the term "Historicist" gradually came to refer solely to
the works of the later British historians and social organicists as
well as to the writings of the later German Historical School of
Gustav Schmoller. The concerns of the early British Historicists
were soon to be forgotten in muddled debates concerning methodological
positions which they themselves had repeatedly disavowed.
The distinctive and most important contribtuioris of British His-
toricism were exclusively the property of the early Historicists, and
the bulk of this study is, therefore, devoted to an examination of
their works and ideas. Ingram and Marshall have been considered at
some length in order to illustrate the transition between the early
and later Historical views and the reasons for the reinterpretation
of the Historicists' original concerns, but these two authors could
just as well have been omitted from this study if an appreciation for
the different periods in the British Historical movement had previously
9been developed.
Although the interests of this study have been historical as well
as methodological, the methodological side of the inquiry has tended
to predominate. The following pages are thus concerned more with a de¬
tailed examination of the Historicists' and Orthodox economists' meta-
economic doctrines than they are with a consideration of their life
histories or their intellectual attainments in other fields.
A Review of the Existing Literature
Despite the vast number of texts and articles concerned with the
development of economics in Britain, there are only a handful of sec¬
ondary sources which consider the history of the British Methoden-
streit. Among these the most frequently cited are T. W. Hutchison's
4
A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929 and A. W. Coats' "The His-
5toricist Reaction In English Political Economy, 1870-1890." Despite
their reputation as authoritative works, however, both Hutchison's
and Coats' accounts of the development and character of the Historical
School are deficient if not blatantly inaccurate.
Hutchison's discussion of the methodological debate in Britain is
limited by his virtual exclusion of all events occurring before the
mid-1870's and by his concentration upon the policy aspects of the
debate. Although he explicitly cites each of the major participants
in the methodological controversies of the period (including David
Symes), his overall consideration of strictly methodological questions
6is limited to a scant four pages. Hutchison's development of any
organized statement concerning the goals and procedures of economic
10
historians along with the economists of the Historical School and by
his rather indecisive separation of the two groups. Although
Hutchison's Review of Economic Doctrines must be acknowledged as one
of the most subtle and suggestive histories of economic thought, its
treatment of British His tori cism is only slightly more revealing than
the single footnote usually accorded the School in other, more stand¬
ard, accounts of the period.
Coats' 1954 Economica article, "The Historical Reaction In English
Political Economy, 1870-1890," builds upon the foundations laid by
Hutchison and suffers from many of the same defects. Coats explains
the popularity of British Historicism by reference to the downturn in
the British economy after the 1850's, and he finds the roots of the
movement in the philosophy of August Comte, the German Historical
School of Roscher and the British historians of social development
(i.e., Morgan and Sir Henry Maine).^ Coats states that Jones' in¬
fluence on the development of the School and on economic theory as a
Qwhole was overrated by past historians, a claim which is undoubtedly
true but which was to the detriment of the discipline rather than to
its advantage. He was further remiss in omitting entirely any refer¬
ence to the writings of either David Symes or William Whewell.
Like Hutchison, Coats' entire consideration of the "dispute over
method" is limited to only a few pages, and like Hutchison he includes
the later minor Historicists and economic historians (i.e., Fawcett,
Cunningham and Sidgwick) on an equal footing with more major writers
like Leslie and Ingram. It is clear from his account that the His¬
torical economists in Britain were disturbed about something, but
1whether they had legitimate grievances against the Classical s' method¬
ology or were merely intellectual imperialists, eager to conquer all
social inquiry for the disciplines of Sociology and History, was a
question which remained an unsolved mystery in his analysis of the
movement.
Two lesser known, but superior, treatments of British Historicism
9
are to be found in William Scott's The Development of Economics and
Robert B. Ekelund's "A British Rejection of Economic Orthodoxy."^
Ekelund in his 1966 article outlines the history of the Historical
School in British economics, placing it within the context of the in¬
tellectual trends of the day and against the background of similar
movements in other nations. He quite properly objects that: "the
role of the British (His tori cists) in this ‘historical revolution' has
been greatly neglected, and their substantive and important contribu¬
tions have been jaded by attention to the German School,"^ and he
correctly identifies the British Historicist's primary target as the
"abstract a priorism" and speculative methodology of the Orthodox
12
economists. Although Ekelund fully recognized the indigenous
status of the Historical movement in Britain, he laid somewhat more
emphasis on the influence of French (Comte) and British (Spencer)
evolutionists than would be appropriate in the present more limited
consideration of early Historical writers. While his consideration
of some of the later Historical economists (i.e., Ingram and Toynbee)
heightens our appreciation for the type of Historicism encountered
by J. N. Keynes and Alfred Marshall and strengthened his case against
considering the British Historicists as "poor relations" of Germans,
12
those parts of his discussion are outside the scope of this dis¬
sertation.
Scott’s survey of particular writers in the British Historical
tratition is less interpretative and more descriptive than Ekelund's,
but it still possesses many excellent features. Scott's section on
the School contains concise and informative summaries of the main
doctrines professed by Leslie, Ingram and Ashley, although he omits
any consideration of Bagehot, Jones or Symes, and he misinterprets the
methodological views of Alfred Marshall. While carefully constructed
and largely accurate, Scott's treatment of British Historicism is
still too brief to serve as more than a rough guide to any of the
following sections. Although Scott has accomplished an admirable
summary of the School within the context of a general text on the his¬
tory of economic thought, his research in no way fulfills the role of
an authoritative study, or even a brief but comprehensive outline of
the issues debated by and the methodological roots of British Histor¬
icism. The works of Ekelund and Scott considered together do, how¬
ever, provide a firm foundation for a more detailed history of the
methodological controversies of the Nineteenth Century. They have
often been referred to in structuring the research which has gone
into the present history, and they promise to provide a basis for an
even more in-depth study of other, later, currents in the British
Methodenstreit.
13
Other References to the British Historical School
Passing comments restricted to the consideration of individuals
within the British Historical tradition are not uncommon in the more
popular and "up-to-date" histories of economic thought or in some of
the older references to the development of the discipline. L. H.
Haney devotes some thirteen pages to the topic under the heading of
13
"Concrete Historical Criticism in Great Britain," Eric Roll comments
14
briefly on Richard Jones in his History of Economic Thought, and
Joseph Schumpeter cites the works of Leslie, Jones and Ingram in his
15
History of Economic Analysis. None of these works, however, extends
much beyond a mere recitation of the basic fact of the movement's
existence and its opposition to the Ricardian tradition. In short,
none of them are substantial enough to warrant further consideration
outside of those chapters to which they most directly relate.
A Brief Introduction to British Historicism
The roots of the Historical movement in Britain are as varied as
the many writers who contributed to its development and are sometimes
identifiable only through conjectures based upon the broader trends in
European thought. Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, Sir Henry Maine and
Auguste Comte were each mentioned in reverent tones by one or another
of the His tori cist writers. Yet the more probable source for their
common inspiration was the inter-related complex of views, represented
in the traditions of nominalism, associationist psychology and
empiricism, that had dominated British thought since before the
Fourteenth Century.
14
Unifying Factors in British Historicism
The British Historicists were in an odd position, historically
speaking, and they were well aware of the anomaly represented in their
intellectual environment. Economics was the only field in British
science so completely dominated by the rationalistic and speculative
methods of the Continent, and its unique status as a "metaphysical11
study seemed to demand an explanation. Jones, Bagehot, Symes, Leslie
and Ingram each examined this question, and to a man they reached
something like the same conclusion: the speculative and "metaphysical11
character of economics in the Nineteenth Century was primarily due to
the influence of Ricardo. Although most of the Historicists were
willing to concede that pre-Ricardian writings, as exemplified by
Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, were both primitive and unstruc¬
tured when compared to the Orthodox treatises of the Nineteenth Cen¬
tury, they recognized in these earlier writings something like their
own interest in and concern for "concrete" empirical inquiries and
their own belief in the importance of determining "the facts of the
case" before formulating theories to explain it. The Ricardians, how¬
ever, were charged with the use of "vicious a priorisms" in formulating
economic hypotheses, and they were held to be doubly guilty for apply¬
ing their counter-factual speculations to the policy issues faced by
the British nation. Leslie, among others, was so incensed by the
Ricardians* use of the "absolute principles" of economics as justi¬
fications for their own political biases that he was driven to quip
that "Instead of a science of wealth they have given us a science
15
for wealth."^ However, neither Leslie nor any of the other early
British Historicists ever questioned the basic social importance of
a science of economic relationships nor faltered in their hopes for
its indefinite improvement.
The Decentralized Character of the "Historical School"
Despite basic agreements concerning a common enemy and a general
course along which economic inquiry should be redirected, each of the
British Historical writers remained largely ideosyncratic in his own
methodological views and the justifications which he offered for these
views. The critical and empirical approach which the Historicists had
adopted in their investigation of economic and social phenomena left
no basis for the creation of a scientific "paradigm", or, more proper¬
ly a scientistic dogma. There were no ground rules for delimiting
and proscribing the types of questions which it was "legitimate" to
pose in an Historical investigation or the types of answers which
were acceptable in response to these questions. For, in fact, there
was no such thing as a well-organized and proscriptive "Historical
School."
In this sense, but only in this sense, were J. N. Keynes and
Alfred Marshall correct in their identification of the Historical
movement with a rejection of "theory." The theory which the Histori¬
cists rejected was not, however, a theory which attempted to examine
the economic and political constraints which structured human action,
which attempted to critically approach social problem-solving through
the tools of empirical research. The "theory" rejected by the His-
16
tori cists was, rather, the theory which composed the "core" of Classi¬
cal and Neoclassical economics, i.e., the methodological ground-rules
which conditioned and limited the thoughts and explanations for
social action proffered by "Orthodox" economists. The British His-
toricists clearly recognized that a critical and reflective method¬
ology was required in social and economic investigations even more
than in the researches of the physical scientist, and they were en¬
thusiastic in their endorsement and defense of those types of pro¬
cedures without much regard for the content of the theories being
proffered for testing. As Bagehot once remarked in a caveat to
those orthodox economists who were excessively hasty in proclaiming
the absolute truth and infallibility of their doctrines, as well as
their universal applicability to any social structure:
...the cultivators of an abstract science are always
in great danger of forgetting its abstract nature;
they rush and act on it at once. In the abstract
physical sciences there is an effectual penalty--
a person who acted on abstract dynamics would soon
break his head; but in mental and ... (social) ...
sciences, unhappily, there are no instant tests of
fai 1 ure,—whatever happens a man can always argue
that he was rightJ7
A Note to the Following Chapters and Appendices
In the chapters that follow I have traced the ideas and achieve¬
ments of the major figures in the British Historical tradition and of
their opponents in the Orthodox School during the period of roughly
1830-1880. Although each of these "methodological sketches" is large¬
ly self-contained, the overall emphasis of the various branches of
the Historical tradition are discovered to be related through a
17
"family resemblance," and that relationship is summarized in the
concluding chapter. In addition, a number of important, if somewhat
tangential, issues and some clarification of the terminology used in
this study have found a home in the appendices attached at the end of
this dissertation. While the body of the work is intelligible with¬
out reference to these supplementary materials, the meaning and
development of the School are more readily comprehended if careful
attention has first been devoted to them. Of special importance are
the appendices on "J. S. Mill's Methodology," "On The Terminology
Used In This Investigation" and "On The Methodology of William
Whewell." These three sections serve to fill certain rather glaring
gaps in the continuity or interpretation of the School, and they act
to clarify certain issues which might otherwise remain obscure.
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CHAPTER II
THE FORMAL BEGINNINGS OF BRITISH HISTORICISM:
THE REVEREND RICHARD JONES
Richard Jones (1790-1855) was of Welsh extraction, the son of a
prosperous British solicitor who originally had planned for him to
follow in the family profession. As fate would have it, however,
Jones' poor health thwarted his father's ambitions, and he was, in¬
stead, sent to Caius College, Cambridge to pursue a less strenuous
course of study leading to the ministry.^ It was during his college
years that Jones' mild took on the mold which it would retain during
the remainder of his life, being formed in discussions held with a
small and closely knit group of fellow students. The Cambridge Study
Group, as they were later known, were mostly acolytes of Francis
Bacon, and had joined together with the primary intention of study-
2
ing and debating his philosophic works. From their number would
arise some of the greater minds of the following decades: John
Herschel , the author of the influential Discourse on the Study of
Natural Philosophy; John Babbage, father of the modern computer and
founder of the British Society for The Advancement of Mathematics;
and William Whewell , Jones' lifelong friend and the author of such
definitive studies as A History of the Inductive Sciences and The
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. (See Appendix D at the end of
this dissertation for a more complete account of Whewell's life and
3scientific contributions.)
While Jones' own scholastic career was not so distinguished as
21
those of his college acquaintances' it was far from uneventful. In
1833 he was elected to the Chair of Political Economy at Kings'
College^ and in 1835 he was appiinted as Professor of Political Econo¬
my and History at East India College, Haileyburg (thus filling the
position left vacant by the death of his acquaintance and correspond¬
ed
ent, T. R. Mai thus). Although Jones was frequently drawn away from
academic duties and economic research by the tide of public affairs,
Haileyburg remained as a refuge for him throughout the remaining
twenty years of his life. In the brief periods between his multitu¬
dinous political crusades he would return to his cherished position
at Haileyburg to partake of those activities which brought him the
highest enjoyment and self-satisfaction: his continuing studies into
g
economic anthropology and into the "Political Economy of Nations".
In 1836, after only one year of exclusively academic pursuits,
Jones added to his other positions membership on the newly created
Parliamentary Tithe Commission. Although he believed that this
appointment was a service to the clergy, and thus a duty owed his
office, he found his time increasingly absorbed in the details of
everyday decision-making and increasingly diverted from the system¬
atic pursuit of his intellectual goals.^ When the Tithe Commission
was reorganized in 1851, Jones at first believed that he would be
allowed to return to his studies and lectures, but the House of
Lords, at the instigation of the clerical faction, reappointed him to
serve as Secretary of the Capitular Commission and later as Charity
Commissioner for England and Wales. So it remained until his death in
1855: Jones' duties in defense of the prerogatives of the Church
22
8continually overwhelmed his own interest in economic research.
Despite the weight of his extra-academic obligations, however,
Jones' merits as a scholar and as a teacher did not go unnoticed. He
is said to have been acclaimed by both students and colleagues for his
vast knowledge of nations and institutions, both of Europe and the Far
East, and for a gentle and persuasive classroom manner. He was a
founder of the London Statistical Society (later renamed the Royal
g
Statistical Society) and was the author of several books and articles
on the theory and application of political economy.
In 1831 Jones published An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth
and on the Sources of Taxation, Part I: Rent which was intended as
the first part of a three part work on rent, wages and profits. Al¬
though the completed work never saw the light of day, several articles
and pamphlets, which may have been intended as fragments of future
volumes, followed over the next twenty years. These included A Short
Tract on Political Economy, Primitive Political Economy,^ and, in
1852, the book-length collection, Textbook of Lectures on the Political
Economy of Nations. Despite J. S. Mill's references to Jones' work in
his Principies, remarks which Whewell would rightly characterize as
"very disparaging praise," and despite Mill's own eventual adoption of
11Jones system for the classification of peasant land rents, Jones'
works received little favorable notice outside of his circles at
Cambridge and Haileyburg. At his death, in 1855, Jones was a recog¬
nized force in clerical politics, but a virtual unknown in his chosen
field of political economy.
The situation of Jones' academic reputation improved somewhat in
23
1859 when there appeared a posthumous collection of his previously
published works and unpublished papers, edited and with a "Prefatory
Note" by William Whewell. It was Whewell's "Note," of over thirty
pages, which gave a definite form and coherent unity to Jones' frag-
12
mentary and often rambling presentations. And it was probably due
to the guidance and influence of this Note that Jones' writings
slowly gained a modicum of fame among the members of the economics
profession.
In the following pages I have not consistently distinguished the
clarifications to be found in Whewell's Note from Jones' own contribu¬
tions to meta-economics. This procedure seemed justified on the basis
of Jones' long and intimate friendship with Whewell, and Whewell's
1 3
enthusiastic endorsement of his economic methodology. It should be
mentioned, however, that Jones and Whewell were not always in complete
14
agreement. Because of this and because of Whewell's own role in the
development of British Historicism, a brief appendix (Appendix D) has
been added which deals with his economic and philosophic views.
Jones and the Historians
The reputation of Richard Jones as an original and important
thinker has fluctuated wildly both over time and between authors.
J. K. Ingram found Jones' works to be "akin to the labors of Cliffe-
Leslie," the highest praise that he could bestow on a pre-Comtian
author; and Marshall, writing in 1897, stated that Jones' influence
"largely dominated the minds of those Englishmen who came to a serious
study of economics after his work had been published by Dr. Whewell in
24
15
1859." Marshall had also confessed, within an earlier writing, that
Jones "gave direction to a good deal of my subsequent thinking"; and
he had alternatively criticized Jones' meta-economics, from the stand¬
point of logical rigor, while praising it as an example of the best
16
procedures which could be followed in economic research.
In the entry on Jones in Pal grave's Dictionary the reader is
informed that "The role of Jones in political economy was like that
of Bacon in physical science: to preach the importance of experience,
and the danger of hasty generalization." And Jones, we are told,
undoubtedly "...deserves to be regarded as the founder of the English
Historical School Yet, less than eleven years later, Marian
Bowley, in her Nassau Senior and Classical Economics, would label
Jones as "an isolated representative of the historical methods in the
'thirties'," and Schumpeter would add, in 1954, that Jones was
"... no more than a forerunner ..." of British His toricism, that he
19could not be considered as a "... root-and-branch objector ..."
to the traditional methods of the Classicals.
Most recent historians of economic thought have apparently con¬
curred in Bowley's and Schumpeter's opinions. Jones has generally
been omitted from textbook treatments of the period or classed with
20a heterogeneous group of "early objectors to Ricardo." There have
been, however, several exceptions to that rule, and over the years a
small but informative literature has grown up in appreciation and
appraisal of Jones' views.
Eric Roll in his History of Economic Thought (1938) and Henri
Grossman in his JPE article, "The Evolutionist Revolt Against Classi-
25
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cal Economics," both devoted substantial space to a treatment of
Jones. Unfortunately, both of these authors patterned their analyses
of Jones upon Marx's earlier critiques of his writings in the Theories
of Surplus Val ue (a work unavailable in English at the time of their
publications). Neither had apparently expended the time necessary
to reconsider original sources. Consequently, both Roll's and Gross¬
man's treatment of Jones suffered from the same defect: as Marx had
criticized all previous thinkers for incompletely comprehending his
own system for analyzing the process of social evolution, so Roll and
Grossman saw all thinkers as forerunners of Marx.
In Grossman's paper, for instance, Jones became an advocate of
evolutionary economics, whose primary interest and efforts were
directed toward the construction of a model explaining "the sequence
through which every nation must pass, though at different tempos"
23
(emphasis in original). His property rights theory was, in Grossman's
interpretation, a demonstration that "... different property relations
correspond to different stages in the development of productive
24
power," and his inductive methods were traceable to Sir James
25
Steuart (who Jones, in fact, never mentioned), rather than to Sir
Francis Bacon, whom he idolized.
Roll's discussion of Jones' writings is much more restrictive
than Grossman's. Although it touches on many of the same points it
is more oriented toward the technical details of Jones' rent theory,
rather than toward his methodology, strictly speaking. Roll's assess¬
ment is, therefore, of less interest for the purposes of this disserta¬
tion than other, more philosophical, critiques. While Roll did
26
realize that "Jones urged economists to pay greater attention to the
historical differences between economic institutions ... (and) ...
26
also stresses the relativity of economic laws," his subsequent
discussion of these doctrines indicates that the emphasis in this
sentence is meant to fall upon the word "historical," i.e., evolu¬
tionary, rather than upon the phrase "differences between economic
institutions." The remainder of Roll's evaluation is little more
than an attempt to (unjustly) interpret Jones as a proponent of
Marxian theories of class conflict and capitalistic accumulation.
After years of complete obscurity, interest was again aroused in
Jones' writings by the centenary anniversary of the Royal Statistical
Society (which he had helped to found). In celebrations of the Cen¬
tenary a paper by L. G. Johnson, concerning Jones' achievements, was
circulated to select members of the Society. In his still unpub¬
lished contribution to the literature on Jones, Johnson suggested
that his (Jones') proper claim to "economic fame" was that "he was a
27founder of the English Historical School." This suggestion was
adopted and built upon by R. Glendy in a note appearing in the 1956
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. In addition to offering
valuable and insightful observations on Jones' academic career and
the character of his economic research, Glendy wrote that he "...
was not simply a 'forerunner' (of the British Historical School)--as
has been so frequently alleged—but (was) one of the progenitors of
the inductive approach to economic problems in the Nineteenth
Century." L The issue of induction vs. deduction, which had confused
many previous historians, was further clarified in Glendy's note. He
27
rightly interpreted the "deductive" position as one of a prioristic
certainty and the "inductive" position as one implying a due regard
for "the facts." As he stated the matter: "Jones and his supporters
in the inductive school found themselves opposed by those--the great
majority in those days--who believed with Whateley, Drummond, pro¬
fessor of political economy at Oxford, that the 'principles of action
are known by consciousness and do not require detailed observa-
.. ,„29tion.
While Glendy's note may rightly be faulted for its excessive
brevity it has added more to our understanding of Jones than have
longer appeals to pseudo-sophistication and professional snobbery, of
which one prime example is William L. Miller's "Richard Jones: A Case
30
Study In Methodology." The central theme of Miller's discussion is
a defense of his own, oddly interpreted, version of Ricardian rent
31
theory against what purports to be an accurate summary of Jones'
theory of peasant rents. Miller, of course, ignores Jones' major
claims concerning the opposing paradigm: that there either was no
empirical theory in Ricardo's writings (only an a prioristic theory
describing situations which were inapplicable to the existing world),
or that Ricardo's speculations were, at best, a special case of his
own, more comprehensive, view of rental returns as a function of the
institutional framework. Yet he (Miller) obviously believes that he
has decisively refuted Jones' "inductivism" by invoking a vulgar form
32of Friedman's methodology of the "as if."
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An Aside on the Vulgar Interpretation of Friedman's Methodology
Although Firedman's paper concerning "The Methodology of Positive
Economics" is dealt with more fully in Chapter 9 of this dissertation,
a few summary considerations may be of aid in assessing Miller's
arguments. If, as Miller says, "there can only be one use of 'induc-
33
tion', in scientific analysis, that of testing hypotheses" then
existing facts about the world would have nothing to do with the con¬
tent of scientific hypotheses. That is, in Miller's view, the theo¬
ries of economics need assert nothing about conditions prevailing in
the world, nor can they ever refer to any observable conditions. If
this is the case, however, how is it that economic theories can have
"testable consequences"? The alternative to Miller's methodological
rationalism is obvious. If scientific theories do_ refer to the exist¬
ing world then they must specify accurately (if incompletely) the
particular situations (or types of situations) to which they do or do
not apply. That is, they must be based on "inductions," in Jones'
sense of the term, for it is only through "inductions" that we can
decide whether the conditions for the application of a theory are or
are not present. The simple-minded rejection of "induction" by ama¬
teur economic methodologists thus leads to either an accompanying
rejection of that which they also wished to retain, i.e., the testable
consequences of their theories, or to the very position which they
are attempting to refute.
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Other Sources Dealing With Jones' Methodology
By far the best appraisal of Jones' work is to be found in an
article, yet unpublished: "Richard Jones, William Whewell and
Induction In Political Economy" by Professor Salim Rashid of Dart-
34
mouth College. Professor Rashid does an admirable job of presenting
35
his readers with a compact picture of the "intellectual milieu" in
which Jones lived and wrote, and in illustrating Jones' empirical
spirit and imaptience with the speculative approach of abstract
Ricardianism. Rashid's familiarity with the journals and opinions of
36
Jones' day is unmatched for its breadth and thoroughness. Yet it
must be admitted that the degree of philosphic sophistication dis-
37
played in his paper leaves something to be desired. Rashid's arti¬
cle has been frequently referred to in the following discussion for
its perceptive analysis of the Jones-Whewell attack on the "abstract¬
ness" or "universality" of Classical theory, their obejctions to the
Classical s' methods for constructing and using economic terms, and
their critique of the "doctrine of tendencies." Yet Rashid's exam¬
ination of more central concerns in Jones' writings, regarding the
uses of deduction and hypothesis, are not so original as he apparently
believed. Many of these same points were previously raised and exam-
38
ined in a 1973 paper by Mardis and Sturges.
There are other more serious defects with Rashid's paper than
occasional lapses into redundancy, however. He, for instance, over¬
steps the available evidence in claiming that "Jones certainly did
not espouse the naive belief that facts could arrange themselves in
39
theoretical patterns if only one collected enough of them," Jones,
30
unfortunately, did believe in exactly that doctrine, and his differ¬
ences with Whewell, which Rashid himself acknowledged, were over that
40
very issue. Rashid must also be taken to task for failing to dis¬
tinguish between the generic and spatial-temporal universality of
theories,^ and for failing to recognize that Jones was an early pre¬
cursor of the theory of anthropological types as well as a "social
42
economist." Overall, however, it is difficult to rate Rashid's
contributions to the literature concerning Jones as anything less
than a brill ant study. When complemented by the supplementary mater¬
ials to be found in these pages it probably is rightfully considered
as a definitive evaluation of Jones' economic works.
Plan and Purpose of this Chapter
One of the striking features of the British Historical movement
is the mixture of scientific and "metaphysical" suggestions which
were proffered by Historical economists for the improvement of their
subject. These heterodox rebels would often, justly and devastatingly,
critique Orthodox economists for their anti-empirical and self-justi¬
fying procedures, while, at the same time, advocating goals and pro¬
cedures as unattainable or unoperationable as anything conceived by
the "Orthodox School". Jones, as "the recognized founder" of Brit¬
ish Historical economics, was as much at fault in this regard as any
of his successors. Yet he also had much of worth to offer to the
field of meta-economics. In order to distinguish the good and the
ill in Jones' writings this chapter has been divided into three parts.
The first deals with topics regarding which Jones' and Whewell's
31
advice would have been well taken by the economists of their day,
the second with unclear or mistaken procedures or goals advanced by
Jones and the third with an overall evaluation of his work. The pur¬
pose of this chapter is, thus, to identify many of those questions in
which Historical economists would have a persistent interest in the
form in which they first arose, to categorize these various concerns
as fruitful or unfruitful, and, finally, to remedy the defects and
omissions in the past accounts of Jones' methodological views.
The Contributions of Richard Jones
Jones' emphasis upon the description aid investigation of economic
institutions and social relations which actually existed in various
parts of the world acted as a healthy antidote to the purely a^
43pnoristic speculations of most Orthodox economists. It was this
emphasis which led him to criticize numerous points in the Classical
system (some still present in an altered form in Neoclassical views)
and to offer positive suggestions for the improvement of economic
methods.
Jones specifically attacked Orthodox economists for playing ideo¬
logical word games, in which economic terms were used in a technical
and highly restrictive sense during the construction of a theoretical
system, only to be used in a quite different sense when policy claims
44
v/ere advanced on the basis of the theory. Jones believed that the
terms used in economic discussions should be flexible enough to
accomodate (or refer to) new or different situations which might be
45encountered in the course of empirical research. Yet he remained
32
adamant in his opposition to the use of terms which could not be tied,
directly or indirectly, to observable phenomena. Thus the term
"rent" was better restricted to actual payments made by tenants to
their landlords, rather than referring to some component of this pay¬
ment (i.e., Ricardian fertility rent) which could never be empirically
46
distinguished from the rest.
There is, however, one rather murky aspect of Jones' discussion
concerning the "proper" use of economic terms and their "proper"
definition. That is, he clearly believed that there was no connota-
tive sense which could properly be given to any economic term prior to
an empirical study of the subject area (or problem) to which it was
intended to apply. As he himself stated this position: "...where
syllogistic reasoning is out of the question, and we are traveling
towards and not from general conclusions, words are to be used to
indicate, not to limit our subject, and, of course, are not meant to
be used as the foundation of the general propositions we are search-
47
mg for ..." This was, almost certainly an expression of Jones'
"inductive view" in the mistaken, Baconian, sense of that term. It
indicates a view even more extreme than that adopted by German His-
toricism, that it is a mistake to have any prior conceptions, or
hypotheses, concerning the subject of one's investigations (i.e., it
indicates a rather absolute belief in the neutrality of the scien¬
tific observer vis-a-vis "the facts", and a total disregard for the
necessity of formulating the problem of an inquiry in a clear and
answerable fashion).
To be more generous to Jones, his suggestion might be alter-
33
natively interpreted as an assertion that some definitions will even¬
tually prove more fruitful than others in organizing the concepts
which we are using to describe and predict social phenomena. That
interpretation is, however, incomplete, or too fully generous, when
viewed against the backdrop of Jones' philosophic underpinnings and
49
methodological writings.
The Restrictiveness of the Classicals' Postulates
Tying in closely with Jones' discussion of the a prioris tic
character of Classical terminology was his criticism of the Classicals1
overly-restrictive theoretical "postulates." In extreme moments Jones
had declared that the Ricardian system was useless for any explanation
of, or predictions about, the world, for it assumed a fairy-land of
perfectly mobile capital, homogeneous labor and unfettered free mar-
50
kets. In more generous moods, however, Jones was forced to concede
that the Orthodox system of political economy was, at least, somewhat
applicable to "the peculiar form and structure of society existing in
51Great Britain." This latter suggestion foreshadowed, of course, the
precise pattern of attack upon the Classicals' postulates, and the
same admission of a singular exception, which Walter Bagehot would
popularize in his Fortnightly Review article of 1876. While we have
no evidence to tie Bagehot's speculations to the influence of Jones,
and, in fact, no evidence to suggest that Bagehot was even aware of
Jones' writings, the similarities between the meta-economic views of
52these two authors are sometimes striking.
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Further Errors of the Orthodox School and Suggested Alternatives
In his "Prefatory Note" to the Literary Remains of Richard Jones
William Whewell extended Jones' criticisms of Orthodox economics to
53
the frequently abused notions of an economic "tendency." He noted
the obscure and ambiguous ways in which the Classicals had used this
term in their apologias in defense of Orthodox methods, and he also
suggested conditions under which the term could be properly applied.
As Whewell noted: to state that there is a tendency for some type of
event to occur, without qualification, is to commit the absolutist
error of leaving unspecified those initial conditions on which any
hypothetical prediction must necessarily rest. The assertion of a
single tendency may also ignore other possible forces which could
diminish or "swamp" the impact of the first. In examining the Ricard¬
ian theory of differential rents Whewell commented as follows:
The doctrine of a universal tendency in the social
world to reduce rents to the form of the Ricardian
definition, we may perhaps be allowed to illustrate
by saying that it is, as if a mathematical speculator
concerning the physical world should teach, as an
important proposition, that all things tend to assume
a form determined by the force of gravity ... To which
the reply would be, that these tendencies are counter¬
acted by opposite tendencies of the same order, and
thus have only a small share in shaping the earth's
surface ... and the doctrine that the earth's surface
tends to a level, is of small value and limited use
in physical geography, (emphasis in original)54
Jones and Whewell did not merely criticize the narrowness of a
Classical theory confined to those highly restrictive cases where the
Classical's postulates were approximately true, however. They also
suggested procedures for building a more general economics. Since it
seemed obvious that differences in the degree of combination of "moral
or physical temperament ... climate, soil, religion, education and
government" could have a bearing on the construction of empirically
justifiable economic theories and on the accuracy of the predictions
55
yielded by these theories, Jones recommended extensive observation
of the particular class of phenomena to which any given theory was
intended to apply. Although he expected little regularity in the
behavior displayed by singular individuals, even when these individual
lived "under similar conditions," he did believe that the behavior of
"bodies of men" was predictable so long as the various groups being
56
compared had "similar backgrounds" and were in "similar situations."
For Jones, then, a universal economics, or the set of different
economic theories describing different types of societies, could only
rest upon an economic anthropology (or a study of "economic types").
This economic anthropology would, in turn, be responsible for provid¬
ing a schema of the major categories of social-economic systems the
institutions commonly associated with each of these categories and
the relevant behavioral constraints imposed by each of the respective
sets of institutions. At one point in his investigations Jones
considered the possibility that the racial traits (or "national
traits," in the old sense of that term) of populations were as impor¬
tant in determining their economic behavior as the institutional and
customary constraints which were dominant in these various societies.
To this doctrine which is surely historicist in the sense in which
Popper uses that term, he responded that: "I will not venture to say
that there is nothing in this, though I believe there is very
36
Jones' own theoretical approach to the problems of economic
methodology was quite different than that of either the a priori Stic
economists or those who professed a belief in an historical fatalism.
Instead of dealing with one type of wage payment or one type of rent
he distinguished three categories in wage payments to laborers and
58
four categories in payments for the use of land. His theory of
national development was constructed around the particular institu¬
tional structure which corresponded to the different paradigms of
social organization and the different ways in which income was dis¬
tributed in each. He always sought to uniquely determine the expected
rate and direction of national growth and development as a function of
this multi-dimensional system for the analysis of social institu-
59
tions.
Although Jones was vitally interested in the'distribution of
wealth between the different functional classes in society his approach
to economics remained in the aggregative-developmental tradition of
Ricardo and Smith. Authors such as T.E.C. Leslie would later consider
the question of how changes in the economic environment affected the
acting individual, and how peculiarities in the institutional struc¬
ture of individual countries affected the details of the composition
and structure of enterprises within those countries. But Jones
consistently dealt with "the mass" and the process of national growth
and national development.
37
"Facts" and the Construction of Economic Theories
The program which Jones had outlined for the economic community—
that of examining all "important" aspects of an economy before formu¬
lating theories about it--was certain to require a massive expenditure
of time and effort, even in those few instances where information was
readily accessible. Yet Jones consistently insisted that there was
no other alternative open to the future advancement of economic
research.
The attempt of past economists to discover "The principles which
determine the position and progress and govern the conduct of large
bodies of the human race, placed under different circumstances ...
(from a) ... mere effort of consciousness, by consulting, [their] own
views, feelings and motives, and the narrow sphere of his observations
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and reasoning a priori ..." would be absurd. No truly "general
principles" could possibly be constructed except from a "comprehensive
view of facts." And any attempt to short-cut that procedure would
result in "general principles which will be found to have no gener¬
ality" and which would then have to be supported through numerous ad
61hoc hypotheses.
The False Paths Within Jones' Meta-Economic Views
Introduction
While Jones and Whewell were responsible for contributing many
valuable insights to the budding tradition of British Historicism,
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they must also share at least a portion of the responsibility, along
with the Gonitists, the Social Darwinists and sundry melioristic reform¬
ers, for the more unproductive turns taken by the movement. A con¬
sideration of those aspects of their writings which were adopted by
many authors in the Historical tradition, but which led, ultimately,
to wasted effort and discarded pathways, is therefore in order.
The most popular and prevalent of the several errors propagated
by Jones and Whewell was the notion that economic investigations
should properly adopt the Baconian version of empiricism, with its
accompanying stress upon "induction." Jones' investigations into
scientific matters were clearly inspired by his early contact with
Bacon's Novum Organon, and he continued to pay an almost religious
devotion to the Baconian view of scientific method throughout the
remainder of his life. As Whewell commented in his Prefatory Note to
Jones' Literary Remains:
Having noticed the inductive nature of Mr. Jones'
social and political philosophy as its special
and distinctive character, perhaps I may be allowed
to say that the disposition to take such a course
in his speculations belonged to him from an early
period. It existed at the time of his Cambridge
undergraduateship, and was nourished by the sym¬
pathy of some of the companions of his college
days. The Novum Organon was one of their favor¬
ite subjects of discussion.62
Whewell, who was, himself, a companion of Jones' college days, and
a participant in the frequent discussions held concerning "the father
of induction," would later write that the method of Bacon, "that
general process of induction," was the means "by which the most sub¬
stantial truths which man possesses (except only mathematical truths)
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have been obtained." Yet Jones would come to view certain passages
in Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences as dogmatically
unsound, and their relations over many methodological issues outside of
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economics were, for a time, somewhat strained.
The division which momentarily threatened to tear asunder the
budding inductivist movement in British economics was not, however,
especially surprising. The issues involved in an "inductivist" posi¬
tion are difficult, even when the term "induction" is clearly limited
to one well-defined meaning. They become substantially more numerous
and more nearly insoluble when that term is used indiscriminately in
several different senses; and that, unfortunately, was Jones' standard
practice.
Perhaps the primary way in which Jones and his Cambridge fellows
used the term "induction" was simply to indicate their desire for an
increased accumulation of basic facts (i.e., a set of accepted obser¬
vation statements which could be used in the formulation and testing
of scientific hypotheses). While there is much merit to this enter¬
prise, if it is meant to supplement and correct the construction of
a body of scientific theories, it can, and has, been carried to
extremes. The idea that conjectures about the connections between
observed phenomena should wait until "the facts" are "complete" is
one example of the absurdities to which an improperly interpreted
inductivist program can lead the unwary, and it is an example which
has a substantial degree of application to the meta-economics of
Richard Jones. Although rightly anxious that "we determine to know
as much as we can of the world as it has been, and of the world as it
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65is, before we lay down general laws," Jones seems to have determined
that the acquisition of this requisite amount of knowledge would
require many decades, if not many generations:
the history of other branches of knowledge teaches
... both the necessity and the rewards of patience
and continuous labor, when great and wide truths
are to be approached. In astronomy, the most per¬
fect of the sciences, predictions ... are assisted
by observations which are the results of the succes¬
sive labor of many generations ... A philosophical
union of humility and hopefulness will lead men to
mistrust the importance ... of the results of their
individual observations, and to rely ... for the
discovery of general laws on the gradually increas¬
ing power of the united efforts of our race, ex¬
tended through large intervals of time and
space.
The actual situation, in fact, may be far different than the pic¬
ture of scientific development which Jones painted. At least some
philosophers of science today believe that the most fruitful specula¬
tions in many areas of the physical sciences have been those least
connected with "established facts" or established paradigms of those
various fields. As Popper has suggested, bold and daring speculations
have the greatest potential for fostering new and fecund areas of
scientific research precisely because they seem to be so readily
susceptible to falsification. This is not to say that ordered research
is not the predominant form of scientific activity, nor would one want
to assert that it is not a very useful form of scientific inquiry.
The significant advances in the "pure theory" of a science are, how¬
ever, almost always the result of investigations which are directed
along new and previously unimagined pathways.
In any case, Jones' successor, Walter Bagehot, decisively laid
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to rest attempts to construct a full or complete history of economic
events, noting that (1) the data on every past economic event was
simply not available and (2) the data on all future economic events
would be as difficult to compile as "a complete history of human
6 7
conversation." While it is at least questionable that Jones himself
had ever believed otherwise, the impression that he endorsed an all-
encompassing economic history continued to haunt many of the later
accounts of his writings, and would eventually become an infectious
source of methodological error in the period of the later British
Historical School.
We have not quite exhausted the controversy over "induction",
however, for "the inductive view" seems to have been sometimes
interpreted by Jones as a belief that the uniquely correct hypothesis
for describing and explaining the causal links which governed a
given class of phenomena is derivable from an examination of "facts"
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about the phenomena. This contention is to some extent "fore¬
shadowed" by a belief in the importance of facts to the formulation
of correct hypotheses, but it is certainly not necessitated by that
belief.
It is a simple matter, however, to refute an "inductivist" posi¬
tion which claims to infer general (or universal) laws from a col¬
lection of particular facts. It is quite clear that no finite num¬
ber of particulars can imply a universal unless the universe of dis¬
course is itself finite. This is merely another way of stating
Popper's original and most fundamental assertion concerning scientific
hypotheses, i.e., that an hypothesis can conceivably be falsified, but
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can never be "confi rmed" or proven true.
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Social Evolution
The second major defect in Jones program for constructing a
"Political Economy of Nations" was his inclusion of a "dynamic" theory
of social evolution along with his static theory of property struc¬
tures. To a certain extent, this feature of Jones' views was ex¬
cusable, since Classical economics was itself a system for explaining
the causes of and impediments to national economic development. Thus
when Jones wrote of "social evolution" he frequently combined with it
a consideration of those factors leading to "economic progress" or
economic stagnation, factors which were primarily connected with
matters of income distribution:
In entering on the subject of the Distribution of
Wealth, we have opening before us some of the wid¬
est departments of political economy. It is the
distribution of its wealth which determines al¬
ways the social, and most often the political,
relations of human society; and until we have an¬
alyzed it, we cannot understand their internal
mechanism. This is obvious enough, if we regard
nations only at one point of time, and seek to
understand their actual condition. But the vital
and lasting importance of our knowledge of the
causes which determine that condition, becomes
fully apparent only when we contemplate human
societies as capable of progress and scrutinize
the laws which govern their advance, stagnation,
or decay.™
Jones' version of evolutionism was thus, in the main, cyclical
rather than linear. He viewed societies as institutional and cultural
structures capable of health or decay, and was only tangentially con-
71cerned with the conception of an ever developing Weitgeist.
43
One can also exempt Jones, in large part, from the methodological
error most frequently associated with evolutionary philosophies--the
claim that social events are historically unique. Although anxious
that the institutional framework of economic action be specified in
12
some detail, Jones was certain that there were economic and social
regularities common to all people living under similar circumstances.
It is unfortunate that the cyclic character of Jones1 evolutionism
and his rejection of historicism, in Popper's sense, were not more
clearly discerned by the later British His tori cists and by Alfred
Marshall. Had Marshall and the later Historicists fully comprehended
the limited character of Jones' science of social development, they
might have been somewhat dissuaded from their own wholehearted en¬
dorsement of Continental evolutionary philosophies (e.g., Comtian and
Hegelian social philosophies).
Unified Social Science
A final, and much less serious, error in Jones' methodological
writings was his insistence upon the unified nature of social inquiry.
From Jones' perspective it was simply inappropriate to engage in any¬
thing like an analysis of social phenomena, which isolated out cer¬
tain of the factors influencing the decisions of groups or individ¬
uals, while impounding all other factors in ceteris paribus. He him¬
self expressed this point in a lengthy passage contained in his Text¬
book of Lectures on the Political Economy of Nations:
It has been said with superfluous modesty ..., that
... changes in social organization, and the subjects
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they lead us in sight of, are not the proper objects
of economical science, which is wealth and wealth
alone.
Economical science can never, however, be successfully
pursued, if such subjects be wholly eschewed by its
promoters. There is a close connection between the
economical and social organization of nations and
their powers of production ...
If we were even erroneously to admit, out of complai¬
sance to some of those who have adopted a narrowed
view of the province of political economy, that all
which bears directly on the social structure, morals,
and happiness of nations lies beyond that province,
still we should not be turned for a moment from our
own selected course of investigation. Beyond polit¬
ical economy, strictly so called, but still closely
and indissolubly connected with the truths it taught,
would then lie those applications of it by which
alone it could be made to assist in unfolding the
shifting political and social influences which accom¬
pany the march of nations from rudeness and feeble¬
ness to power and civilization. This application of
the science would ever be, to the best order of minds,
that which makes its results valuable, and the labor
of approaching them tolerable. 3
The error of insisting upon a social science which is indissolv-
ably unified is thus found to rest upon two principles, one sound and
one faulty. This doctrine was, on the one hand, merely a reflection
of Jones' desire for a testable, or "applied" social science, while,
on the other hand, it was an extension of his excessive attachment
to the Baconian "know-everything" view of science and his inability
to conceive of a science which was "hypothetical" in the sense of
Marshall's partial equilibrium analysis.
Jones Historical Impact: An Assessment
While Jones may have served as a reasonable antidote to the
overly rationalistic outlook of the later Ricardians, his errors--
45
derived primarily from his early interest in Bacon--would too fre¬
quently influence the path taken by later British Historical writers.
While his interest in inter-cultural applications and tests of eco¬
nomic theories undoubtedly inspired the excellent empirical studies
of Leslie and the methodological polemics of Bagehot, his comments
on induction, social evolution and the unified nature of social
investigations would often be misinterpreted and misused as a jus¬
tification for points of view which he never imagined.
In the grand synthesis of economics carried out by Marshall the
less desirable elements of Jones' outlook were resurrected and again
injected into the mainstream of economic thought. Unfortunately, the
positive elements of his writings, represented by his exhortations to
an increased emphasis upon the study of property structures, were
submerged for an indefinite period to come. What was worthwhile in
Jones' writings was thus either overlooked or discarded while that
which was questionable or vague was elevated in importance.
46
Footnotes to Chapter II
1. William Whewell (ed.), The Literary Remains of the Late
Rev. Richard Jones, Consisting of Lectures and Tracts on Political
Economy (1859) (New York: Augustus Kelley, Publisher, 1964), p. xx
(Hereafter cited as Literary Remains).
2. Ibid., pp. xix-xx.
3. For an account of the membership of the Cambridge Study
Group see N. B. De Marchi and R. P. Sturges, "Malthus and Ricardo's
Inductivist Critics: Four Letters to William Whewell," Economica,
N. S., Vol. 40, 1973, p. 380, and Literary Remains, op. cit.,
pp. xx-xxi.
4. Literary Remains, op. cit., p. xxii.
5. Ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi.
6. Ibid., pp. xxxvii.
7. For a summary of Jones' work on the Tithes Commission see
Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. xxix-xxxiv, and for Whewell1s
appraisal of the detrimental influence exercised by Jones' non-
academic duties on his scholarly research see Ibid., p. xxxix.
8. Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
9. For an account of Jones' activities in the formation of the
London Statistical Scoiety, and his hopes that one day social science
might become more statistical see R. Glenday's "Richard Jones: A
Reappraisal," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A,
Vol. 18 (1953), pp. 192-193, and De Marchi and Sturges, ojd. cit.,
p. 571 .
10. The dates of these intermediate works are c. 1844 (unpub¬
lished until 1859) and 1847, respectively.
11. Whewell, with some justice, referred to Mill's comments
concerning Jones as "very disparaging praise," noting that "whether
he means it so or not, (this) is the way in which people speak of
books, when they want to deny their originality and philosophical
value." (Contained in a letter from Whewell to Jones dated April 30,
1848, and reprinted in Issac Todhunter (ed.), Wi11iam Whewel1: An
Account of His Writings with Selections from His Literary and
Scientific Correspondence, Volume il 0-ondon: Macmillan, 1876),
p. 345. Page 353 of the same volume contains further remarks from
Whewell to Jones regarding Mill's ingratitude in not acknowledging
Jones as the source of his system for the classification of peasant
rents.
12. The lack of "literary symmetry" and the "confused arrange¬
ment" of Jones' writings was even noted by his usually uncritical
friend, William Whewell, in his "Prefatory Note" to the Literary
Remains, op. ci t., p. xxxix.
13. For one example of Whewell's enthusiastic response to Jones'
meta-economic views see the passage quoted in Professor Salim Rashid1
unpublished paper, "Richard Jones, William Whewell and Induction In
Political Economy" (Dartmouth College),1975, p. 22.
14. For some details of, and rather extensive references to, the
Jones-Whewel1 disagreements over the proper sense of "induction" see
De Marchi and Sturges, op. cit., p. 381 fn.
15. J. K. Ingram, A History of Political Economy (New York:
Augustus Kelley, 1967) p. 141. Mars ha 111s rema rk is quoted in T. S.
Hutchison's /\ Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 19537Tp* 66.
16. A. C. Pigou (edj, Memo rials of A1 fred Marshal 1 (New York:
Augustus Kelley, 1956),p. 296.
17. HenryHiggs (ed.),Pal grave1s Dictionary of Political Eco-
onomy, Vol II (London: Macmillan, 1926),p. 490.
18. Quoted in Eric Roll A History of Economic Thought, Third
Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,1964) ,
p. 311.
19. Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1954). See p. 539 for Schumpeter's evalua¬
tion of Jones as "not a root-and-branch objector" and pp. 544 and
822 for his evaluation of him as no more than a forefunner of
British Historicism.
20. See, for instance, John Fred Bell's A History of Economic
Thought, Second Edition (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1967),
pp. 345-346. Exceptions to the widespread misinterpretation of Jones
writings are L. H. Haney's History of Economic Thought, Fourth
Edition (New York: Macmillan, 194977pp. 525-527, and William A.
Scott's The Development of Economics (New York: D. Appleton-Century,
1933),pp. 133-137. Scott^s treatment is especially wel1-constructed,
but is more concerned with the technical details of Jones' critique
of Ricardian rent theory, than with his meta-economic doctrines.
21. See Roll, 0£. cit. The complete citation to Grossman's
article is: Henri Grossman, "The Evolutionist Revolt Against Classi¬
cal Economics," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 51 (1943), Pt. 1,
PP. 381 -396; Pt. 2, pp.
48
22. Marx's Theories of Surplus Value is now available in a
complete, three volume, English translation. For his comments on
Richard Jones see Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Volume III
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971),pp. 399-452.
23. Grossman, 0£. cit., p. 511.
24. Ibid., p. 512.
25. Grossman, 0£. cit., p. 387.
26. Roll, ojD. cit., p. 311.
27. Glenday, ap_. cit., p. 192. Rashid, ojd. cit., Note 2,
criticizes Johnson for the "well-meaning effort ... to remove Jones
from the list of forerunners of Historical Economics or Institutional¬
ism and make him one of the founders of a Statistical Society ..."
But it is apparent that Johnson's intent was to re-emphasize Jones'
role as a founder of the British Historical School, rather than a
mere forerunner. It is also apparent that Historical Economics and
Institutional economics have little in conrnon, at least if one is
referring to the Historical Economics of Jones, Whewell, Bagehot,
Symes, and Leslie, and finally, it should be noted that Jones' role
in the formation of the London Statistical Society was very much in
line with his beliefs in an Historical Economics.
28. Glenday, £p_. cit. , p. 192.
29. Ibid.
30. William L. Miller, "Richard Jones: A Case Study in Method¬
ology," History of Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1971),
pp. 198-707.” "
31. For Miller's interpretation of Ricardo see Ibid., pp. 204-
206.
32. Miller, o£. cit., p. 201. As representative of "modern
views" concerning induction Miller cites a 1958 volume by Hansen and
Pierces and a collection of journal articles, mostly from the Nine¬
teen 'Twenties.
33. Mi Her, o£. ci t., p. 206.
34. Rashid, ojd. cit., Note 13.
35. Rashid, o£. cit., pp. 13-1
36. Ibid., pp. 18-22.
49
37. It is notable that Rashid never directly examined the ques¬
tion of what is meant by "induction" in Jones' writings, although he
did do an admirable job of fending off undeserved criticisms of Jones'
methodological views (e.g., his comments on "abstraction" on p. 9 of
his article). He also, however, committed occasional errors, as, for
instance, his misinterpretation of Whewell's comment to Jones (p. 4
of his paper) which he mistakenly assumes was by Jones and favored
the construction of hypotheses, when, in fact, it was by_Whewell, and
was intended as reprimand to Jones for his excessive "look-and-see"
attitude.
38. N. B. Marchi and R. P. Sturges, op. cit., pp. 379-393, see
especially p. 380 for their comments on the issue of the role of
hypotheses in scientific investigations. Marchi and Sturges' paper
is by far the best research and best constructed of the papers deal¬
ing with Jones, Whewell and their contemporaries. Unfortunately, it
was written with one specific purpose in mind, to focus upon Mai thus'
correspondence with Whewell. The other issues it considers are
handled as tangential to this purpose.
39. Rashid, op_. cit., p. 3.
40. See Rashid, og_. cit., p. 13 for mention of the feud,
Todhunter, o£. cit., p. 61 for an exchange between Jones and Whewell
concerning it, and De Marchi and Sturges, op. cit., pp. 389-391 for
further references and commentary upon it.
41. Rashid, 0£. cit., pp. 8-9.
42. Rashid, oja. cit., p. 1.
43. For an examination of the methodology of the "Orthodox
School" see the appendix " On Mill's Methodology" to the Introduc¬
tory Chapter of this dissertation and Chapter 3, on J. E. Cairnes.
44. In illustration of this point Whewell notes, in his
"Prefatory Note" to Jones' Literary Remains,that although Ricardo
had redefined rent so as to refer to something quite different than
the ordinary use of that term,"It is certain that he did not ...
really confine his assertions concerning rent" to that (technical)
sense of the term. Literary Remains, oja. cit., pp. xii-xiii. This
same issue is examined at greater length in Rashid, oja_. cit., p. 7.
45. Literary Remains, op. cit. , pp. 598-599.
As Whewell clearly notes, in this regard:
...the object of Mr. Jones was to give an account
of the laws by which rent, “in the ordinary sense
of the word," is regulated. He tried to ascertain
46.
the progress and consequences of "what is
commonly called rent." And the reader might
be left to decide for himself which subject
of inquiry may be the better worth his no¬
tice,—the rents that are actually paid in
every country, or the Ricardian rents, which
are not those actually paid in any country.
(Emphasis in original)
Literary Remains, pp. xii-xiii.
Jones himself stated in clarifying this same point that:
Suppose, for instance, rent were defined to be
the payment made to the 1andlord for the ori¬
ginal powers of the soil: the fact is, that
when outlay is so mixed up with the land that
it cannot be again moved, the return to that
capital is influenced by the laws which govern
rent and not those which govern profits; and
to separate the payment made for such a spot
of land into rent and profits is only perplex¬
ing the subject by a definition, not making it
more easy.
Literary Remains, op. cit., p. 599.
There is, incidentally, no direct evidence that Jones
consistently favored the adoption of the common usage of a term asits technical meaning within economics, despite Whewell's implicitassertion to the contrary. He always demanded, however, that if aterm was used in two distinct senses that these senses must be keptclearly separate. Jones was so adamant in this stance that he evenspoke disrespectfully of the writings of his deceased friend, T. R.Mai thus, for committing this very error (Literary Remains, op. cit.,p. 95.) (Maithus, incidentally, had foreseen this turn of eventsand wrote to Whewell, shortly before his death, that he believedthat Jones was going too far in his empirical attitudes. See DeMarchi and Sturges, 0£. cit., pp. 388 and 390.)
47. Literary Remains, p. 600.
48. Jones' views of "proper definition" were never perfectlyclear-cut, but we can locate some key passages from his literaryfragments:
I have been reproached with giving no regulardefinition of rent. The omission was not
accidental. To begin, or indeed to end, an
inquiry into the nature of any subject, a
circumstance existing before us, by a def¬
inition, is to shew how little we know how
to set about our task--how little of the
51
inductive spirit is within us ...
... when we wish to establish general facts or
principles relating to things as they actually
exist, if we begin by a definition, it is to
suppose our task finished before it is begun;
and as man's art can rarely exhaust the subtlety
or guess at the extent of nature, therefore to
end with a definition is seldom a much wiser
attempt than to begin with one ...
Men have too often on this, as on many other
subjects, instead of using definitions to
assist their reasonings, treated them as the
foundation of their conclusions; and there
cannot be a greater mistake ...
It is obvious that, in inquiring into principles
and laws relating to things as they exist in the
world, words may be used to indicate the subject
of the research but not to supersede them.
Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. 598, 599,600.
49. I am referring, of course, to Jones' lifelong attachment
to the views of Sir Francis Bacon, and to the already mentioned feud
with Whewell over this very perspective.
50. Jones' own analysis was based on an examination of the
different categories of labor and capital which existed in various
countries and the different institutional structures developed for
the remuneration of these factors; see, for instance, Literary
Remains, op. cit., pp. 12-14, 48-66, and 185-225 for Jones' exam¬
ination of some of the possible categories.
51. In his "Prefatory Note" to Jones' Literary Remains, Whewell
expands on this qualification, noting that: 11..." there can be no
doubt in England, and in countries circumstanced like England, it
[the Ricardian theory of rents] is a very happy and striking general¬
ization of the conditions of the problem ..." (Literary Remains, op.
cit., p. xiv.) And Jones himself espands on this same theme by in¬
troducing his Lectures with the remark that: "The general principlesof Political Economy have hitherto been laid down by English writers
with an especial and exclusive view to the peculiar form and struc¬
ture of society existing in Great Britain ... I shall endeavor to
avoid this error." (Literary Remains, p. 1. The original passage
quoted in the text of this chapter is to be found on p. 338 of the
Literary Remains.)
52. Compare with the passages cited in the last Note, Walter
Bagehot's Economic Studies (Stanford: Academic Reprints, 1969),
p. 19.
52
53. Counter to the use of the term "tendency" as it was employed
by the defenders of Ricardo's theory of rents, Whewell replied that:
Those who ... cling to the Ricardian formulation
respecting rent, while they allow the wide ex¬
tent of the exceptions to its applicability
pointed out by Mr. Jones, say sometimes that
there is everywhere ... a tendency to conform
to the formulas though this tendency may be
overmastered by the peculiar circumstances of
the various countries ... Now to this the reply
is, that it is not the obstacles to the tendency
which are the exceptional case, but the tendency
itself. The tendency of rents to the formula
(the excess of good soils over the bad) results
entirely from the hypothesis of the accessibility
of land to the farmer, and the mobility of the
farmer's capital ... But this hypothesis ...
is very rarely verified.
Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. xiv-xv.
54. Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. xiv-xvi.
55. Literary Remains, op. cit., p. 189. The methodological doc¬
trine which recommends that all obvious features of a situation
should be included in any theory describing or explaining the situa¬
tion is called "verbal realism." There is no more sound foundation
for believing in verbal realism than there is for believing in a_priorism and intuitive certainty, although it was common among the
British Historicists to endorse this position. The issue is dis¬
cussed further in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.
56. Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. 178, 187-188.
57. Literary Remains, op. cit., p. 574. See also Remains,
p. 410.
58. For a detailed presentation of Jones' system for classifying
wage earners, see his "Lectures on Labor and Capital," Li teraryRemai ns, op. ci t., pp. 4-20 and his "Textbook of Lectures," 0£_. cit.,pp. 414-418. Rental payments on land and terms of land tenancy aredealt with in his "Short Tract on Political Economy," LiteraryRemains, op. cit., pp. 197-219.
59. As Whewell expressed Jones' opinions concerning nationaldevelopment:
... the original structure of nations, their
early history, customs, and habits determine
the tenure of land, and the relation of the
cultivator to the classes above him, (they
53
have a social impact) in a degree indefinitely
greater than the mobility of capital and the
consequent changes of tenure. Over a large
portion of the earth's surface, and during a
large portion of the history of every nation,
the former causes do almost everything, the
latter, almost nothing.
Literary Remains, op. cit., p. xvi.
60. Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. 188-189.
61. Ibid., pp. xxiv-ssv, 562.
62. Ibid., p. xix.
63. Ibid., p. xii.
64. Todhunter, op_. cit., pp. 115-116.
65. Literary Remains, op. cit., p. 570.
66. Ibid., p. 180.
67. Walter Bagehot, Economic Studies, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
68. Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. 472, 556, 559.
69. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York:
Harper and Row, 1967). See pp. 278-279 for Popper's critique of
Bacon's views.
70. Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
71. There is no real objection to a cyclical theory of social
development as long as (1) the forces leading to social growth and
social decay are clearly defined rather than being replaced by some
variety of a biological analogy to aging, (2) "social growth" and
"social decay" are, themselves, clearly defined, and (3) there is no
assertion of historical uniqueness, i.e., no assertion that mere
differences in temporal, spatial, racial or other singular differ¬
ences between cases will significantly affect the applicability of
the theory. The same cannot, however, be said of a linear theory
because of the singular character of its predictions.
72. See Literary Remains, op. cit., pp. 346, 445, and previous
notes to this chapter.
/ j Ibid., pp. 405-406.
54
CHAPTER III
J. E. CAIRNES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ORTHODOX METHODOLOGY
John Elliot Cairnes was undoubtedly the most vocal critic of
the Historical movement in British economics and the staunchest
defender of the "deductive" or a priori Stic method of economic in¬
quiry. Cairnes' role in the development of economic methodology was,
however, quite different than he himself believed. Although Cairnes
regarded himself as no more than a defender of the meta-economic
tradition which had developed linearly and without essential modi¬
fication from Adam Smith through John Stuart Mill, in fact, he was
much too modest concerning his own originality. While his extensive
references to past writers did demonstrate the continuity of an
Orthodox tradition dating from the time of Adam SmithJ Cairnes'
own methodological views were both more and less than a summary of
this tradition. His observations concerning economic method were
certainly more systematically developed than those of any previous
Orthodox authors. Furthermore, they dealt with several doctrines
not considered or only superficially considered within even the
copious methodological writings of J. S. Mill. Cairnes' meta-
economi c writings also differed from those of earlier methodologists
by being far less "impure" in their reliance upon a prioriStic
foundations. Cairnes relied hardly at all on empirical facts, but
rested his case almost exclusively on the "intuitions" which he
believed were common to all competent economists.
This section is intended to throw some light on the meta-
economic thought of the Nineteenth Century, and thus upon the
intellectual environment to which the Historical economists were
reacting. In the process of examining Cairnes as the paradigm of
Nineteenth Century orthodoxy after Mill, I have also attempted to
highlight a few of his views which have maintained their popular¬
ity, albeit in somewhat altered form, to the present day. It is
only through an understanding of the essential features of "the
deductive view" (as embodied in the works of economists such as
Senior, Mill, Whately and Cairnes) that we can fully appreciate
the merits of the British Historical economists both in their own
age and within the methodological context of modern neoclassicism.
Previous Research into Cairnes1 Methodology
J. E. Cairnes has received the attention of many historians
for his Some Leading Principles of Political Economy Newly Ex-
3
pounded, sometimes characterized as the dying gasp of the Class¬
ical School, and for his participation in the wages-fund contro¬
versy, initiated by Mill's 1874 "recantation" in the Fortnightly
Review.^ He was equally well-known among his contemporaries,
5however, for his popular political treatise, The Slave Power,
and for his influential text on The Character and Logical Method
of Political Economy.
Although Joseph Schumpeter once referred to The Character and
Logical Method of Political Economy as "... a landmark in the his-
7
tory of methodology," the professional literature explicitly
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concerned with Cairnes' methodological writings has been almost non¬
existent. In the two key papers dealing with Cairnes' relations
o
with his fellow economists J. S. Mill and W. S. Jevons, only passing
mention is made of his methodological views. And the treatment
accorded him in many of the standard histories of economic thought
does not even extend to an acknowledgement of his interest in meta-
economic questions.
9The only published source to attempt an evaluation of Cairnes’
methodology is Ekelund and Olsen's "Comte, Mill and Cairnes: The
Positivist-Empiricist Interlude in Late Classical Economics."^
There are, however, points of emphasis and completeness, even in
this generally excellent study, which require addition and correc¬
tion for our purposes in this dissertation. Ekelund and Olsen were
primarily concerned with the Cairnes-Comtist debate over the scope
of economic theory and the proper relation between economic inquiry
and the other social sciences. While they consider issues such as
the research procedures proposed by both Cairnes and the Comtists
and the role of empirical evidence within these alternative methodol¬
ogies, they never enter into these matters in much depth. In
addition, the way in which Ekelund and Olsen interpret Cairnes1
position on what were to them subsidiary issues often does not
square with his acknowledged role as a standard-bearer of methodo¬
logical orthodoxy. I have discussed the ambiguities embodied in
some of Cairnes1 meta-economic doctrines and the consequent diffi¬
culty in arriving at an interpretation of them in the appropriate
sections below.
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An even more comprehensive description of the Cairnes system
of economic methodology, one which touches upon most of the central
issues in his perspective, is to be found in Emilie Olsen's unpub¬
lished thesis on the Comte-Cairnes controversy.^ Although Olsen
has done an admirable job of summarizing Cairnes' meta-economic
views, she tended to present his doctrines in much too terse a
manner, without sufficient supplementary commentary. Many times she
also seemed unaware of the full implications of Cairnes' methodology
for the path taken by economists after the 1890's, and occasionally
she did not seem to fully appreciate how certain positions of
Cairnes' meta-economic views related to the remainder of his system.
Although Olsen's thesis is an excellent reference on the Comte-
Cai rnes debate for those already familiar with the issues, it is
much too complex for the uninitiated. Her preoccupation with Comte
tended to obscure Cairnes1 quite respectable roots in the tradition
of British economics and made him appear as somewhat of an isolated
crank.
Cairnes on the Goal of Science and its Taxonomy
Cairnes' discussion of economic methodology was, of course,
grounded in his views regarding the nature of science in general.
That topic serves as a necessary prolegomena to any of his more
specific views.
Cairnes equated science, any science, with what today would be
referred to as "pure science" or, perhaps, "pure theory." He
continually reiterated his conviction: that scientific studies
58
should not be pursued for any immediate practical purposes, but
solely for the abstract knowledge of "cause and effect" which was to
be gained from them. The scientist, according to Cairnes, should
pursue his subject only for the "intellectual satisfactions" aris-
12
ing from his investigations, as opposed to the artisan, who should
seek after imnediate applications for his skills.
Practical by-products of scientific activity, although "acci¬
dental" to its true purposes, were not entirely neglected by Cairnes,
1 3
however. Despite a high-minded adherence to the pursuit of "pure
knowledge," he was no more above an appeal to the practical ahcieve-
ments of science, as a justification for that enterprise, than are
clergymen above citing the social conduct of the religious as a
merit of faith.^
Even though all sciences shared the common goal of "establish¬
ing" those cause and effect relationships which prevailed in their
particular fields of study, they were differentiated by much more
than just the character of their subject matter. Cairnes introduced
(or systematized) three distinct categories to be used in the class¬
ification and division of the sciences.
First, the various sciences were separable according to the
character of the phenomena with which they dealt. There were the
sciences of physical objects, such as chemistry, mechanics and
physics, the science of mental objects or thoughts (psychology) and
1 5the social sciences of politics, economics and sociology. The
social sciences were distinct from both the physical and mental
sciences in that their subject phenomena were neither physical
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objects nor thought but, rather, the appraisal of physical objects.
16
They dealt with, in Cairnes' own terms, "valued matter."
A second means for distinguishing the sciences was found in the
distinction between those disciplines in which induction was a central
investigative tool and those which could proceed only through non-
inductive techniques. In Cairnes' writings the term "induction"
was usually used to refer to Mill's "rules of inductive inference"
and the accompanying conditions for their application. He thus
resolved the distinction between inductive and deductive studies
into a distinction between those fields in which controlled ex¬
periments could be carried out and those fields which were barred
from the use of experimental techniques.^ The non-physical
sciences were, hence, almost entirely "deductive" or, at least,
non-inductive.
The modern characterization of science as composed of hypo¬
thetical-deductive systems of conditional statements (of laws and
theorems) would probably fit most closely into Cairnes' third dis¬
tinction between "hypothetical" and "positive" sciences. Positive
studies were those which were concerned solely with the discovery
of generalized facts (or "empirical generalizations"). Although
this was considered in Cairnes' time as a perfectly legitimate and
fully autonomous branch of scientific inquiry, we would today
recognize that it is no more than a part of the procedure for
testing of present or future hypotheses (i.e., that part in which
"important" or "significant" facts are isolated from those which
are "insignificant"). Hypothetical studies, on the other hand, were
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defined by Cairnes as those in which either the premises were
"arbitrary," or the conclusions of the science were derived by
deduction and were true only "on the hypothesis that the premises
18
include all causes affecting the results."
It is to Cairnes' credit that he recognized the distinction
between positive and hypothetical "science" many years before it
became popular in the discipline at large. Later controversies
over the role of historical research in economic studies and over
issues raised by the later English and German Historical Schools
could have been more easily resolved had most economists been aware
of the possibility of hypothetical (deductive) inquiry and the role
of positive research within that framework. The arguments of the
later German Historical School were, in fact, little more than a
contention that "positive science," in Cairnes1 sense, should
comprise the whole of the economist's endeavors.
Science as a Study of Tendencies
In a discussion colosely related to his distinction between
hypothetical and positive studies, Cairnes considered the nature of
the results to be expected from any scientific investigation and the
procedures to be followed in scientific research. In Cairnes' view,
a science did not predict classes of events, but merely the tendency
19
for an event of a particular class to occur. The fact that the
laws of science were limited to the prediction of tendencies was
itself a consequence of the procedures available to analyze human
institutions and relationships. The multi-dimensional and "complex"
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character of social phenomena led to the specialization of social
inquiry into various subfields: i.e., politics, which dealt with
governmental organization and power; sociology, which dealt with
societal customs and such informal institutions as the family;
economics, which dealt with the production and distribution of
wealth; and ethics, which dealt with sanctions against certain forms
of action. Each field of social science thus proceeded to abstract
out its own aspect of study from complex reality and thus to dis¬
solve the reality into its elemental components. Once complete, the
separate analyses of the different components of human action could
be synthesized into an overall explanation of the actions customarily
observed iri everyday life. Although this explanation could never
become predictive in character, for the relative weightings to be
acta hed to the different types of human motives could never be
determined before the fact, it could, at least, eventually become
complete.^ (That is, it could become satisfying to the social
sci errt i s t.)
Cairnes believed that any more direct or more unified approach
to the analysis of social phenomena was doomed to failure, and he
attacked the Comtists for proposing such a grossly unspecialized
program of social research. The sheer difficulty of performing a
satisfactory analysis on even the relatively simple components into
which most social questions were divided precluded, for him, a frontal
attack on the significantly more complex phenomena of which these
components were the parts. Further, the duration of the educational
program which a social scientist was required to undertake in order
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to become competent in even a single field of social study effect-
21
ively eliminated the Comtist dream of a unified science of society.
As we shall see below, Cairnes' arguments for the hypothetical or
incomplete character of economic investigations were not, however,
purely "abstract" or "philosophic." They provided him with a useful
tool to be used in the defense of orthodox economics against the
attacks leveled by its his tori cist critics.
The Character and Classification of Economic Science
In terms of the foregoing classification schema, Cairnes con¬
sidered economics as: (1) a social science whose object was neither
strictly mental nor strictly physical , but, rather, a combination of
both; (2) a science in which controlled experiments could not be
performed, and thus, one in which induction would play no important
role; (3) a science which described only one aspect of human action,
the economic, leaving the merits of conduct to ethics, the "rules of
thought" to psychology and the religious motive to dogmatic theol-
24 / \
ogy; and, finally, as (4) a study which was hypothetical, in the
sense that its conclusions were derived by deduction and were, in
the language of the economist, "true only in the absence of disturb¬
ing causes," yet also a science which was positive, in the sense
that its premises were representative of the facts of the world
25
rather than being the result of arbitrary choice.
Wertfrei Science and the Formulation of Public Policy
Cairnes was expecially vehement in denying any valuative char-
acter to the pronouncements of economic science. In his influential
essay on "Political Economy and Laissez-Faire," he attempted to undo
the damage inflicted on the reputation of economics by its past
association with the increasingly unpopular doctrines of laissez-
faire, and to thus preserve its status as a respectable field of
26
Wertfrei investigation. Despite the fact that Cairnes' critique
of normative economics was more thorough and exacting than similar
discourses penned by his predecessors, he, however, like these pre-
27
decessors, fell back into the role of political philosopher.
It was Schumpeter's opinion that Cairnes wished to reduce all
28
of economics to “pure economics" or “pure theory," and, as we
have seen, there is some justification for that opinion. Yet,
Cairnes' complete view on the topic of the applied or normative
significance of economic inquiry was not as simple or as consis¬
tent as it might at first appear. Ekelund and Olsen have noted
that Cairnes believed that:
... the extinction of trade corporations, the
abolition of usury laws, the more or less ex¬
tensive adoption by the leading nations of
Europe of the principle of free trade, English
colonial policy, English financial, monetary,
and poor-law reforms [were] achievements which
it will scarcely be denied, may be fairly
credited to Political Economy.29
and it is well-known that Cairnes was not at all hesitant about
30
taking stands on issues such as unionization and free-trade.
Passages in his "Political Economy and Laissez-Faire" seem even
to contradict his primary stress on a value-free approach to
economics, as he turns from a critique of the pro-1aissez-faire
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pronouncements of past economists to a critique of 1aissez-faire
31
itself. If Cairnes had really wished to break with the long¬
standing tradition among economists of insinuating their own values
into the conclusions of their theoretical analyses he surely would
have abided by his own prohibitions against the application of a
"purely hypothetical" theory to "concrete" cases. He would have
been more cautious about the use of economic analysis as a justifi¬
cation for personally preferred public policies rather than invoking
its authority in support of his own positions on virtually all major
policy issues of his day. As it was, Cairnes gained both the ani¬
mosity of the Historical economists, for his repeated appeal to an
untestable theory, and the contempt of the man he most respected,
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J. S. Mill, for his often dogmatic defense of policy views.
The Boundaries and Subject Matter of Economic Inquiry
The problem of the appropriate boundaries for economic inquiry
was much less perplexing to Cairnes than it was to generations of
economists before or since his time. Whenever an "economic fact"
could be causally (viz., "deductively") traced to either a "mental
principle" or a "physical law" then the problem "so far as the
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science of wealth is concerned" was to be considered as closed.
The business of the economist was concisely summarized and tightly
circumscribed in the following quote from Cairnes1 Character and
Logical Method of Political Economy:
It is for the economist to prove, first, that
the premises (of his theories) are true in fact
(we will discuss the method of the "proof" below;
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and secondly, that they account for the phen¬
omena; ... when this is done his business is
ended. He does not attempt to explain the
physical laws ... and no more does he under¬
take to analyze the nature of those feelings
of self interest ... He regards them both as
facts, not to be analysized and explained, but
to be ascertained and taken account of; not as
the subject-matter, but as the basis of his
reasonings. If further information be desired,
recourse must be had to other sciences; the
physical facts he hands over to the chemist
or the physiologist; the mental to the psy¬
chological scholar. 34
Perhaps the critical point to note in Cairnes' treatment of the
scope of economic inquiry was his delineation of the boundaries of
the various social sciences in terms of the type of phenomena with
which they were concerned. Later authors have frequently chosen to
ignore the distinction between "economic" and "non-economic" "mo¬
tives" for action by defining economics as the social science which
uses the model of constrained maximizing behavior (whether the var¬
iables being maximized are "economic" or "non-economic"). They have
handled the problem of deciding which type of motives dominate in
particular situations by making economics responsible only for the
prediction of changes in the values of dependent variables rather
35
than for the determination of the total values of these variables.
Cairnes, however, knew nothing of these distinctions. His naive
acceptance of the traditional division between those motives which
were properly the concern of the political economist and those about
which the economist could say nothing was to lead him into further
varieties of meta-economic error.
The doctrine of the "hypothetical" or "incomplete" character of
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economic hypotheses combined with the restriction of economics to
the consideration of "economic variables" inexorably led to Cairnes1
reinterpretation of economics as a tautological system. If human
actions were seldom the result of unmixed motives, but economists
could only be concerned with those motives which flowed from the
desire for wealth, then it followed that the science could never be
anything more than a study of tendencies. The hypotheses of a
science of tendencies can, by definition, never be refuted by "facts"
based upon any observable events, however. Any "fact" contradicting
explanations deduced from proffered economic hypotheses can always
be explained as an instance where "non-economic motives" dominated
(or overwhelmed) the proffered "economic motives." Facts could help
to "confirm" theories, but they could never really contradict the
hypotheses of a "science of economic tendencies." (The contradiction
in this last statement is apparent, but it was never really recog¬
nized by Orthodox methodologists of Classical Economics.)
Intuition, Experimentation and the Role of Social Facts
Cairnes was very much in the mainstream of Nineteenth Century
thought when he endorsed intuition and introspection as methods
appropriate to the social sciences. Like Marshall, the later Symes
and Ingram he readily accepted the notion that social scientists had
open to them a special class of data, composed of mental impressions,
which were denied to the physical scientist in his investigations.
The type of "mental facts" upon which social inquiry was properly
based was derived from peoples' secret worlds of thought and moti-
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vation. Only the individual could know what he was really thinking
or what he was really feeling, although he could report both his
or
thoughts and his emotions to others.
While the procedure of introspection was widely endorsed in
Nineteenth Century social science, Cairnes was definitely in a
minority in his expressed willingness to exclude any other types of
investigative methods within economics. Although he sometimes
hedged concerning this "extremist" stance, it clearly occurs in
several places in his methodological writings, the following com¬
prising one exceptionally clear example:
For what purpose is hypothesis used in physical
research? Always as a means of arriving at ul¬
timate causes and laws. Such causes and laws
not being susceptible of direct proof, through
an appeal to the consciousness or senses, ...
the physicist frames an hypothesis as to the
nature of ... the causes and laws, and having
done so, proceeds to bring together conditions
fitted to test the correctness of his guesses
... Such a course would be obviously unsuitable
in the analogous case in economic investigation.
No one thinks of framing an hypothesis as to
the motives which induce men to engage in in¬
dustry, to prefer remuneration to unremunera¬
tion... Conjectures here would be manifestly
out of place, inasmuch as we possess in our
consciousness and in the testimony of our
senses ... direct and easy proof of that which
we desire to know.37
Controlled experiments, which were and are essential to inves¬
tigations in the physical sciences, had been denied a role in the
social sciences by J. S. Mill; and Mill's authority, for Cairnes,
oo
precluded any further consideration of this issue. Although
Cairnes believed that the procedures of controlled experimentation
were "powerful instruments" as opposed to the "inferior substitutes"
68
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available to the social scientist, he expressed much less regard
for the virtues of statistical tools when applied to the phenomena
of human action. Any attempt to determine the existing social con¬
ditions in the world he considered to be futile since "the economist
starts with a knowledge of ultimate causes." That is, we, as econ¬
omists, possess " ... direct knowledge of these causes (of human
action) in our minds, and in the information which our senses con-
40
vey... " It is further clear, from Cairnes' subsequent remarks,
that " ... the information which our senses convey ... " was a refer¬
ence not to " ... those refined inductive processes by which the
ultimate truths of physical science are established ..." but rather
to "... the direct proof of our senses" (emphasis added). That is,
it constituted an "anticipation" of what Marshall would later de¬
scribe as "casual observation."^
Ultimately, however, Cairnes did waver in some slight degree
concerning the usefulness of observational methods and other non-
introspective techniques. As already noted he had maintained that
it was important for the premises of economic theory to be based on
"... the existing facts of nature," although offering nothing
approximating formal observation rules for determining how such
"facts" were to be arrived at. Cairnes also admitted that "...
observation and experience ..." could "... furnish sufficient
corroboration to the processes of deductive reasoning to justify a
high degree of confidence in the conclusions thus obtained ..."
and that empirical tools could be useful in isolating "... disturb¬
ing causes ..." (and thus in furthering the increased "perfection"
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or "completeness" of economic hypotheses). None of this, of
course, had any direct bearing on the possibility of testing
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economic theories with a view to their possible falsification.
Statistical Evidence and the "Validity" of Economic Theories
We have already observed that Cairnes1 general attitude toward
the use of statistics in economics was one of neglect, if not of
outright hostility. Yet Ekelund and Olsen have noted that Cairnes
was not above the use of statistical data in support of his own
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analyses. In an 1877 pamphlet entitled "The Gold Question" he
quoted extensively from the available data sources. Cairnes1 true
views concerning empirical techniques are further obscured by the
fact that W. S. Jevons, the populari.zer of statistical studies in
British economics, "always had a high regard for Cairnes' work and
capabilities" and had used some of Cairnes1 writings on empirical
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subjects to support the conclusion of his own research.
The key to these seeming paradoxes, I believe, must lie in
Cairnes’ psychological attitudes toward the essential nature of
economic theory. The "Laws" of Classical economics were, for
Cairnes, the object of an almost religious veneration. Had he been
more familiar with Kantian philosophy Cairnes might even have stated
his methodological position in a form similar to that adopted by
Ludwig von Mises^ many years later, i.e., "the basic propositions
of economic science are expressive of fundamental categories of
human thought." Although both Cairnes and Mises would admit that
empirical evidence could be used to bolster psychological assurance
in an economic relationship, and that such evidence might be psycho¬
logically suggestive of embellishments to be added to the basic
theoretic structure, neither would assent to the notion of falsifying
economic theories by reference to such evidence. As Cairnes stated
in his major methodological work:
From this conception of an economic law, as ex¬
pressing a hypothetical, not a positive, truth
... we can have no difficulty in perceiving the
kind of proof on which such a law rests, and the
kind of arguments ... by which alone, if questioned
it can be refuted.
Not being an assertion respecting the order of
economic phenomena, it can neither be established
nor refuted by an appeal to the records of such
phenomena--that is to say, by statistical or
documentary evidence ...
We also discover, at another point in Cairnes' writings, that he
means by the term "fact," in this context, not an observation
carried out according to some well defined observation procedure,
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but rather "some mental or physical law.11
The tendency to transform social investigation into a secular
faith was, unfortunately, very prevalent in the intellectual tradi¬
tions of the Nineteenth Century. It was a spirit which captured
and inspired such diverse thinkers as Comte, Marx and Cairnes, and
which eventually provided the tone of Marshall's reconstruction of
economic analysis. We will see in the closing sections of this
dissertation how the attitude of worshipful devotion to the theoret¬
ical structure existing in a particular field of social science has
been preserved, even today, in the meta-economic writings of several
prominent economists.
Mathematics and Economics
A rather unfortunate aspect of Cairnes' methodological views
was his distinct hostility toward the use of mathematics in economic
problem solving. Although Cairnes had read and reviewed Jevons1
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Theory of Political Economy, which contained a lucid statement of
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the adaptability of mathematical techniques to ordinal rankings,
he persisted in rejecting mathematical economics on the grounds that
50
economic relationships were qualitative rather than quantitative.
He later weakened this original position somewhat but still opposed
the extensive use of mathematics in economics because it added
nothing to the subject not already known and was a mode of stating
economic theorems which was unfamiliar to many, otherwise competent,
thinkers. Cairnes1 examples in demonstration of the inappropriate¬
ness of a mathematized economics do, it is true, add some superfi¬
cial plausibility to his case against an overuse of mathematics in
those areas of economics which are not yet well developed theoreti¬
cally, i.e., in those areas where basic problems have not yet been
well established. Yet in many instances Cairnes seems to have con¬
fused the issue of empirical vs, theoretical economics with the issue
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of mathematical vs. verbal economics.
Relativism and the Influence of Popular Culture
A final point of some interest in Cairnes' meta-economic dis¬
cussions is found in his views concerning the issue since described
as "relativism vs. absolutism," a long-debated question in the
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history of economic thought. The debate, summarized and simpli¬
fied, is concerned with the determinants for the particular path of
development taken by economic theory, the factors causing certain
specialities within the discipline to flourish while others wither,
and certain theoretical systems (or "paradigms") to prosper while
others are ignored.
The basic relativist position is that the particular historical
course followed in the development of economics has been a conse¬
quence of the history of those social problems for which economists
were expected to provide solutions. Thus the primitive systems of
development economics, which constituted Mercantile and classical
theories, arose as a result of a demand by Western European nations
for programs which would hasten the rate of their commercial and
industrial growth. Keynesian macro-economics was called into being
by the economic upheaval of the Great Depression, and the study of
large scale production with elements of high fixed costs was a pro¬
duct of the early programs to regulate the railways "in the public
interest."
A more extreme and logically unrelated form of relativism
claims that both questions that economists pose for analysis and the
responses they offer to these questions have been pre-determined by
the social milieu. Although this position has been most popular
among the less sophisticated Marxists, it has also found a home in
52the writings of less doctrinaire authors such as Leo Rogin.
The basic position of absolutism, as presented by George Stigler
in his 1960 "The Influence of Events and Policies on Economic
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Theory, is that the path along which economics has progressed has
been determined by the inner "dialectic" of the theory, functioning
according to "internal values and pressures of the discipline." This
theme was further refined and modified in the later contributions of
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Spengler, Eagly and Fetter. Eagly has noted that the development
of economics has become more self-directed as the discipline has it¬
self become more professionalized and insulated (or isolated) from
the thoughts and goals of those outside of the academy. Spengler
introduced into "absolutism" a distinction between the "core" of
"pure theory" in economics, which he believed had developed accord¬
ing to the absolutist's conception of intellectual progress, and the
"shell" of "economic doctrines" (i.e., matters connected with policy
or issues of "applied economics") which changed in response to in¬
fluences exogenous to the discipline. Finally, Fetter noted that
"The more closely one associates economic thought with technical
analysis ... the greater is one likely to consider the effect of
economic thought on history, and the less the effect of history on
thought."J^
Cairnes' own position presents an interesting contrast to these
views. If Schumpeter is correct in believing that Cairnes was con¬
cerned with pure theory to the virtual exclusion of applied or
policy economics, then it might well be expected that he (Cairnes)
would be an absolutist. His emphasis on the speculative nature of
economic inquiry (as opposed to the applied craft of statemanship)
and his polemics against a reliance on statistical methods in
economic studies would further reinforce this expectation. In fact
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however, Cairnes was clearly a relativist and declared himself as
such (although, of course, not in those terms) at several points in
his writings. The following is probably the clearest such passage:
The economic conditions of patriarchal life, of
Greek or Roman life, of feudal life, are not the
economic conditions of modern comnercial life;
and had Political Economy been cultivated in
those primitive, ancient or mediaeval times, it
would doubtless have contained some expositions
which we do not now find in it.°
"Relativism" and "Absolutism": A Digression
The relativist position is not without its justification, how¬
ever, and we need not fault Cairnes for adopting it. Eagly, Spengler
and Fetter may, in fact, have conceeded so much to their relativist
opponents that there is little basis remaining for a distinct abso¬
lutist stance.
A simple profit-maximizing analysis of the pursuits in which
economists engage would indicate that the more professionalized the
discipline becomes the more relativist it will also become. Despite
the idealization of the scientific enterprise presented by Cairnes,
one would expect that a significant factor affecting the choices made
by economists between alternative types of research would be the
relative rewards in salary and position attached to each of the
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various categories. While the standards of "good" and "bad" work
are largely determined within the profession, the allocation of re¬
search grants, new professorships, and thus the relative monetary
rewards and rewards of "professional prestige" attached to the
various specialities, are largely a function of the social problems
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which seem pressing to non-economists. (Undoubtedly, there is a
distinction between the determinants of standards of "good11 and
"bad" work and the standards of "interesting" and "uninteresting"
research.) The question of which sub-areas of economics will re¬
ceive the most attention and which will fall into relative obscur¬
ity has thus'become more dependent on exogenous influences as
economists have become increasingly recognized as professional ex¬
perts who can provide valuable services to those outside the academy.
Although it is conceivable that further advances in some areas of the
theory will "dialectically" require a reworking of basic propositions
in other areas, the emphasis of theory development and problem
solving will, for the foreseeable future, remain with those parti -
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cular specialities best able to tap the public purse.
A11 of this is not to deny that there is a_ val id distinction
between pure economics and the "doctrines" or applications of
economic theory. That distinction must, however, be examined more
fully in order to place it in its proper perspective. The "pure
theory" or "core" of economics, referred to by both Marshall and
Spengler, can only be the set of definitions and methodological
proscriptions which define and distinguish economics as a distinct
social science, separate from sociology, political science and
psychology. (This distinction is one apparent interpretation for
Marshall's oft-quoted comment that "Economics is not a body of con¬
crete truths, but an engine for the discovery of concrete truths.")
While exogenous influences cannot, by definition, affect the
methodological conventions or basic identities of economics, as long
as this particular form of social inquiry is accepted as a viable
enterprise, neither are these conventions or identities alterable
59
through the action of endogenous influences. One cannot play
chess by changing the rules for playing chess, neither can one do
"economic research" which violates the rules or framework in terms
of which "economic research" is defined. (While this point is, of
course, "trivial," in the sense of tautological, I am afraid that
something of just this sort is basic to the "absolutist" conception
of the development and future paths open to economic thought.) If
demand curves slope up rather than down, then a new and different
type of scientific study is created, one similar to the old study
in name only. If behavior is described using models other than
those which involve the constrained maximization of some behavioral
(?) variables, then a similar anomaly is generated within "the
theory."
The only escape from this dilemma is to reject the position of
absolutism and to reject along with it the characterization of sci-
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entific development currently in vogue0 (i.e., that of Thomas
Kuhn). Both the absolutists and Kuhn seem to view economics as a
game (perhaps an ideological or "religious" game) which is judicabl
only by its own internal rules and which proceeds by "puzzle
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solving" rather than "problem solving." Although Kuhn's theory
was originated to explain "scientific revolutions" or, using the
terms of absolutism, changes in the pure theory or "core" of
economics, neither Kuhn nor the absolutists are able to provide any
real explanation for peoples' decision to change the rules of the
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game which they are playing. All suggested (perhaps, all possible)
explanations seem to turn upon such non-logical criteria as "bore¬
dom," "a general uneasiness," or "a feeling that things aren't going
right." The idea that the Kuhnian or absolutist view can justify
paradigm change (a change in "the core") on the grounds of consis¬
tent "failures" of "the theory" simply begs the question of what,
under this view, can constitute an instance of "a failure." In fact,
a "failure" of the the theory cannot be connected to any intersub-
jective test of "the theory" (i.e., of "the core"), for there are no
intersubjectively observable implications of "the theory" until it
has been empirically interpreted. "Failure" is thus reducible only
to psychological discontent.
Faced with their own inability to provide an explanation of the
logic of (or for) scientific change, Kuhn's followers have concluded
that his speculations constitute a sociological explanation or
description of what it is that scientists do, rather than an analysis
of the criteria they use (or "should" use) in deciding whether to
retain or reject a portion of "the core." (Spengler, not surprising-
C p
ly, adopts the same tactic. ) It is evident, however, that the
sociological causes for the actions and orientation of economists
must, at some point, be traceable precisely to those extra¬
professional influences which the absolutists consider to be insig¬
nificant. Economists are simply not their own judges in every re¬
spect since they are not the exclusive or ultimate consumers of
their own efforts.
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J. E. Cairnes and the Historical School of Economics
Despite his defense of several doctrines held dear by historical
writers, Cairnes was rightfully known as the most outspoken and un¬
compromising critic of the Historical School. He quite correctly
viewed the meta-econornic upheaval in Nineteenth Century economics
as the main barrier to the continued progress of the study, and he
fully realized that the future survival of the discipline depended
upon the speedy resolution of this divisive struggle. His arguments
although unreserved in their condemnation of the major planks in the
Historical program, were so appealing and well-reasoned that he
gained the respect, if not the agreement, of many of his Histori-
6 3
cist opponents. At the very least they uniformly agreed that he
had done an admirable job in systematizing and clarifying those
"orthodox" views which they were so anxious to destroy, and that he
6 4
had said "everything which could be said" in their defense.
Cairnes' rejection of induction, in the sense defined by Mill,
has previously received our attention. It is worthy of note, how¬
ever, that he was equally opposed to "inductivism" (to the excessive
use of inductive methods in economics) even when that term was de¬
fined in a weaker sense. Thus Cairnes cautioned against all attempts
to "turn economics into the study of economic statistics," holding
that economic statistics could, at best, disclose "the succession
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of phenomena" which it is the business of science to explain.
As already stated, Cairnes also opposed the reduction of
economics to an all-encompassing historical sociology (as proposed
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by the Comtists). His most persuasive and pervasive reason in de¬
fense of a separate and legitimate science of wealth was based upon
the increased productivity which he believed to be the result of the
division of scientific pursuits into separate areas of specializa¬
tion. Just as the principle of a division of labor resulted in
increased output in manufacture, it also had a place in the pro-
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duction of new knowledge. The increase in knowledge resulting
from a specialization of intellect was not, however, Cairnes1 sole
justification for the autonomy of the economics discipline. He
clearly believed that there was no more of a "natural’1 boundary
separating wealth maximizing behavior from human behavior in general,
than there was separating astronomy, chemistry and physiology from
some overreaching science of physical laws and relations. The test
of science lay in its ability to construct well-ordered and appealing
hypothesis systems and not in its correspondence to any presumed
ultimate essences of reality.
While admonishing economists to exercise care in determining
6 7
the truth or falsity of their premises, by determining their
correspondence with known physical and psychological laws, Cairnes
vigorously combatted all attempts to reduce economics to either
mechanics or psychology. While the "principles" of these disciplines
provided the basis on which most economic investigations were based,
the laws of economics, he believed, added "additional insights" to
the study of human action not attainable directly from a knowledge
of either mechanical or psychological relations. Economic laws were
thus not eliminable from the class of independent scientific
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hypotheses through the use of Occam's Razor.
Medievalism and Social Darwinism: The Other Heresies
Two remaining views that received Cairnes1 harshest expression
of scorn were "medievalism" and social Darwinism. Medievalism, which
was popular during the Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Centuries
and was resurrected by the Social Romantics of the Ninteenth Century,
held that economic laws or the laws of any social science, were
illegitimate intellectual constructs. Medievalists believed that
social relationships were better left to the inquiries of ethics or
religion or to the customary politics of the poll’s rather than
being manipulated on the basis of abstract and purportedly Wertfrei
social speculations. In response to this reasoning Cairnes replied
that economic laws possessed all the properties common to laws in the
physical sciences and social behavior was as proper an object for
scientific investigation as were the objects of the non-social
world. Indeed, Cairnes believed "that Political Economy does for
the phenomena of wealth ... what Astronomy does for the phenomena
of the heavenly bodies; what Dynamics does for the phenomena of
motion; what Chemistry does for the phenomena of chemical combin¬
ation ... it expounds the laws according to which those phenomena
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co-exist with or succeed each other ..." As he also stated in
response to those who feared that political economy would come to
replace ethics, right actions are seldom the result of ignorance
about human beings.
The doctrines of social evolution and social organicism,
championed by Herbert Spencer and, to a lesser extent, by Auguste
Comte, were also to feel the sting of Cairnes1 pen. Cairnes found
the social organicist methodology to be "philosophically unsound and
practically mischevious," and he believed that its logic was "entire¬
ly destitute of cogency." Spencer's analogies between the growth,
decay and death of organisms and the growth, decay and death of
civilizations prompted Cairnes to a lengthy critique in which he
sought to use the main features of the proposed analogies to demon¬
strate their own inapplicability. The entire course of social
Darwinian thought was, he believed, politically pernicious and
"fitted more to obscure and confound, rather than elucidate, the
problems of social existence." Cairnes' goal was clearly not to
reform these doctrines and perspectives on social theorizing, but to
eliminate them from all future discussions of social policy.^
In Summary
Cairnes' opposition to the programs of historical economics
and his defense of "the deductive view" left no room for a distinc¬
tion, either in his eyes or in the eyes of his followers, between
the older and newer branches of the British Historical School.
Cairnes emphasized deductive methods to the virtual exclusion of
inductive techniques, denied the role of statistics in economic
inquiry, characterized economics as a pure study of cause and
effect relationships rather than a practical study of "applied"
problems, argued for the value-free status of economics and its
autonomy from all other social and physical sciences, defended the
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legitimacy of economic laws and their origination apart from either
systematic fact-gathering or the laws of a universal social theory
and waged war on the doctrines of social evolution and social organ-
icism, both popular doctrines of his day. Even when he hedged his
case, by admitting the introduction of statistics and casual obser¬
vation in specialized instances, Cairnes was always ready to assure
his critics that these procedures were no more than window-dressing,
covering the corpus of intuitive theories and systematic deductions
on which economic theory was essentially based. A priorism and
"right intuition" were always more important in Cairnes' methodo¬
logical outlook than were any collection of (probably meaningless)
facts, and this was never more the case than in a science which
rested on the firm intuitive generalization of "the desire for
wealth."
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scientific know!edge--the power of interpreting
nature, of explaining phenomena ...
Essays, op. ci_t., pp. 298-299.
The curious contradiction which seems implicit in all this is the
extensive use which Cairnes made of the supposedly abstract con¬
clusions of political economy when he was defending his own polit¬
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and, as I maintain, dependent equally on the
laws of matter and on those of mind.
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This question was of prime importance for the other aspectsof Cairnes1 methodology since the introspective techniques of themental sciences were inappropriate to research in the physical sci¬
ences and the empirical techniques of the physical sciences were
inappropriate to research in the mental sciences. To put the matterdifferently, by claiming that economics had elements of both mental
and physical studies, Cairnes could "switch-off" between introspect¬ive and empirical methods as he desired.
23. The tie between the ability to perform controlled experi¬ments and the use of induction is clearly recognized by Cairnes in
at least two separate writings.
The foregoing considerations suffice to show
the utter inadequacy of the inductive method,
in the narrower sense of that expression, as
a means of solving the class of problems with
which Political Economy has to deal, arising
from the impossibility of employing experiment
in economic inquiries under those rigorous
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cogency to our inductions.
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ture; and it is a strictly logical deduction
from those laws that the path of a projectile
is in the course of a parabola; yet, in point
of fact, no projectile accurately describes
this course; the friction of the air coming
in to disturb the other principles.
Character and Logical Method of Political
Economy, op. cit., p. 54.
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Political Economy stands apart from all parti¬
cular systems of social or industrial existence.
It has nothing to do with 1aissez-faire any more
than with communism ...
Essays, op. cit., p. 255.
Economic science has no more connection with our
present industrial system than the science of
mechanics has with our present system of rail¬
roads .
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basis whatever, but isat best a mere handy rule
of practice, useful, perhaps, as a reminder to
statesmen ..., but totally destitute of all sci¬
entific authority.
Essays, op. cit., p. 244. See also Character
and Logical Method, op. cit., pp. 13, 14, and
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Hutchison's "Positive" Economics and Policy Objectives (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1964"). For a consideration
of Cairnes' views see especially pp. 32-34, 40-41.
28. Joseph Schumpeter, A History of Economic Analysis (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 824fn.
29. J. E. Cairnes, "M. Comte and Political Economy," Fort¬
nightly Review, Vol. 13 (1870), pp. 579-580. Quoted in Ekelund
and Olsen, ojd. cit., p. 400.
30. See Ekelund and Olsen, "Comte, Mill, and Cairnes," ojD_. cit.,
pp. 403-405 and O'Brien, "J. S. Mill and J. E. Cairnes," 0£. cit.,
pp. 277-278 for references to Cairnes' policy pronouncements.
31. J. E. Cairnes, Essays in Political Economy, Theoretical
and Applied, op. cit., pp. 245-251.
32. J. S. Mill's attitude of polite disdain (one would not like
to say "contempt") for Cairnes' more doctrinaire opinions is comment
ed on and illustrated by quotation in O'Brien, 0£. cit., pp. 276-
277. See footnotes 57 and 58 below for the British Historical
economists' opinions of Cairnes.
33. Character and Logical Method of Political Economy, op. cit.
pp. 224-225.
34. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
35. See, for instance, Gary S. Becker, Economic Theory (New
York: Alfred A. Knoph, Inc., 1971), pp. 1-4, 25-26.
36. The idea of a "secret world" of "hidden motives" which
"only the individual knows 'for sure'" is dissected in Gilbert
Ryle's The Concept of Mind (New York: Hutchison's University
Library, 1949). For a discussion of "Descarte's Myth" of motives
as something apart from actions, see pp. 11-24; and for a discussion
of the loqical and linguistic status of motives and emotions, see
pp. 83-115.
The idea that economists could perform "mental experiments"
in their "inner worlds" of thought and reflection is well illustra¬
ted in the following passage from Cairnes' writings:
The economist may thus be considered at the
outset as already in possession of those
ultimate principles governing the phenomena
which serve for the subject of his study,
the discovery of which in the case of phys¬
ical investigation constitutes for the in¬
quirer his most arduous task: ... although
precluded from actually producing the con¬
ditions suited to his purpose, there is
nothing to prevent the economist from bring¬
ing such conditions before his mental vision,
and from reasoning as if these only were
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present ... It is true that the conclusions
arrived at would represent hypothetical truth
merely—that is to say, would express a law
true only in the absence of disturbing causes;
but, as I have already explained, so much
qualification as this must be understood of
all scientific laws ... The process, then,
which I have been describing ... is in the
nature of an experiment conducted mentally.
Character and Logical Method, op. cit., pp.
78-80.
The curious feature of this doctrine is not only that it
separates the world of ideas from the world of physical events, but
also that it then makes the latter dependent upon the former in, an
almost Kantian fashion (i.e., through the assertion that our "true"
knowledge of the social world rests upon synthetic a priori proposi¬
tions). If men can conceive of some way of explaining their most
elemental impressions about social organization, then that way of
looking at the matter must be fundamental1y correct, even thou gh it
can be subject to further modification on the basis of further re¬
flection. The idea that some ways of organizing "common sense
knowledge" about society and social relationships might ultimately
prove factually false, rather than internally inconsistent, never
seems to have deeply impressed Cairnes.
37. Character and Logical Method, op. cit., pp. 83-88. Although
Cairnes sometimes hedged on the exclusivity of introspective tech¬
niques in social investigations (see p. 67 and footnote 41 of this
chapter) he stated upon several occasions that any proper methodol¬
ogy of economic science must ultimately rest upon our inner percep¬
tions. For additional comments regarding the irrelevance of empir¬
ical tests in economics see p. 14 of the present chapter.
38. Schumpeter has correctly evaluated Cairnes' relationship
with Mi 11 in his History of Economic Analysis:
He [Cairnes] may be called Mill's pupil for
he always reasoned with reference to the
latter's teaching—even where he did not
mention the fact explicitly--and he enter¬
tained toward Mill, as his correspondence
shows, feelings that can be rendered only
by the term "reverence."
History of Economic Analysis, op. cit.,
pp. 533-534.
Yet Schumpeter was also correct in stating that:
Nevertheless, he [Cairnes] sometimes criti¬
cized Mill sharply and, by virtue of this
criticism, constructed something that, though
entirely within the Mi Ilian groundwork, was in
some measure his own.
Ibid., p. 5 34.
It should be kept in mind, however, that Cairnes was not
totally aware of his originality, expecially in methodological
matters. Frequehtly he assumed that he was merely repeating,
clarifying and systematizing the earlier Classicals, and when he
criticized Mill he often argued from what he believed to be a
traditionalist standpoint.
39. Character and Logical Method, op. cit., p. 78.
40. Ibid., pp. 76-77. Cairnes goes on to state that:
The economist starts with a^ knowledge of ul-
timate causes. He is already, at the outset
of his enterprise, in the position which the
physicist only attains after ages of laborious
research. (Emphasis in original)
It is not necessary to ... [resort to induc¬
tion for empirical generalizations or an
understanding of the facts of the case] ...
for the reason, that we have, or may have
if we choose to turn our attention to the
subject, direct knowledge of these causes
in our consciousness of what passes in our
own minds, and in the information which our
senses convey, or at least are capable of
conveying to us of external facts. Everyone
who embarks in [sic] any industrial pursuit
is conscious of the motives which actuate
him in doing so ...
Character and Logical Method, op. cit., pp.
75, 76-77.
41 . Ibid.
42. The distinction between observation for the purpose of
falsification and observation as a device to insure the completeness
of intuitive reasoning is clearly apparent in those passages where
Cairnes does make some concessions to a loose form of empiricism:
... there is in a hypothetical experiment al¬
ways the danger, not only that some of the
conditions supposed to be present may, in the
course of ratiocination, be overlooked, but
also of a flaw in the reasoning by which the
action of the particular cause under consid-
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eration is established. And this renders it
expedient that the process in question should
as far as possible be supplemented by such
sorts of verification as economical inquiry
admits of. For example, it is open to the
economist, having worked out his problem in
the manner described, to look out for some
actual instance which approximates in as many
of its principal circumstances as possible to
those of his hypothesis. Having found one, he
can observe how far the results realized in the
conclusions; and in case, as would usually
happen, the correspondence was not complete,
he would have to consider how far the discrep¬
ancy admitted of being explained by reference
to the presence of known disturbing causes.
Unfortunately, for reasons already indicated,
verification can never, in economic inquiry,
be otherwise than imperfectly performed.
Character and Logical Method, op. cit.,
pp. 80-81. See also pp. 84-85.
43. That Cairnes was willing to admit any role for factual
evidence in economic inquiry can only be viewed as an anomaly in his
perception of "correct" methodological procedures. However, he
never approached the idea that such evidence might be used to test
the theories of economics with a view to possible falsification.
Note the passage from his works reproduced on p. 70 of this chapter.
44. R. B. Ekelund, Jr. and E. S. Olsen, "Comte, Mill and
Cairnes," ojd. cit., p. 405. Despite his concessions to a loose
form of empiricism, Cairnes1 attitudes toward the use of statistical
data in economic investigations remained highly ambivalent. Noting
that economic hypotheses are "imperfect," or, in more modern terms,
that they do not include all relevant causes affecting the phenomena
(they state only sufficient and not necessary conditions), Cairnes
argued that statistical evidence seeming to contradict the hypothe¬
ses of political economy was not, in itself, enough to indicate
whether the hypotheses were actually in error or whether "distur¬
bing causes" (changes in one of the variables implicitly held in
the pound of ceteris paribus) had in some way affected the predic¬
tion. See his Character and Logical Method, op. cit., p. 99.
45. R. D. C. Black, "Jevons and Cairnes," op_. cit., p. 214.
There was a rather lengthy correspondence between Jevons and Cairnes
regarding their mutual contributions to the question of price dis¬
persal (the differing local impacts of fluctuations in the money
stock on differing geographical locations). During the course of
this interchange Jevons remarked that he had learned much from
94
Cairnes' published articles on the subject, articles which were, at
least in part, "statistical" in content.
46. Those interested in Mises' methodological views should re¬
fer to his Epistemological Problems of Economics (Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand,1960), hi s ill timate Foundation of Economic Science
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1960) and his Human Action (New Haven:
Yalue University Press, 1949), pp. 10-89. In short, Mises claims to
have deduced the whole of economics from some rather elementary
"facts of human consciousness." The claim is, of course, fallacious.
47. The quote occurring in the text is drawn from Character
and Logical Method, op. cit., p. 99. The latter passage, referred
to in the text, reads as follows:
In economic reasoning, therefore, supposing
the logical portion of the process to be
sound, the appeal must in all cases ulti¬
mately be to consciousness or to some ex¬
ternal fact--to some mental or physical
1 aw.
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Also see J. E. Cairnes, Essays in Political Economy, Theoretical
and Applied (London: Macmillan, 1873), pp. 258-260.
57. It might be believed that this critique of the absolutist
position is incomplete, in that it leaves unanswered the question
of where the axioms of political economy originally came from and
the question of why they are what they are rather than something
else. This is, however, a historical, or, perhaps, psychological,
issue which is concerned with unique unrepeatable events. As such
it is not open to either the analysis of logical structures or the
repetition of scientific tests. Viewed in this way, then, the en¬
tire relativist-absolutist controversy reduces to a quibble over
which historical explanation (that is, which well-constructed myth)
we feel most comfortable with when describing the development of
economic thought. The critical question then appears to be not
what caused economics to develop the particular doctrines which it
has but, rather, what constitutes the criteria for "successful"
and "unsuccessful" doctrines (assuming that the criteria are not
exhausted by the canons of empirical research).
In a comment on an earlier draft of this chapter, Profes¬
sor R. B. Ekelund has raised the following question: "Don't econ¬
omists have economic incentives to maintain 'the core1 of their
theories as distinct from theories in the other social sciences?
Doesn't this consideration go some way toward undermining your
arguments for relativism on the basis of the economics of Economics?'
(I have paraphrased freely.) I will attempt to sketch what I be¬
lieve may be an answer to this question, for it is important to the
argument presented in the text of this chapter. The following is,
however, only a sketch; an exhaustive answer to this question would
require a chapter of its own.
On pages 20-21 of this chapter I have expressed the belief
that there is a valid distinction between the "core" of economics
and the "shell" of economic doctrines. However, I also believe that
the true character of this distinction has been obscured in many of
the articles which employ this terminology. The distinction, in
short, is that "the core" is composed either of tautologies, which
express basic definitions used in economic research, or of methodo¬
logical conventions for carrying out such research. The "shell," on
the other hand, is composed of attempts at the empirical interpre¬
tation of such purely tautological conepts as "utility maximization.
Since the "shell" is the only part of economic theory which can be
modified without reinterpreting the entire enterprise, it should be
apparent that my arguments from the economics of Economics can apply
only to it. I thus agree with the modified absolutist position, but
believe that this position asserts nothing of significance: that is
that it is reducible to the statement, "As long as economists con¬
tinue doing Economics they will continue to use "pure theories"
such as utility maximization, demand curves and production
functions."
In regard to the economic incentives to differentiate
economic research from other forms of social science, it must be
explicitly recognized that this preseumes an imperfectly competitive
academic market in the production of economic research (most parti¬
cularly, in the production of economic theory). While I personally
believe that this assumption is consistent with other casual obser¬
vations (such as the preponderance of articles from certain schools
in the major journals and the neglect of, if not hostility toward,
methodological inquiry within the economics profession) such obser¬
vations are without any formal basis.
58. It might be interesting to consider the extent to which
economics, or any publically subsidized intellectual speciality,
would have been different in the absence of outside funding. The
increasing emphasis on "applied" sub-fields of economics within the
discipline today is perhaps more connected with the incentives to
develop these fields as a way of making the "product" marketable,
than it is a reflection of a rising concern over the importance of
empirical research in social science. That many economists are
quite satisfied with the "correctness" of their more vivid "intui¬
tions" is evident from their frequently expressed willingness to
"fudge" empirical studies so they "come out right." On the other
hand, it might be argued that there have been significant "spillover
effects": that those areas which would have developed even without
public support have developed even further in a subsidized environ¬
ment and that, although the number of reliable and competent empiri¬
cal researchers is still "too small," it is larger than it would
have been otherwise. All such arguments, either pro or con, are,
of course, in the nature of "story-telling" since we are dealing
with the "what if ..." of historical counter-factuals; but the
speculation is, in any case, intriguing.
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Press, 1970J7 pp. 25-37. See especially pp. 30-31, 35.
60. The central and most familiar work of the recent revival
of a Kantian view of science is Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition (Chicago: Phoenix Books,
University of Chicago Press, 1970). A more recent restatement and
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cit., pp. 1-23 and "Reflections on my Critics," Ibid., pp. 231-278.
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History to a criticism of its contents. He also believed that
Cairnes1 "... Slave Power (1862) was the most valuable work which
has appeared on the subject of the great American conflict." (Ibid.,
p. 162.)
Leslie also had words of both praise and criticism for
Cairnes. In his 1875 obituary notice he wrote that Cairnes' repu¬
tation was second only to that of J. S. Mill, who had had the
advantages of a prestigious background and a term in Parliament
to his advantage. He described Cairnes' The Slave Power as "one of
the most masterly essays in the literature of political controversy,"
and his Leading Principles was, in Leslie's opinion, " a work which
ought to be regarded, even by those who dissent most from some of
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is a Euclidian precision about them which fits
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at any rate, you feel that you have seen in
all likelihood the worst of the subject ...
Reading his works is like living on high
ground; the "thin air of abstract truth"
which they give you braces the mind just
as fine material air does the body ...
Why a mind like his should have been cre¬
ated, and then the power to use it at all
withheld, is one of the mysteries of which
in this world we have no solution (empha¬
sis added).
E. F. Hutton (ed.), The Works of Walter
Bagehot, Vol. Ill (Hartford: Traveler's
Insurance Company, 1891), pp. 443-444.
65. Cairnes' separation of empirical generalizations and the
laws of science is emphatic and totally unambiguous:
... [Universal generalizations] ... afford
no explanation of any phenomenon connected
with the production and distribution of
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complex and difficult phenomenon which it
is the business of the political economist
to explain. To bring forward this as a
final result in economic speculation—to
deprecate all analysis of the causes on
which the so-called "law" depends ... is
to simply abandon all pretensions to solving
the problem of wealth--is to give up at once
the cause of Political Economy as a branch
of scientific research.
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CHAPTER IV
T. E. C. LESLIE AND THE REVIVAL OF BRITISH HISTORICISM
Evaluation of Leslie by Other Economists
Of the many major and minor Historical economists who succeeded
Jones and Whewell, T. E. C. Leslie was the one individual most capa¬
ble of preserving and building upon the tradition of the early Bri¬
tish Historical School He not only penned a devastating critique
of the orthodox methodology which he was in the process of revising
into a systematic treatise at his death, but he also was one of the
few British Historical economists to put to practice the principles
of empirical research which the School had long professed. In
Schumpeter's evaluation, that part of Leslie's work which was of
"the descriptive kind" was often "high-grade,"^ especially when it
dealt with conditions and consequences of British and Continental
land tenure; the praise of Leslie's elder contemporary, J. S. Mill,
was even less constrained. Mill referred to Leslie as "one of the
best living writers on political economy" and wrote an extensive
and laudatory appraisal of his Land Systems for the Fortnightly
Review.^
Leslie was, in fact, well-received by "friend" and "foe" alike.
He was one of the few "non-Positivists" to receive the unguarded
3
praise of J. K. Ingram, who both edited the later edition of his
Essays in Political Economy and borrowed heavily from his writings
on Adam Smith in the interpretation of that author presented in his
4
own History. Although his reputation carried over into the early
5 6
Twentieth Century in the histories of Haney and Scott, Leslie was
gradually "weeded out" from more modern texts, including the standard
works by Roll and Blaugh.^ Of the accounts of the development of
economics published during the second half of the Twentieth Century
g
only Schumpeter, Ekelund and Herbert, and Bell make reference to
Leslie's life and work, and none of these volumes contain anything
approaching a developed and systematic consideration of his methodo¬
logical views.
His Influence on Contemporaries
In a history of Victorian economic methodology and the develop¬
ment of the British Historical School it is, however, not only im¬
proper, but, indeed, impossible to overlook the overwhelming force
of Leslie’s thoughts and writings. By the time his views had gained
their full audience in the mid and late 1870's, the empirical orien¬
tation of Jones and Whewell had all but disappeared from British
economics. There may be some dispute regarding Leslie's priority
as the instigator of a revival of methodological controversy in
British economics, for his "On the Philosophical Methods of Political
Economy"^ appeared in the same year (1876) as Bagehot's "Postulates
of Political Economy"^ and Symes' Outlines of an Industrial Sci¬
ence. 1 However, Leslie had published essays dealing with methodo-
12 , .
logical issues as early as 1862, with Symes first essay not
1 8
appearing until 1871. It is also notable that Symes was reputed
to have been virtually unknown in Great Britain and that he
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acknowledged Leslie as his mentor in the introduction to his
14
Outlines of an Industrial Science. Among other evidence for
15
Leslie s priority we may mention that his Land Systems, which
Mill rightly acknowledged as a truly significant contribution to
both empirical economics and the extension of economic theorizing,
had appeared in 1870, and several of the papers collected in it had
been separately published as early as 1867.
While Bagehot and Symes arrived at valuable and original in¬
sights contemporaneous with Leslie's more mature publications, Les¬
lie led the way in applications of the "historical method" (rightly
conceived) and served as an inspiration, if not a direct source, for
the bulk of those issues debated during the 1 ate'Seventies. Indeed,
16
those sections of Bagehot's Economic Studies composed after the
publication of the Postulates, in 1876, contain many points which
are little more than a "rewrite" of Leslie's basic methodological
contributions. It would be unjust, however, to underestimate the
role of Bagehot and of later writers such as Ingram in the signifi¬
cant, if fleeting, popularity enjoyed by Leslie's views. For al¬
though he often wrote in literary and popular journals, Leslie's own
style was more often that of the philosopher or the pure social sci¬
entist, rather than that of a popularizer of vital issues.
PI an o.f Thi s Chapter
In this chapter, I have attempted to trace the historical de¬
velopment of Leslie's methodological views and to summarize the cen¬
tral features of his mature writings. In this manner I have hoped
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to indicate those aspects of his thoughts which, for good or ill,
would eventually gain some public recognition, and to uncover those
"hidden insights" in his methodological writings which were, unfor¬
tunately, neglected by his contemporaries. While some of the doc¬
trines in Leslie's methodological system can only be judged as
faulty and productive of much later confusion, it is my general con¬
clusion that he was the last, and in many senses, the best of the
early English Historical economists. After his death in 1882 there
remained only J. K. Ingram as a standard bearer of the "early"
historical tradition in England. Whatever else might be said in
Ingram's favor, he was unequal to the enormity of that task and was,
in fact, ill-equipped for it by virtue of his own philosophic pre¬
occupation with the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. Throughout
the 'Eighties and 'Nineties the Historical movement in England rapid¬
ly disintegrated into Comtist-Historicist (in the Popperian sense)
and German Historical factions. By the time of Marshall's Principles
and Keynes' On^ the Scope and Method of Political Economy there is
some question if anyone still understood the intent of the earlier
British School, or whether, perhaps, its perspective had not been
wholly obscured by the pseudo-debates of the 'Eighties and 1Nine-
Leslie's Life and Intellectual Foundations
The biographical accounts of Leslie's education and youth are
abbreviated to such a degree that we have only the barest sketch of
those influences which imparted the cast to his mature thoughts. In
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his introduction to the second edition of Leslie's Essays in Politi¬
cal Economy, Ingram tells us that his subject began his education at
King Williams College at an exceptionally early age and left there
to enter Trinity College, Dublin, when he was yet only fifteen.
Within three years he had gained a scholarship in classical studies.
And the following year he was awarded a gold medal in mental and
moral philosophy for exceptional performance at his degree examina¬
tion. At nineteen, with degree in hand, Leslie took up the practice
of law but gladly abandoned that profession some seven years later
when he received an appointment as Professor of Jurisprudence and
1 8
Political Economy at Queen's College, Belfast.
As a part of his own autobiography Leslie credited Sir Henry
Maine's early lectures on historical anthropology as a telling in¬
fluence on his own early intellectual development. But he quickly
added that "... the English economists of the future must study in
the schools of both .. . Sir Henry Maine ... [and] ... J. S. Mill."^
Whether we should accept Leslie's own hindsight account as an
accurate appraisal of the influences which played a primary role in
his intellectual development is, however, open to several major
questions. Although his essays often dwell upon the institutional
differences of the various nations of Europe and on the process of
historical evolution of these institutions (both themes in Maine's
lectures), there is a deeper and more fundamental strain present in
his writings. Virtually all of Leslie's criticisms of Orthodox
methodology turn upon an implicit parallel between the thought
patterns (or "games") traditionally encountered in philosophy and
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the corresponding types of methodological arguments often employed
by economists. It was in this light that he characterized orthodox
economics as "being infested" by "the disease of language which meta-
20physicians call the realism of the Schools." ("The Schools" re¬
ferring to the Thomistic-Aristotilian tradition in metaphysics and
epistemology.) In this same regard it is notable that Leslie never
actually distinguished economics as a separate science independent
from other forms of social study, and frequently referred to its
21theoretical and methodological aspects as "philosophy." It is
perhaps safest, then, to view Leslie's methodological discussions as
a combination of these two elements: the institutional relativism
which he derived from the lectures of Maine and philosophic concerns
which undoubtedly arose from his early studies in metaphysics and
British empiricism. As we progress through the various stages of
Leslie's intellectual development, it will become apparent that he
continually wavered back and forth from one of these issues to the
other, first taking up the study of economics as a science of human
motives, then turning to a descriptive and statistical study of the
conditions of land tenure in various nations, only to return once
again to the issue of economic a priprism, and finally, to consider
the historical and geographic patterns of price and wage fluctuations.
Early Essays
Leslie's earliest essay on an economic topic, "On the Love of
9 9
Money," " appeared in 1862 in an obscure journal which soon there¬
after "ceased publication." The contents of this article were not,
as might be assumed from the title, a moralistic disquisition on why
one should not love money, but rather comprised a detailed analysis
of what had served as money or wealth throughout the ages and what
different types of conduct had been promoted by the desire for its
23
acquisition. Although at this early date Leslie was less openly
critical of the orthodox position than he would eventually become,
it is not difficult to discover passages which are reflective of the
serious doubts over orthodox methodology which were even then troub¬
ling his mind. As one instance we quote the following:
... perhaps political economists have not escaped
a bias from their own phraseology, and are apt to
imagine in their scientific discussions a much
fuller explanation of the complete phenomena of
wealth, and a much closer approximation to the
complete philosophy of the subject, than lies
within their providence as completely circum¬
scribed by themselves at present.24
Although this essay was later relied upon by Symes in his paper "On
the Method of Political Economy" and was once again returned to in
his Outlines of an Industrial Science, it is questionable whether
either of these performances came close to the sophistication of
Leslie's early essay.
During the eight years following the publication of his "The
Love of Money" Leslie turned away from methodological concerns and
toward more topical issues. In 1863 he published a lengthy essay
25
entitled "The Wealth of Nations and the Slave Power" in which he
traced the history and intellectual arguments opposing the institu¬
tion of slavery. (Leslie thereby anticipated and may have inspired
the article on "Slavery and Serfdom" which Ingram prepared for the
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ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1885. Even so,
Ingram claimed in the book-length revision of this article that it
nr
was the first systematic treatment of the subject in English,
omitting any acknowledgement which might have been due to the then-
deceased Leslie.) In the subsequent two years (1864-1865) Leslie
published the first of a series of five articles dealing with the
quantity theory of money and prices and its application to the
economic history of European price fluctuations.
It was not until 1870 that Leslie again took up methodological
issues, this time in the context of a history of thought study con-
27
cerning "The Political Economy of Adam Smith." In Smith's writings
Leslie discovered a kindred spirit: a concern, like his own, with
inquiries into the particular customary and formal institutions
which distinguished and differentiated ages and societies and with
theories which were themselves built upon these differentiations.
Smith, Leslie claimed, was the founder of "historical research" in
28
British economics, a claim which was subsequently adopted by many
of the British Historical economists. Yet Leslie was not so blinded
by the virtues of the Wealth of Nations as to become insensitive to
its flaws. He warned that many of Smith's views were the product of
29
an age wedded to a belief in natural law and absolute truth, ' views
which he, himself, rejected.
While Leslie acknowledged that natural law arguments had served
as a powerful weapon in the liberal "revolt against the tyranny of
the folly and inequality of such human codes as the world had known
30
..." (i.e., those of Mercantilism), he argued vigorously against
the retension of natural law appeals as a part of the theoretical
31
underpinnings of "modern" economics. Smith, himself, was partly
excused from the force of these arguments since, according to Leslie
his writings contained:
Two essentially opposite systems of reasoning
respecting the fundamental laws of human so¬
ciety ... the former speculating a priori
about "Nature," and seeking to develop from a
particular hypothesis the "Natural" order of
things, the latter seeking to investigate in
history and the phenomena of the actual world
the different states of society and their an¬
tecedents or causes--or, in short, the real
as contrasted with the ideal, order of things.32
And because Smith, unlike many of his followers:
... subjected the phenomena of history and
the existing state of the world to a search¬
ing investigation, traced the actual econom¬
ic progress of different countries, the in¬
fluences of laws of succession, and of the
political distribution of property, the action
and reaction of legal and industrial changes,
and the real movements of wages and profits
so far as they could be ascertained. Nor was
he content with the inductions of the closet
from written evidence--though necessarily the
most important field of inductive investiga¬
tion in social phi 1osophy--he compared all
the phenomena which careful personal obser¬
vation, both in his own country and in France,
had brought under hic. view. 33
For Smith, then, "the Code of Nature" was not the idle daydream of
a spinner of social mythology, it was a very real empirical order di
covered from the extensive observation of many times and many places
While Leslie usually assumed a most tolerant and generous atti¬
tude in his interpretation of the writings of the founding fathers
of economics, including Ricardo, his judgement of those orthodox
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writers who were more nearly his contemporaries was not always so
beneficient. He discovered in most post-Ricardian economists, with
the exception of J. S. Mill, a strain of Continental Rationalism
and a priori reasoning a la Descartes and the Scholastics:
That the clearness with which a conception is
entertained gives evidence of its truth is a
proposition for which the maxim of an illus¬
trious philosopher might be cited: "Credid
me," said Descartes, "pro regula generali
sumere posse omne id quod valde di1ucide et
distincte conci pi chain verum esse." Modern
logic, nevertheless rejects the presumption,
and, as Mr. Mill has observed, no one can
have examined the sources of fallacious
thought without becoming deeply conscious
that a nice coherence and concatenation of
our ideas are apt to pass off with us for
evidence of their truth.34
His acceptance of intuitive certainty as the test for the falsity or
correctness of economic hypotheses inexorably led the orthodox econo¬
mist to a concern with abstract notions: notions which were intro¬
duced into the science without the least regard for their connection
with observable phenomena. In addition to the concept of "wealth
maximization," on which we have already commented, Leslie also
scrutinized the "excessive generalization" represented in the con¬
cepts of "an equality of wages and of prices," the Ricardian theory
of land rent and the equalization of profits under conditions of long
run market equilibrium. In each of these cases he discovered that
the orthodox theory required major modifications, concerned mostly
with institutional or customary constraints, before it could become
even a rough guide to a discussion of those economic conditions
actually observed in the world.
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It was due to the eventual recognition of similar criticisms
that modern economics would later develop the specialized branches
of "industrial organization," "resource economics," "agricultural
economics" and other fields dealing with "applied" problem solving.
While the orthodox economists may have provided a basic theoretic
perspective within which the discipline was able to develop a so¬
phisticated analytic structure, their unwillingness to acknowledge
the methodological validity of empirical studies, aimed at a deter¬
mination of the nature and effects of informal and formal constraints
upon the maximizing behavior of individuals and firms, was to sig¬
nificantly impede the progressive development of economics from a
social philosophy to a social science.
Early Empirical Studies
From the foregoing it might be presumed that Leslie was merely
a critical intellect, concerned only with launching destructive ar¬
guments against the methodological traditions of Nineteenth Century
economics. Yet this was far from the case; Leslie desired not only
the repudiation of erroneous doctrines, but, further, their replace¬
ment by a positive program for continuing economic research. In
pursuit of these goals he published in 1864 his historical study of
"The Distribution and Value of the Precious Metals in the Sixteenth
37
and Nineteenth Centuries" and followed this in 1865 by an article
38
dealing with contemporary data on this same topic. The most im¬
pressive of Leslie's early empirical studies, however, was his Land
Systems and Industrial Economy of Ireland, Engl and and Continental
no
39
Countries (1870), supplemented in 1869 by an essay on "The Land
40
System of France" and in 1871 by a lengthy study of "Financial
41
Reform." Leslie had attempted to develop a modified "relativist"
perspective on both the history of economic thought and the appli¬
cation of economic theory in his 1870 "Political Economy of Adam
Smith" and had argued for a consideration of the importance of
42
structural constraints in this same essay. Yet it is only within
the context of his more empirical studies that we can fully sense
the significance which he attached to these doctrines.
In an article on Irish land tenure first published in 1867 and
later reprinted as a chapter of his Land Systems, Leslie traced the
perpetual poverty and continual instability which plagued the region
to the historical and contemporary arrangement of "leases to farmers
[which, where they] existed at all, ... were for the most part too
short to permit of permanent improvements essential to husbandry
43
being made by tenants." Any improvements on the land, he noted,
became automatically the property of the landlord at the expiration
of the tenant's lease. There were thus no incentives for the workers
of the land to either improve the land's productivity or even to
preserve any improvements which might have been accomplished by
others. Although the solution to these difficulties was, in Leslie's
eyes, a simple matter of allowing for the legal enforcement of ren¬
tal contracts of a longer term and providing to tenants some guaran¬
tees of reimbursement for those improvements which they might add to
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the land, these proposals were considered by other economists as
45"interference" with the operations of "free competition."
in
While Leslie might have considerably strengthened his position and
reemphasized his perspective on property structures by an appropriate
consideration of the meaning of "free competition" considered in
abstracto without reference to a body of laws (or "rules of the
game"), he instead chose the Ricardian path of arguing that land-
rental contracts could not be free because land was a naturally mon-
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oponzed resource.
From these rather simple and hardly very original beginnings,
however, Leslie began to delve more deeply into the interaction
between the institutional or legal framework in which economic
actions took place and the quite different forms taken by these
actions. In an 1868 essay entitled "Political Economy and Emigra¬
tion" (also reprinted in his Land SystemsLeslie abandoned his
former attitude of deference toward the prevailing authorities of
orthodox political economy. In sharp and uncompromising language
he ridiculed their presumptions to universal knowledge without ob¬
servation:
... a school of economists of no small pre¬
tensions, strongly represented in Parliament,
supposes itself to be furnished with a com¬
plete apparatus of formulas, within which
all economic knowledge is comprised; --which
clearly and satisfactorily expounds all the
phenomena of wealth, and renders all further
investigation of the causes and effects of
the existing economy of society needless, and
even mischevious as tending to introduce doubt
and heresy into a scientific world of certain¬
ty and truth, discontent and disturbance into
a social world of order and prosperity. Po¬
litical writers and speakers of this school
have long enjoyed the double satisfaction of
beholding in themselves the masters of a
difficult study, and of pleasing the powers
that be, by lending the sanction of science
to all established institutions and customs
.. .48
It is a matter of some interest that J. S. Mill quoted this passage
with approval in his review of Leslie's Land Systems, and he himself
reiterated what he believed to be a warning against the too hasty
derivation of policy from theory:
The founders of Political Economy have left
two sorts of disciples: those who have in¬
herited their methods, and those who have
stopped short at their phrases; those who
have carried on the work of the masters, and
those who think that the masters have left
them no work to do. The former follow the
example of their teachers in endeavoring to
discern what principles are applicable to
particular cases, by analysizing its cir¬
cumstances; the latter believe themselves
to be provided with a set of catch-words
which they mistake for principles ... which
supersede analysis, and are applicable to
every variety of case.49
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In another essay also issued in 1868, Leslie added to his
other interests a fascination with the effects resulting from cus¬
tomary or cultural constraints on such "economic matters" as the
choice of a lifetime occupation or the rules of "fair dealing" in
ri
the transaction of exchanges."" This article was the first of a
number of cultural studies of which Mill stated, with obvious
oblivion to their true worth, that "No one [besides Leslie] was
able to write narratives of foreign visits at once so instructive
and so interesting."
It is perhaps no coincidence that during the same period when
Leslie was most intensely involved in his research on the legalities
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of land tenure and the customary constraints to free trade and the
free movement of labor, he also came to consider to wages-fund
doctrine as "excessively abstract." Although explicitly exempting
Mill from his attack on those who espoused this doctrine (even though
Mill's own repudiation of the wages-fund did not appear until over a
year later), Leslie vigorously opposed the continued use of the
wages-fund explanation for the determination of an average wage
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rate. In its place he suggested a micro-economic theory of wage
determination in somewhat the same vein as had Adam Smith, i.e.,
that wages were determined partly by the relative bargaining
strength of employees and employers and partly by the productivity
of labor in the production of goods. Although less explicitly
"structuralist" than other of his doctrines, this critique of the
wages-fund theory once again illustrated Leslie's omnipresent ten¬
dency to reduce theory from a generalized or "philosophic" position
to a more applied and testable form.
The Tone and Emphasis of Leslie's Empiricism
Throughout his inquiries into land tenure Leslie always re-
54ferred to "the facts," citing them in whatever form they were
available (either as personal observation of the phenomena con¬
sidered, as historical accounts or as statistical tables). The
bulk of his discussion concerning the conditions of land tenure
in various nations of Europe did not, however, rely upon "casual
observations" of the type so favored by British economists of the
turn of the century, but was rather comprised of correspondence
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with those who had long inhabited the respective regions and who
were thus in a position of greatest familiarity with their insti¬
tutions and peculiarities. Instead of being repelled by numerical
data, Leslie was always at great pains to include it in those in-
55
stances when it was available.
Leslie was far from disintegrating into a mere collection of
statistical data and historical examples, however. Instead of be¬
coming more and more of a narrow historical-statistician, Leslie's
interests in property and legal structures was ever on the increase.
As late as 1868 he penned what was perhaps his definitive statement
concerning the economic effects of the legal structure of land
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tenure in Ireland. In 1872 we find him concerned with the effects
of geography and distance on the isolation of markets and the smooth
57operation of a quantity theory of money and prices, and in 1871
his most sophisticated structural analysis, entitled "Financial
Reform," appeared as a contribution to a volume issued by the pres¬
tigious Cobden Club.^
Although Leslie was ever the firm advocate of increasing em¬
pirical research in economics, he was far from the German Historical
ideal of the economic historian who collected random bits of data
which neither related to, nor were meant to relate to, any unifying
explanation of human behavior. As he himself expressed the critique
of the purely historical-statistical approach to economics:
It is curious that some who ... regard the
numerical statement of facts, and the mar¬
shalling of tables of figures as the proper
business of the statistician, nevertheless
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speak of statistics as science. But as the
eminent economist Roscher has observed, num¬
bering or numerical statement is only an in¬
strument of which any branch of science may
avail itself, and can never, in itself, con¬
stitute a science ...
No branch of science, no scientific body,
confines itself to the observation of phen¬
omena without seeking to interpret them or
ascertain their laws ... serious error, and
even practical mischief, have followed from
attention merely to the recurrence of sta¬
tistical facts without inquiry into their
causes.59
While "facts" of a specific nature could be useful in testing
economic theories and suggesting modifications for the improvement
of these theories, facts of a more general type, i.e., those con¬
cerned with the basic social structures which differentiated econo¬
mies, were, Leslie realized, the fundamental concern of the compe¬
tent theorist. As he himself stated:
No ... theory respecting the effect of con¬
sumption on either the nature or the amount
of wealth, can be forthcoming without a study
of the history and the entire structure of
society, and the laws which they disclose
...we need an investigation, not only of the
motives and impulses which prompt to the ac¬
quisition of wealth, but also of those which
withdraw men from its pursuit, or give other
directions to their energies.
Yet even in Leslie's writings we find the foreshadowing of the
belief in a science of history and of historical laws. In both his
empirical work on British and Continental land systems and in his
later methodological essays, he paid lip service to the idea that
economics "... should investigate the laws of evolution of which the
present economic structure and state of (any particular) ... society
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61is the outcome." Although this orientation never really played
any major part in Leslie's research other than to make him sensi¬
tive to those features of particular property arrangements which
would lead to their increasing stability or instability, it
nevertheless was frequently lurking in the background of his writings,
ready to be seized upon and developed by the Ingrams, Cunninghams
c o
and Marshalls of future years.
Leslie's Mature Methodological Views
To a great extent Leslie's mature views concerning methodologi¬
cal subjects were merely a more consistent and completed version
of the positions first outlined in his early essays on "The Love of
Money," "The Political Economy of Adam Smith" and his various empiri¬
cal studies. The "Realism of the Schools" as. applied to economic
concepts was discussed early in the course of an essay Leslie com¬
posed on demography entitled "Political Economy and Emigration"
(1868):
In few countries (of Europe) ... is this branch
of political philosophy (economics) less care¬
fully or commonly studied (than in Engl and),how¬
ever commonly its terms are in use; and it be¬
comes daily more evident that the air ought to
be cleared of clouds of confusion enveloping
these very terms. For instead of facilitating
thought, as the terms of a science should do,
they have come to supersede it; they are taken
to settle several problems about which economic
inquiry is almost in its infancy; and, what is
yet more misleading, they have caused different
and even opposite things to be confounded under
one name ...^
And the extension of his criticism of "realistic" concepts to such
issues as the existence of a wages-fund, the average rate of wages
and the long-run equality of profits was discussed at length in his
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1873 "Economics and Statistics. As a replacement for these
"generalizations of which the world ... has grown a little doubtful
and not a little weary," Leslie suggested that "the collection of
statistics and careful inquiry into facts" might lead the economist
to "statements which were much closer approximations to the truth."
Even though Leslie recognized that the a priori approach to
political economy had been a useful technique for impressing the
subject on the minds of the uninitiated and was thus responsible
for much of the original esteem attached to the subject, he never¬
theless believed that this same methodology had largely inhibited
any real scientific growth which might otherwise have occurred
during the history of the subject. It was in an attempt to reori¬
ent economic investigation toward a more empirical and scientific
methodology that Leslie eventually declared war on what he charac¬
terized as "deduction" and the excessive use of "deductive techni¬
ques .
In evaluating Leslie's attack upon the use of deduction in
economic investigations, it must be recognized that he was not
directly concerned with those "epistemological" or meta-scientific
issues addressed by Whewell. Nor were his remarks intended to
exalt history and historical inquiry over "theory," as were the
similar-sounding anti-deductive writings of the German Historical
School. Leslie was, in fact, quite "moderate" in his stance on
this issue, although not oblivious to the passionate debates which
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were then raging on the Continent over this very question. "De¬
duction" for Leslie was by no means to be abandoned in economic
research, at least when that term was restricted to strictly in-
68ferential reasoning from premises to testable conclusions. Leslie
was mainly anxious that the past damage done to the science by de¬
duction from "false premises" would not continue into the future,
that arguments based upon the faulty concepts of an economic man
or of wealth maximization would no longer be used in political de¬
bates thus bringing scorn to bear on anyone professing to be a
political economist.^
As we have already mentioned, Leslie was always generous in
his evaluation of the founders of political economy, and this atti¬
tude was by no means eschewed when he turned to their opinions re¬
garding deduction. Both Smith and Ricardo were explicitly exempted
from his strictures against deductivists, Smith for the obvious
reasons already discussed, and Ricardo for reasons dissented from
by all other British Historical economists. Although Leslie was by
no means perfectly sanguine about Ricardo's role in the development
of political economy, he did believe that he had been unjustly char¬
acterized as the founder and chief advocate of deduction in economics.
The differences between Ricardo and Roscher, the founder of the Ger¬
man Historical School, were, Leslie believed, "for the most part,
matters of tone rather than of principle.Similarly, Leslie
held that the widespread debate over inductive vs. deductive methods
in economics and the other social sciences was somewhat of a mis¬
understanding. The correct perspective was to view the conflict as
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a matter of timing rather than of substance.
For Leslie, then, both inductive techniques (i.e., empirical
studies of certain types of economic and economic-related social
phenomena) and deductive techniques (i.e., the construction of a
systematic body of theory to explain economic activity) were vital
to any mature science of society. Deductions (i.e., theories or
hypotheses) were, however, properly founded on (or formulated with
regard to) "the facts," and the enterprise of fact gathering (of
induction) had been largely neglected in British economics since
the days of the Wealth of Nations. Induction was, therefore, "the
urgent work of the present" for economics had yet to properly attain
"the deductive stage"^ concerning a large number of the questions
which it was called upon to answer.
Tendencies, Disturbing Causes and Incomplete Hypotheses
From his basic beliefs concerning the scientific character of
economics and the role of inductive and deductive techniques within
its methodology, Leslie evolved a number of secondary positions re¬
garding the orthodox doctrines of tendencies, disturbing causes and
the incomplete nature of economic hypotheses and predictions. While
recognizing that there was some sense in the Classical's talk of
"disturbing causes," in that a theory could not usually include all
possible variables and thus was subject to changes in the ceteris
paribus conditions on which it rested, Leslie stressed the impor¬
tance of being specific about the types and relative weights
attached to any potential disturbing cause. Any attempt to
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"patch up" the predictions of a theory after the failure of the
theory he recognized as little more than the arbitrary introduction
73of ad hoc hypotheses. Whereas a more proper procedure might be
to search for those particular formal and informal social constraints
which adversely affected the consequences predicted by the theory.
Leslie also attacked the orthodox economists who claimed that
political economy could not and should not be expected to predict
74events actually occuring in the world. He fully recognized the
close relationship between this point of view and the characteri¬
zation of economics as an "incomplete" study of human action, yet
his response to this connection was quite different from that of
either Cairnes or J. S. Mill. Instead of rejecting the predictive
power of economic theory due to its "incomplete" character, Ingram
rejected the incomplete and isolated status of economics as a dis-
75cipline concerned only with "economic" or "wealth-related" motives.
That Leslie sought for a social science capable of dealing with the
actualities of human behavior and untied to artificial distinctions
between "economic" and "non-economic" behavior is clear from the
following passages from his essay on "Political Economy and Sociol¬
ogy":
All men, it may be said, desire health, and
"in the absence of disturbing causes" will
seek it. But can a science of health be
based on this assumption, or the conduct of
mankind be predicted from it?
No such principle as "the desire for wealth,"
in the sense of a single, universal motive,
whose consequences are uniform and can be
foreseen, really exists. Adam Smith does
not use the phrase, and his doctrine re¬
specting the nature of wealth shows the
impossibility of using it as a key to the
movements of the economic world.
His attack upon the purely abstract, "philosophic" or "metaphys¬
ical" character of orthodox economic speculation is also summarized
in several pages in that essay and in a later study entitled "The
Known and the Unknown in the Economic World." We again quote a few
short excerpts for reasons of illustration:
Mr. Cairnes ... concurs with Mr. Mill that
positive, unconditional conclusions are be¬
yond the reach of the economist, since he
does not take into account, or even know,
all the forces at work, much less can
measure them with precision. An entire
lecture in Mr. Cairnes' Logical Method of
Political Economy is devoted to prove that
quantitative exactness is unattainable in
the science, and that its conclusions being
only hypothetically true, and representing
only several tendencies "in the absence of
disturbing causes" ought not to affect the
semblance of numerical exactness J7
Political economy,(the orthodox economist)
tells you, with an air of offended dignity,
is a science of tendencies in the long run,
and in the absence of disturbing causes; it
does not predict in individual cases. A
great general used to say that a man who
was good at excuses was never good for any¬
thing else; and nearly as much may be said
of a theory.78
Miscellaneous Methodological Issues in Leslie's Writings
In concluding this evaluation of Leslie's methodology, it is
desirable to consider briefly two of the more minor, but still well
integrated, features of his general perspective on social investiga-
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tions. First of all, Leslie, like most Nineteenth Century econo¬
mists of both the Orthodox and Historical Schools, was a "relati¬
vist" in matters of the history of economic thought. "Throughout
the history of political economy," he wrote, "... the personal his¬
tory, education, and character of particular writers has borne no
79small part in its developments and forms." And, indeed, it
appears that he was somewhat attracted to J. S. Mill's characteri¬
zation of economics as a "mentaliStic" science, as well as to psy¬
cho! ogistic investigations into the social-environmental "causes"
for the proffering of particular social theories. Although this
extreme form of relativism, which might be labelled "epistemologi¬
cal relativism," was common in the writings of the later British
and German Historical Schools, it was in no way implied by other
of Leslie's own views. It can only be usefully interpreted as a
support for his views concerning social and economic policy (i.e.,
as a subtle form of ad hominem to be used against political oppon¬
ents .
Finally, Leslie must be understood as both a social scientist
and a social theorist. He clearly recognized that economics played
a role not only in determining the "truth or falsity" of certain
hypotheses, but also "as a factor in the formation of public opinion
80
and policy." Although there is some indication that Leslie re¬
gretted this dual character of social theories, he was quite ready
to act upon it and to voice his own views concerning the optimal set
of social policies. Here again the main difference between Leslie's
involvement in policy issues and the similar involvement of his
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contemporaries in both the Orthodox and Historical camps was that
Leslie seldom claimed the authority of either "absolute theory" or
"inevitable historical trends" in justification for his opinions.
Although often passionate in his denouncement of contemporary social
on
practices and institutions, Leslie was always at pains to emphasize
the conditional and transitory character of the knowledge which so¬
cial science could contribute to the arena of public controversy.
Concluding Remarks
Leslie was unquestionably the last of the truly great figures
in the British Historical tradition. Although economics would
probably have been more deeply influenced by the dogmatic treatises
of J. K. Ingram, the popularizations of Walter Bagehot or the pon¬
derous tomes penned by various economic historians around the turn
of the century, it was Leslie's writings that provided the inspira¬
tion for whatever remnants remained of an empirical economic metho¬
dology. The supporters of a nominally "historical economics" could
be found in British academies for many decades after the 1880's, but
the movement no longer possessed any of its former dynamic origin¬
ality. Its advocates were restricted to mouthing worn and often
irrelevant slogans directed against an "Orthodox economics" which
had long since died and been resurrected in new clothing by Marshall
and the early Neoclassicals. The "historical economists" of the
closing decades of the Nineteenth Century would either be justifiably
ignored as cranks, crackpots and methodological quacks or they would
be, often just as justifiably, lumped into a heterogeneous category
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containing Marxists, Georgists and other assorted political malcon¬
tents. The burning intelligence and dedication to authentic social
science which Leslie brought to his study of economics would not
again be seen until well into the Twentieth Century, and in the
interim all memory of the fundamental character of his methodological
critiques would be erased from the conciousness of new generations
of economists. F. A. Hayek has observed that of all the periods of
intellectual development, today's scholars are least familiar with
o o
the mid and latter Nineteenth Century, especially in Britain. Yet
it was during that period that most of the basic meta-economic atti¬
tudes still dominating our science first received their systematic
formulation. It is in the debates of that period that we can first
recognize the "as if" doctrine of Milton Friedman, the "operation¬
al ism" of T. W. Hutchison and the extreme rationalism of Mises and
Machlup. It was during this period that the irreverent attitudes of
many economists toward "empirical realities" first gained professional
support, and it was during this period that the case for economics
as a science of actual human behavior and existing social structures
was first openly defended. To reduce the debates of the period,
especially those debates centering around figures such as Leslie
and Whewell, to a conflict between "historians and theorists" is to
entirely obfuscate the true issues at hand. It was in the writings
of Leslie and of his antagonist, J. E. Cairnes, that those issues
were most lucidly stated.
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Footnotes to Chapter IV
1. J. A. Schumpeter, A History of Economic Analysis (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 823. Despite Schumpeter's
high regard for Leslie's empirical work, however, his assessment of
his overall methodological position was somewhat less than totally
accurate. He says in part:
The two papers that present his methodology or,
as he preferred to call it, philosophy of social
sciences ... read much like a reformulation of the
Schmollerian program; in view of the dates of their
first publication (1876 and 1879) this should not
induce us to deny them originality.
Ibid.
As we will show conclusively in this chapter and the supporting foot¬
notes, Leslie's point of view had very little in common with "the
Schmollerian program" and was formed long before 1876.
2. A brief account of Mill's assessment of Leslie as an econo¬
mist and as a journalist is presented in J. K. Ingram's "Biographical
Notice of the Author" appended as a preface to T. E. C. Leslie's
Essays in Political Economy, 2nd edition, original printing 1888
(New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1969), especially pp. x-xi.
Mill's review of Leslie's Land Systems and Industrial Econo¬
my of Ireland, England and Continental Countries (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1870) is reprinted in J. S. Mill, Col 1ected Works,
Vol. V, one of two volumes appearing under the subtitle of Essays on
Economics and Society, edited by J. M. Robson with an introduction
by Lord Robbins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp.
669-685. The evaluation of Leslie as "one of the best living wri¬
ters on applied political economy ..." appears on p. 671.
3. In his "Biographical Notice," 0£. cit., J. K. Ingram refers
to Leslie as "... one of the ablest and most original English econo¬
mists of the present century; and in his Hi story of Political Econo¬
my (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1967) he faborably
reviews his works and compares him to Comte, pp. 222-225. See also
p. 141. Ingram's treatment of Smith's economics refers explicitly
to Leslie several times (Ibid., pp. 87, 107, 109),and it obviously
owes a great deal more to Leslie's pioneering study than is indi¬
cated in these references.
4. See the previous footnote for Ingram's references to Leslie
in his treatment of Smith.
5. L. H. Haney's History of Economic Thought, 4th enlarged
edition (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 529-532, 540,contains a
brief but excellent sketch of some of Leslie's main methodological
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positions and his general political perspective.
T. W. Hutchison's A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-
1949 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953y~a1so contains numerous refer¬
ences to Leslie and to the British Historical School in general,
but it does not contain any extensive consideration of his meta-
economic views.
6. William A. Scott, The Development of Economics (New York:
D. Appleton-Century Co., 19337, pp. 510-514.
7. Of the leading histories of economic thought, Mark Blaugh's
Economic Theory in Retrospect, revised edition (Homewood: Richard
D. Irwin, 1968), Eric Roll's A History of Economic Thought, 3rd
edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964) and Jacob Oser and
William C. B1anchfield's The Evolution of Economic Thought (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Johanovich, 1975) all omit any reference
to Leslie.
8. R. B. Ekelund, Jr. and R. F. Hebert, A History of Economic
Theory and Method (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975"), pp. 199-201 , con¬
tains a discussion of Leslie in conjunction with a broader discuss¬
ion concerned with J. K. Ingram and Auguste Comte.
9. Leslie's essay "On the Philosophical Method of Political
Economy" was first published in Hermathena, Vol. ii (1876) and is
reprinted in his Essays in Political Economy (hereafter abbreviated
as Essays), pp. 163-190.
10. Walter Bagehot, "The Postulates of English Political Econ¬
omy," Fortnightly Review, Vol. 19 (1876), pp. 215-242, 720-741.
11. David Symes, Outlines of an Industrial Science (London:
Henry S. King and Co., 1876). See chapter 5, page 101 of this disser¬
tation for a discussion of Symes' lack of notice in England.
12. T. E. C. Leslie's "The Love of Money" is reprinted in his
Essays, op. cit., pp. 1-8.
13. David Symes, "On the Method of Political Economy," West-
Minister Review, N.S., Vol. 40 (July, 1871), pp. 206-218.
14. David Symes, Outlines of an Industrial Science, op. cit.,
p. i x.
15. T. E. C. Leslie, Land Systems and Industrial Economy of
Ireland, England and Continental Countries, op. cit. (hereafter
abbreviated as Land Systems).
16. Walter Bagehot, Economic Studies (Stanford: Academic
Reprints, 1963), pp. 66fn.
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17. Beyond several scant citations, J. N. Keynes, the methodol¬
ogist of the early Neoclassicals, hardly recognizes Leslie's exist¬
ence. When he does, he is quick to note that "the problems which
he (Leslie) asserts are left entirely unsolved by the deductive
method are mostly of a purely historical character," and that Les¬
lie's own attempts at problem solving "constantly imply or presuppose
the use of a deductive or a priori method of reasoning on fundamen¬
tals" (J. N. Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy, 4th
edition (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 318fn.) See also Ibid.,
pp. 314-315, 321 where Keynes attempts to establish a link between
Leslie and the later German Historical School.
In appreciating the attitudes of the Cambridge Neoclassicals
toward the Historical School, it is also of some significance that
Marshall, in attempting to maintain his usual pose of impartiality
in correspondence with Foxwell, described his own views as follows:
Most of the suggestions which I made on the
proofs of Keynes' Scope and Method were aimed
at bringing it more into harmony with the
views of Schmoller ... It still remains true
that as regards method I regard myself midway
between Keynes + Sidgwick + Cairnes and
Schmoller + Ashley.
R. H. Coase, "Marshall on Method," Journal of
Law and Economics, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (Apri1,
1975TTPP. 27-28.
The only "historical" alternative to the orthodox position
of "Keynes + Sidgwick + Cairnes" was, thus, in Marshall's mind, the
evolutionary history of Ashley or the pseudo-Marxism of Schmoller.
18. See Ingram's "Biographical Notice" appended to Leslie's
Essays, op. cit., pp. xix-x. A short sketch of Leslie's life and
writings is also to be found in Henry Higgs (ed.), Pal grave1s
Dictionary of Political Economy, Vol. II (London: Macmil1 an, 1926),
pp. 596-598 and in Sir Leslie Stephens and Sir Sidney Lee (eds.),
Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XI (London: Oxford University
Press, 1921*77 pp. 987-988.
19. T. E. C. Leslie, Essays, op. cit., p.xfn.
20. Ibid., p. 3; see also Essays, p. 166 and Land Systems, op.
cit., p. 85.
21. Thus, for instance, Leslie states, "No other branch of
philosophy is still so deeply tinctured with the realism of the
schools as economic science." (Essays, op. ci_t., p. 166) See also
Land Systems, op. cit., p. 85.
22. "On the Love of Money," confined in Essays, op. £it., pp.
1-8.
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the Method of Political Economy" and his Outlines of an Industrial
Science and referred to in a lesser extent by Bagehot in his Economic
Studies. Yet Leslie's illustrations of this principle, which may, in
part, have been drawn from Maine's lectures, are of special interest
for the systematic way in which they arrange the central motivational
objects of different types and different stages of society. Thus
pastoral and nomadic peoples hold wealth in livestock or in those
items which are highly portable, and their descendents may follow
suit for numerous generations after this practice has ceased to be
functional. Agricultural peoples, however, develop wealth holdings
primarily in the form of land and large families, while urban dwell¬
ers hold wealth in a multiplicity of forms, depending on the poli¬
tical stability and the cultural backgrounds of their populations.
24. Essays, op. cit., p. 3.
25. Leslie's article on "The Wealth of Nations and the Slave
Power" first appeared in the February, 1863, issue of Macmillan‘s
Magazine and is reprinted in his Essays, op. cit., pp. 9-20.
26. Ingram stated of his Encyclopedia Britannica article on
"Slavery" that "That article was, so far as I am aware, the first
attempt in English to give a complete account of slavery and serf¬
dom in ancient, medieval and modern times." (J. K. Ingram, A
History of Slavery and Serfdom (London: Adam and Charles Black,
1895), p. ix.) To take this claim at all seriously, however, we
must place the stress solely on the modifying clause "a complete
account of slavery in ancient, medieval and modern times," for
not only had Leslie's essay appeared in 1863, but J. E. Cairnes'
massive study of slavery in the Americas was published and widely
known in 1862, twenty-three years before Ingram's article appeared
in the 1885 Encyclopedia Britannica. For Cairnes' contribution to
this issue, see his The Slave Power (New York: Carleton Publish¬
ers, 1862).
27. Leslie's "The Political Economy of Adam Smith" first
appeared in the Fortnightly Review of November 1 , 1870, and was
reprinted in his Essays, op. ci t., pp. 21-40.
28. Leslie stated of Smith's approach to economic inquiry:
... his method, though combining throughout
a vein of unsound a priori speculation, was
in a large measure inductive.
Essays, op. cit., p. 23.
See also the quote from Leslie's Essays reproduced on p. 107 of this
chapter and Essays, op. cit., p. 37. In his earlier essay, "The
Wealth of Nations and the Slave Power," Leslie had also expressed
his appreciation for the historical character of much of Smith's
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29. In referring to Smith's belief in natural law and his ten¬
dency toward an absolutist conception of social theory, Leslie stated
that:
What he did not see was that his own system,
... was the product of a particular history;
that what he regarded as the System of Na¬
ture was a descendant of the System of Na¬
ture of the ancients, in a form fashioned
by the ideas and circumstances of his own
time, and coloured by his disposition and
course of 1 i fe.
Essays, op. cit., p. 22.
30. Ibid.
31. According to Leslie, the Code of Nature was a descendant
of the Greco-Roman belief in a pre-societal order. In all of its
"variety of forms and disguises" it involved "one fundamental fall¬
acy, of reasoning a priori from assumptions obtained, not by the
interrogation but by the anticipation of Nature; what is assumed
as Nature being ... a mere conjecture respecting its constitution
and arrangements." All the various reformulations of this doctrine
undertaken in the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries only
helped "to thicken the confusion perpetually arising between the
real and the ideal, between that which by assumption ought to be
and that which actually is." (Essays, op. cit., pp. 24-25.)
32. Essays, op. cit., pp. 23-24, 31. From Smith, Leslie
believed, had descended:
...two systems of political economy ... one
... reasoning entirely from hypothetical laws
or principles of nature, and discarding in¬
duction, not only for the assessment of its
premises, but even for the verification of
its deductive conclusions; the other ...
reasoning sometimes, it is true, from pure
hypotheses, but also from experience and
shrinking from no corrections which the test
of experience may require in deductions. Of
the two schools distinguished by their me¬
thods, the first finds in assumptions re¬
specting the nature of man, and the course of
conduct it prompts, a complete "natural" or¬
ganization of the economic world, and aims at
the discovery of "natural prices," "natural
wages," and "natural profits."
Essays, op. cit., p. 24.
1 30
33. Essays, op. ci_t., p. 33. For Leslie's interpretation of
Smith's Code of Nature as ultimately empirical, see Ibid., p. 35.
34. Essays, op. cit., p. 143.
35. Leslie's criticism of the doctrine of a "tendency to
equality" in both wages and profits was first expressed in his essay
on "The Political Economy of Adam Smith" in Essays, op. cit., pp.
37-39. He stated, in part, that, "The truth is that the doctrine
of a tendency to equality is a mere theorem in political economy;
and a theorem which imports the tendency only under special condi¬
tions ... conditions the opposite of those which prevail in the
present industrial world." (Essays, op. cit., p. 39.) It was not
until much later that Leslie sought to make specific all those
conditions required for a movement toward equilibrium. Among the
conventional considerations dealing with monopolized markets, in¬
stitutional constraints, the effects of distance on market separ¬
ation and dynamic effects of economic growth (Ibid.), Leslie would
eventually "center in" upon the assumption of perfect knowledge.
Not only did he believe that this assumption obscured the true
dimensions of economic decision-making, but he was especially con¬
cerned to stress its increasing inapplicability in consideration
of advanced societies, rather than simple tribal groups:
The full knowledge and foreknowledge lately
claimed for political economy in modern
commercial society can exist only at an
opposite stage of development, at which
human business and conduct are determined,
not by individual choice, or the pursuit
of wealth, or commercial principles, but by
immemorial ancestral customs.
Essays, op. cit., p. 222.
It might ... be not irrationally conjectured
that in a little village at the present day
every man knows all his neighbors affairs.
To jump from that to the conclusion that every¬
body in England knows the affairs of every¬
body else is the leap that Ricardo and his
followers have made.
Ibid., p. 232.
(It is rather startling that Leslie seems to have had a well-develop¬
ed notion of the concept of a market as a social institution "the
consequence of human action, but not of human intention" some seven¬
ty years before Hayek developed this idea into his critique of social¬
ism and centrally planned economies:
It is a fundamental error of the a priori or
deductive political economy that Tt takes no
cognizance of the cardinal fact that the
movement of the economic world has been one
from simplicity to complexity, from uni¬
formity to diversity, from unbroken custom
to change, and, therefore, from the known
to the unknown.
Essays, op. cit., p. 224.)
For other references to Leslie's critique of the perfect knowledge
assumption of early Neoclassical economics, see his Essays, op. cit.
pp. 228-229; and for the extension of this argument to the quantity
theory of money, to which he preferred a theory of regional price
changes and an examination of the determinants of price levels be¬
tween market areas, see his essay on "The Distribution and Value of
the Precious Metals in the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,"
Essays , op. cit., pp. 269-300.
Perhaps the most famous of Leslie's attacks on the "gen¬
eralizations" of orthodox political economy was his critique of
the wages-fund theory, which first appeared in his "Political
Economy and Emigration," reprinted in his Land Systems, op. cit.,
pp. 85-116 (see especially pp. 87-88), and which was subsequently
expanded upon in his 1868 essay on "political Economy and the Rate
of Wages," reprinted in Land Systems, op. cit., pp. 357-379. It
was further systematized and refined in his review of Cairnes'
Leading Principles (1874), reprinted in Essays, op. cit., pp. 41-
53 (see especially pp. 44-46), and was finalized in his "The
Movement of Agricultural Wages in Europe," (1874), reprinted in
Essays, op. cit., pp. 364-383 (see especially pp. 379-383).
36. I do not mean to imply by these comments that the econo¬
mists of the early British Historical School were "without error."
Their involvement with historicism, in Popper's sense, was cer¬
tainly to their demerit as was their often excessive appeals to a
purely "verbal realism" (discussed in the concluding chapter of
this dissertation). Leslie, while frequently over-zealous in his
attacks on orthodox writers of his own time, was, however, seldom
at fault in any of these more common ways. His most grievous
error was to become excessively involved with the sociology, or
better, the psychology, of social investigation and to too fre¬
quently partake of the psychological interpretation of political
economy emphasized and developed by J. S. Mill.
37. Essays, op. cit., pp. 269-300.
38. "The New Gold Mines and Prices in Europe," first printed
in the June, 1865, issue of the North British Review and later re¬
printed in Essays, op. cit., pp. 301-331.
An even later article concerned with a summary of previous
arguments and their application to a more limited question was
"Prices in Germany in 1872," Fortnightly Review (November 1, 1872),
also included in Essays, op. cit_., pp. 332-355.
39. T. E. C. Leslie, Land Systems, op. cit.
40. T. E. C. Leslie, "The Land System of France," appearing in
J. W. Probyn (ed.), Systems of Land Tenure of Various Countries,
Series of Essays Pub!ished Under the Sanction of the Cobden Club,
new edition, revised and corrected (London: Cassell, Petter, Galpin
and Co., 1869), pp. 291-312. Leslie demonstrated once again his
concern with alternative property structures in his first intro¬
ductory paragraph to this essay:
The object of this essay is to describe the
Land System of France in respect of the dis¬
tribution of landed property in that country,
with the rural organisation in which it re¬
sults, and to examine its causes and effects.
In considering its causes, laws and customs
relating to property (including succession
and transfer), and to tenure, of necessity
form prominent objects of inquiry; but their
operation is so bound up with that of eco¬
nomical causes and conditions, that we should
miss in place of obtaining clearness by
separating what may be termed the legal from
the economical class of subjects ...
Ibid., p. 1.
41. T. E. C. Leslie, "Financial Reform," appearing in Cobden
Club Essays, Second Series, 1871-1872 (London: Cassell, Petter and
Galpin, 1872), pp. 189-264. This is by far the best example of
Leslie's skills as a structural political economist. Although the
amount of material available for a study of questions concerning
customs and excise taxes was, no doubt, of vast proportions, Leslie'
essay skillfully combined the central points which should be found
in such a study with an unusually rich assortment of original sugges
tions. In the first few pages of the essay we discover an anticipa¬
tion of Hayek's conception of the market as a vast and supra-
intelligible calculating machine (see fn.35 of this chapter for an
additional reference to this same concept) and a noteworthy express¬
ion of the 1 ittle-researched connection between changing prices
and long-run effects on changing tastes (Ibid., pp. 195, 200).
Also included in the essay are anticipations of Mises' doctrine of
"the effects of prior market intervention as a justification for
further intervention" (Ibid., p. 206), an appreciation for the
intra-national redistributional effects of tariff legislation
(Ibid., p. 213), numerous examples of the inflexibility of bureau¬
cratic administration of economic affairs (Ibid., pp. 225-227) and
a realization of the increased administrative and uncertainty costs
borne by those businesses liable to possible government intervention
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(and thus the flow of capital funds from these enterprises to
others) (Ibid., p. 240).
42. Leslie's expressions of the historical relativism of
economic doctrines sometimes did border upon an assertion of the
historical relativity of all social science. In his essay on "The
Political Economy of Adam Smith," for instance, he states that:
I venture to maintain ... that political econo¬
my is not a body of natural laws in the true
sense or of universal and immutable truths, but
an assemblage of speculations and doctrines which
are the result of a particular history, coloured
even by the history and character of its chief
writers; that, so far from being of no country,
and unchangeable from age to age, it has varied
much in different ages and countries, and even
with different expositors in the same age and
country ...
Essays, op. cit., p. 21.
Later in this same essay he says of Adam Smith that, "... had he
lived even two generations later, his general theory of the organ¬
ization of the economic world and the results of the competition
for economic life would have been cast in a very different mode."
(Essays, op. cit., p. 39)
43. T. E. C. Leslie, "The State of Ireland in 1867," reprinted
in Land Systems, op. cit., pp. 5-33 (see especially p. 14).
44. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
45. It is noteworthy that J. S. Mill defended Leslie's stand
in his review article on the Land Systems, and that he was parti¬
cularly sharp in rebuking those who "believe themselves to be pro¬
vided with a set of catch-words, which they mistake for principles--
free-trade, freedom of contract, competition, demand and supply, the
wages-fund, individual interest, desire of wealth &c.--which super¬
sede analysis, and are applicable to every variety of cases without
the trouble of thought." (J. S. Mill, Collected Works, op. cit.,
p. 671.)
Leslie's flexibility in considering matters of economic
legislation and his scientific attitude toward even those issues
with which he was most passionately involved is well illustrated
by his refusal to become caught up in the issue of which form of
economic organization was "best" in agriculture. As he expressed
this matter in another of his 1867 essays entitled "The Peasantry
and Farms of Belgium, 1867":
... to Mr. Harrison's question--"Are small
farms or large farms best?"--we answer, Both
are best. Not only because there are in all
countries ... places specially adapted for
each, but also because the existence of both
creates various experiments and improvements,
which may be transferred from one to the
other ...
Land Systems, op. cit., p. 337.
46. Unfortunately, Mill's defense, like Leslie's original ar¬
gument, turned on the "natural monopoly" characteristics of land
ownership rather than stressing that there was no such thing as
"free competition" without the prior specification of a legal code
( a property rights structure) for defining the rules of legitimate
competition. For Leslie's argument, see Land Systems, op. cit.,
p. 28; and for Mill's discussion, in a similar vein, see his
Collected Works, op. cit., pp. 672-673. Mill even went so far as
to rely upon a mixture of arguments made popular by Locke, and
later by Proudhon, arguments which maintain that land is properly
a social good which has been provisionally allocated to the care of
private individuals as a public trust.
47. Leslie's article on "Political Economy and Emigration" was
originally published in Fraser's Magazine for May, 1868, and is re¬
produced in Land Systems, op. cit., pp. 85-116.
48. Land Systems, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
49. J. S. Mill, Collected Works, op. cit., pp. 671-672. In the
extension of his remarks, Mill states:
May I venture to suggest that there are no such
principles of political economy as those which
(Leslie's critics) believe themselves to be vio¬
lating? The principles of political economy, as
of every other department of knowledge, are a
different thing from its practical precepts.
The same principles require different precepts,
wherever different means are required for the
same ends ...
Ibid., pp. 674-675.
50. For Leslie's analysis of the customary constraints opera¬
ting on the residents of a small farming village, see his "Ireland
in 1868," Land Systems, pp. 39-40. A further example dealing with
the case of the informal (non-legal) institution of primogenitor and
of the differences in job choice between eldest and younger sons of
any given family is found in Leslie's "Auve-rge" (1874), reprinted in
his Essays, op. cjt., pp. 415-437 (see especially, pp. 419-421).
51. It was during this same period that Leslie came to oppose
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economic a priorism and to connect it with the "realism of the
Schools," which he had formerly attacked in his 1862 "The Love of
Money." We quote the central passage:
In no other branch of philosophy indeed, unless
metaphysics itself, does the ancient mist of
realism continue so to "darken counsel by words
without knowledge." A resemblance has been seen
by a philosopher in a number of different things
viewed in one particular light, and a common name
has been given to them with reference only to
that point of resemblance ... In like manner, a
phrase used at first to signify merely a tenden¬
cy of things under particular conditions comes
to stand for a universal law or principle of
nature, and a generalization, which originally
threw a new light upon phenomena, finally in¬
volves them in almost impenetrable obscurity.
"Political Economy and Emigration" (1868, re¬
printed in Land Systems, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
The quote from Mill is found in Ingram's "Biographical Notice" to
Leslie's Essays, op. cit., pp. x-xi.
52. J. S. Mill's recantation of the wages-fund doctrine is to
be found in his "Thornton on Labour and its Claims," Fortnightly
Review, Vol. 32 (May and June, 1869), pp. 505-518, 680-700.
53. See Leslie's "Political Economy and the Rate of Wages,"
Land Systems, op. cit., pp. 362fn. Leslie was not unaware of the
differences between a macro theory concerned with labor's share of
GNP (see IbjJ., p. 361) and a micro theory of wage determination in
particular occupations or localities, but he clearly preferred the
latter, and, indeed, seems to have believed that the former was
nearly useless.
54. We must, of course, be cautious when comnending those who
speak with great fervor of "the facts," for a criticism of "ab¬
stract theorizing" based on "the facts" may be just as misplaced as
the error being criticized. We must first establish some sort of
rules or procedures to guide us in the determination of what does
and does not count as a relevant fact, i.e., one which will cause
"significant" modifications in our predictions and thus should be
explicitly considered in our theory. Without such procedures we
are only engaging in word games over what seems, to us, as an "im¬
portant" element of "reality," viz., we are engaged in the same type
of misplaced metaphysics as the absolutist concern with the model of
profit maximization and perfect knowledge.
55. Examples of Leslie's use of correspondence and other sup¬
porting documents are far too numerous for citation. However, it
may be mentioned that in his Land Systems alone there are at least
eleven instances of his inclusion of significant amounts of numer¬
ical data (see Land Systems, op. cit., pp. 62, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72,
92, 98, 103, 105 and 313).
56. See Leslie's "Ireland in 1868," 0£. cit.
57. See Leslie's "Prices in Germany in 1872," Essays, op. cit.
pp. 332-355, especially pp. 333-334, 339-342.
58. See footnote 41 of this chapter for a discussion of Leslie
essay on "Financial Reform."
59. Essays, op. cit., p. 156. Leslie was, in many ways, en¬
thusiastic about the union of economics and statistics, despite
his caveats concerning an overemphasis on this empirical tool. As
he saw the matter:
The formal incorporation of economic science
with statistics ... tends to correct the error
to which economists as well as that to which
statisticians are specially prone. If the
latter have been prone to think only of facts,
it has been the besetting sin of the former to
neglect facts altogether ... if statisticians
have often been content to collect phenomena
without heed to their laws, economists more
often still have jumped to the laws without
heed to the phenomena; if statistics have
[sic] lain chiefly in the region of dry fi¬
gures and numerical tables, economics have
[sic] dwelt in the region of assumption, con¬
jecture and provisional generalization, which
other sciences, indeed--geology to witness-
have not escaped, but from which they are tri¬
umphantly emerging by combining the closest
observation of phenomena with the boldest use
of speculation and scientific hypothesis.
Essays, op. cit., pp. 157-158.
Although quite lengthy, the above extract is especially worthy of
attention, not only for the light which it throws on Leslie's ma¬
ture attitudes toward the use of statistical tools in economics
but also as a summary of his entire methodological position.
60. Essays, op. cit., p. 172.
61. See Scott, The Development of Economics, op. cit., p. 513
and Essays, op. cit., pp. 175, 212, 210.62.The tendency in Leslie's writings to employ an analysis
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of economic structures as a guide to their future change or "evo¬
lution" (in a non-dialectical or Darwinian sense of that term) is
quite similar to the modern turns in the economics of politics; see,
for instance, James Buchanan's The Limits of Liberty, Between
Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
63. In regard to his occasional expressions of belief in a
theory of social evolution, Leslie might well be associated with
Comte as, indeed, he has been by several authors. Yet Ingram was
probably correct in classing him in with the non-Positivists (J.
K. Ingram, A History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 157). It
i_s true, however, that on those occasions when Leslie did refer to
Comte, he had nothing but words of praise for his work (see Essays,
pp. 213-215). Yet is is possible to find many more references in
his writings to the German Roscher or the Frenchman Leonce De
Lavergne, to say nothing of English writers, than to Comte.
64. Land Systems, op. cit., p. 85.
65. Essays, op. cit., pp. 158-159.
66. Ibid.
67. The debate over "deduction vs. induction" in economics was
subject to continual misunderstandings from its origins in the wri¬
tings of Whately and Whewell to its eventual disappearance in the
early decades of the Twentieth Century. Regarding this debate,
however, at least two major interpretations and three major points
of view may be readily distinguished. Leslie and most other British
Historical economists interpreted the question as either: (1) hav¬
ing to do with the choice of premises or axioms for economic models,
i,e., whether the premises were in accord with established facts or
contradicted them (the "inductive" or "historical" concern) or
whether they were "intuitively appealing" and sufficiently "simple"
for ease of manipulation (the "deductive," "a pri oris tic11 or "ortho¬
dox" approach), or as (2) having to do with the claim of empirical
truth (as opposed to inferential validity) which was often advanced
for theorems derived from a prioristic systems. In either of these
interpretations the Historical economists were opposed to "deducti-
vism," believing that premises should be chosen with due regard for
"the facts" so they were not immediately falsified by them, and also
believing that any of the deductive consequences of higher level
theories were properly candidates for testing (that they were not
necessarily true just because they were derived from "intuitively
obvious" premises). In many cases the Historical economists also
opposed higher level theories, believing that any theory not immedi¬
ately connected with observable phenomena was little more than meta¬
physical speculation about the ultimate essence of things.
The other major interpretation of the issue debated under
the label of "induction vs. deduction" was shared in common by the
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early Neoclassicals (i.e., Marshall and Keynes) and by the later
German Historical School of Schmoller. According to this inter¬
pretation deduction meant little more than the extensive use of
inferential reasoning (Marshall's "long chains of reasoning") and
induction meant a refusal to engage in (explicit) inferential
reasoning, relying instead on "history" and "the facts" to structure
themselves. This interpretation of inductive methods was, in short,
little more than a return to the belief in a mystical nature-force,
or a Hegelian Weitgeist, which underlay and directed the flow of his¬
torical events. While the German Historical authors of the time of
Schmoller were almost exclusively caught up in the cult of induction,
Marshall would, as usual, choose to compromise between the two views
(as he understood them). In his recent article on "Marshall on
Method" in the Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XVIII, No. 1
(April, 1975), pp. 25-31, R. H. Coase has noted that although Mar¬
shall had declared himself to be opposed to "philosophical economics"
he still believed that both "induction" and "deduction" had their
places in economic inquiry (Ibid., p. 27). Of course, he was never
very clear in defining either of these two terms and, as Coase has
noted, never really tried except in the structure of his outline of
an ideal course of study (Ibid.).
68. In attempting to clarify his critique of deductive methods
Leslie states, in a review of Jevon's Theory of Political Economy,
that:
We are, it is true, for deletion of the deductive
method of Ricardo: that is to say, of deduction
from unverified assumptions respecting "natural
values, natural wages, and natural profits." But
we are not against deduction in the sense of in¬
ference from true generalizations and principles,
though we regard the urgent work of the present
as induction ...
Essays, op. cit., p. 72.
and in his essay on "Political Economy and Sociology" Leslie expands
upon this notion of induction and presents his alternative:
The deductive theory of wages, profits, prices,
rents and taxation is substantially a set of pre¬
dictions respecting the distribution of wealth,
which affects to foretell exactly the gain in
every business and the rates at which goods of
every kind will be sold. It has been well said
that before predicting the future, we must learn
to predict the past; and before predicting the
past, it might be added, we should learn to pre¬
dict the present, by studying the forces at work
in the world around us, the conditions under which
they operate, and their actual results.
Essays, ojd. cijt., p. 203.
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Finally, in "Economic Science and Statistics," Leslie clearly
differentiates between his own views and the "inductivist" approach
of many Baconian oriented philosophers:
(Quetelet) assumed that by enlarging the
number of instances we eliminate chance,
and arrive at general or stable laws or
conditions. But a great number of in¬
stances does not give us their law or
justify us in any positive conclusion
respecting the future.
Essays, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
69. Leslie was keenly aware of the harm done to the reputation
of political economy by the absolutist arguments of dogmatic free¬
traders; and, although his own political sentiments were often in
accord with theirs (see the references to his "Financial Reform,"
op. cit.), he was anxious to free economics from any such normative
associations. As he expressed the matter, it was not necessary that
economists have immediate knowledge of the total structure of the
social world or that they be able to offer sweeping statements on
social policy, but only that they follow "a right method" in the
progressive development of their science (Essays, op. cit., p. 215).
For further warnings against premature construction of elaborate
and all-embracing deductive systems, see Essays, op. cit., pp. 213,
214.
70. Essays, op. cit., P- 96.
71 . Essays, op. cit., pp.■ 72, 241 .
72. Essays, op. cit., P- 197. In speaking of the "disturbing
causes" or "frictions" which Orthodox economists constantly referred
to in justification of their theories, Leslie stated:
The real defect of the treatment by economics
of these other principles (or disturbing
causes) is, that it is superficial and un-
phi losophical; that no attempt has been made
even to enumerate them adequately, much less
to measure their relative force in different
states of society; ... they are emphasized
simply to prop up rude generalizations for
which the authority of "laws" is claimed.
Essays, op. cit., p. 173.
And once again, "... with respect to the deductive economist's
practice of setting aside a number of forces as 'frictions,' ...
the best corrective would be that this so-called friction is capable
of scientific analysis and measurement ..." (Essays, op. cit., p.
193. )
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73. For at least one of Leslie's comments concerning ad hoc:
hypotheses, see Essays, op. cit., p. 197. This critique, indica¬
ting the "saving effects" of calling upon disturbing forces or the
partial nature of economic deductions, is reemphasized at many
points in both the Essays and the Land Systems as, for instance,
in the following:
(these "other principles" to which political
economists often appeal) ... serve, along
with other conditions, to give some sort of
support to saving clauses— such as "allowing
for differences in the nature of different
employments," "caeteris paribus," "in the
absence of disturbing causes," "making allow¬
ance for frictions"--by which the "law" that
wages and profits tend to equality eludes
scruti ny.
Essays, op. cit., p. 173.
74. See p. 121 of this chapter and fns. 76 and 77 below. The
following passage, although somewhat lengthy, is also instructive:
A bone fairly enough represents the sort of
wealth coveted by a dog, who has a compara¬
tively simple cerebral system, and few other
objects. Vet you cannot predict the conduct
even of a dog from his love of bones, or not
one would be left in the butchers' shops.
The dog has a regard for his master and a
fear of the police, and he has other pur¬
suits ...
Everybody, it might be affirmed, loves virtue
"in the abstract," and "in the absence of dis¬
turbing causes" would be virtuous; yet, po¬
licemen, prisons, and the Divorce Court show
that no theory of morals, much less absolute
predictions, can be drawn from this abstract
principie.
Essays, op. cit., p. 198.
75. The Comtian program of submerging economics into a general
science of society was frequently referred to in Leslie's writings,
mainly in connection with his realization of the impossibility in¬
volved in both (1) a science which dealt strictly with the maximi¬
zation of wealth and (2) a science which was at the same time pre¬
dictive and descriptive of human action. Thus we find the following
passage among many similar ones:
Political economy is ... a department of the
science of society which selects a special
class of social phenomena for special investi¬
gation, but for this purpose must investigate
all the forces and laws by which they are gov¬
erned. The deductive economist misconceives
altogether the method of isolation permissible
in philosophy. In consequence of the limita¬
tion of human faculties, not that the narrow¬
ing of the field is in itself desirable or
scientific, it is legitimate to make economic
phenomena ... the subject of particular exam¬
ination, provided that all causes affecting
them be taken into account. To isolate a sin¬
gle force, even if a real force and not a mere
abstraction, and to call deductions from it
alone the laws of wealth, can lead only to
error, and is radically unscientific.
Essays, op. cit., p. 212.
Yet sometimes the theme of a unified social science was interwoven
with that of historical evolution as in the following:
The truth is, that the whole economy of every
nation, as regards the occupations and pursuits
of both sexes, the nature, amount, distribution,
and consumption of wealth, is the result of a
long evolution, in which there has been both
continuity and change, and of which the eco¬
nomical side is only a particular aspect or
phase. And the laws of which it is the result
must be sought in history and the general laws
of society and social evolution.
Essays, op. cit., p. 175.
76. Essays, op. cit., pp. 197,198.
77. Essays, op. cit., p. 202.
78. Essays, op. cit., p. 282.
79. Essays, op. cit., p. 144.
80. The complete quote outlining Leslie's total perspective on
the social functions and scientific character of economic theories,
reads as follows:
Economic theories and systems may be regarded
in several different lights:
(1) in reference to their causes, as the
products of particular social, political and
physical conditions of thought;
(2) in reference to their truth or error;
(3) as factors in the formation of pub¬
lic opinion and policy.
Essays, op. cit., p. 142.
81. Lewis Haney, History of Economic Thought, op. cit., p. 531,
contains several quotes illustrating Leslie's dissatisfaction with
the political policies and institutions of his time.
82. F. A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
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CHAPTER V
DAVID SYMES AND THE AUSTRALIAN SCHOOL
David Symes (1827-1908) differed from most other British His-
toricists both in his cultural surroundings and in his choice of a
profession. Although born in Scotland and educated at home by his
schoolmaster-father, Symes departed his homeland at the age of
twenty-two, never again to return. After a year spent broadening
his education at various German universities, he travelled to the
gold fields of California to "find his fortune." There he labored
long hours under dreary and exhausting conditions, yet his luck
yielded him little better than the existence of a common laborer
and nothing in the way of intellectual satisfaction. In 1851, af¬
ter a year of unpleasant experiences, family duties and rumors of
a new gold strike in Australia lured him to Melbourne where two of
his brothers had already settled with their families. Although the
gold fields of Australia provided only a slightly better income than
had those of California, a turn of fate allowed Symes to purchase a
small newspaper, The Age, which, through much dint of effort and
his obvious skills as a "promoter," he eventually built into Aus¬
tralia's most influential daily. By the mid 18601s Symes was
known as a major force in Australian politics and the leading
light of the Australian Liberal Party. By the 1880's he was power¬
ful enough to veto legislation planned by government officials and
excercise the deciding influence in the appointment of premiers
and cabinet ministers."* Symes was more than a publicist with an
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interest in economic methodology, however. In addition to journa¬
listic duties and multitudinous political crusades, he authored
volumes in the fields of political science, evolutionary biology,
2
theology and political economy. It is his main work in political
3
economy, Outlines of an Industrial Science (1877), and his two
4
earlier articles on land tenure and economic that serve as the
primary basis for the following discussion of his economic and
meta-economic views.
Symes1 reflections on issues of social and economic policy
were obviously influenced by his education in German philosophy at
the University of Heidelberg. They incorporated the collectivist
and holistic orientations of German social thought during the Nine¬
teenth and early Twentieth centuries and were in many ways remark¬
able anticipations of views held by the dominant school of English
social and political theorists several decades later.
The Germanic strain in Symes1methodological writings was, how¬
ever, contradicted by the equally strong themes of subjectivism and
empiricism, evident, if not dominant, in his early (1871) Westminis¬
ter Review article "On the Method of Political Economy." As a re¬
sult of the diversity in his philosophic training and views, Symes'
mature methodological position was an eclectic conglomeration of
elements associated with the subjectivist-psycho!ogiStic tradition
in British philosophy and economics and of views derived from the
"objective"-historical tradition in German philosophy.
While Symes' experiences in Germany turned him against organ¬
ized Christianity and caused him to abandon his family's tradition
of adopting the ministry as a profession, his intellectual outlook
was permanently cast in the moralistic modes of social "reasoning”
so closely associated with Victorian Christianity. Symes' omni¬
present concern with the ethical consequences and dimensions of
human acts played a decisive role in his critique of the Wertfrei
cloak in which later classicals had wrapped their ideological
5
views. It was also one of the roots from which sprang his nearly
6
medieval perspective on public policy.
Previous Discussions of Symes' Methodology
Secondary sources dealing with Symes' economic or meta-
economic views are exceedingly rare, even though lengthy biographi¬
cal studies of his personal affairs and political activities have
appeared in abundance. In England during the Nineteenth Century
his methodological writings received no recognition whatever beyond
a single sentence in J. K. Ingram's History of Political Economy.'7
Even his close friend, T. E. C. Leslie, whom Symes had credited as
the inspiration for his Outlines, repaid the gracious acknowledge¬
ment of his Australian colleague by a stoney silence.
In Germany, however, the response to Symes' methodological
writings was more widespread and more generally appreciative. He
received the praises of Schmoller in an early Twentieth Century
g
article written for Conrad's Handworterbuck (1911), and his
writings were examined at some length in Cohn's The Progress of
9
Pol i tical Economy i n Engl and and America. Symes 1 Outl ines of a_n
Industrial Science was translated into German and apparently
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engendered some significant interest among the economists of the
later German Historical School. It was also widely used "as a
textbook in elementary political economy ... in U. S. colleges and
schools"^ and was reported to have been favorably reviewed by Henry
r nCarey.
Interest in Symes' economic writings during the recent decades
of the Twentieth Century has been, however, even less enthusiastic
than that of his own period. The only major exceptions to his con¬
tinued anonymity are a two line footnote in Hutchison's Review of
12
Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929 and passing notice in an appendix
1 3
of Marshall's Principies. His name is not to found even in
Schumpeter's History of Economic Analysis, despite the reputation
of that volume as the ultimate depository of references to both the
obscure and famous. Fortunately for those interested in Symes'
economic speculations there has appeared one reasonably satisfactory
consideration of his economic and meta-economic writings. As a part
of a survey of little-known Australian economists of the Nineteenth
Century, J. A. La Nauze of the University of Sidney included a thirty-
six page section on the doctrines of Symes. Although La Nauze!s
contribution to the literature on Symes1 economics and meta-
economics is certainly the most significant assessment of his views
to date, and although it has been relied upon in the preparation of
the following material, it unfortunately suffers from many of the
errors common in evaluations of British Historical authors. La
Nauze, for instance, seems to associate Symes in particular and
British His tori ci sm in general with the quite different trends in
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German economic thought. He places undue emphasis on the policy
aspects of the Historicist-Orthodox debate over the model of an
"economic man," comprehending incompletely the meta-economic issues
involved in this controversy. He also neglects the Historicists1
more central concern with operational theories and with the impact
of institutions on the forms taken by "maximizing behavior."
Finally, like so many commentators on British Historicism, La Nauze
underrates the significance of the Historicist-Orthodox debate con¬
cerning the uses of inductive and deductive methods in the social
sciences. In finding the Historicists' arguments against a prior-
14
istic methods to be "crude," "uninteresting" and unscientific,
La Nauze displays either his own ignorance regarding the study of
scientific methods and procedures or a lack of appreciation for
the intent and setting of the methodological debates in Nineteenth
Century economics.
In a study dealing with Symes as an isolated author, viewed
apart from the British Historical tradition, some of La Nauze's
errors might be to a degree justified. Symes was at times obscure,
if not muddled, in his writings, and an obscure passage may easily
be interpreted as one pleases. It might, indeed, be noted that La
Nauze's summary and evaluation of Symes' works has the virtue of
correctly identifying his most important and unique contributions
to British Historicism, i.e., his arguments attacking the possibility
15
of a Wertfrei theory of economic optimality. Despite this virtue
of La Nauze's evaluation, however, there is much more to Symes'
writings than the superficial characteristics which La Nauze has
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chosen to concentrate upon. It is the purpose of the following pages
to delve into the depths of Symes' meta-economic writings and thus
lay bare the full scope of his contributions, both in terms of the
debates of his day and in the light of more modern methodological
research.
Symes' Classification of Economic Science
The key to an understanding of Symes' overall perspective on
the character of economic investigations is to be found in his re¬
marks regarding the classification of political economy. Like
Cairnes, Symes divided all sciences into the mental and the physical
according to the nature of their subject matters. Unlike Cairnes,
Symes classified economics as a study dealing with strictly "men¬
tal 11 phenomena, as opposed to "valued matter" of a complex mental
1 g
and physical character. Symes' explanation for the meaning to
be attached to the term "mental science," and his justification for
disregarding the "physical side" of those objects investigated by
economists, illuminates difficulties and questions still unresolved
in economic research. In summarizing his position on this question,
Symes stated that:
... mental science does not concern itself with
the external objects, being occupied exclusively
with the sensations and ideas of which they are
merely the exciting cause. So it is with the
material objects which constitute Wealth. It
is not with these that Political Economy has to
deal, but with the impressions which they pro¬
duce, the mental associations connected with
them, and the Desires which their presence or
absence incite.17
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While one may agree, disagree or consider controversies con¬
cerning the "mental" or "physical" nature of social objects to be
meaningless (in the philosophic sense of that term ), Symes1
treatment of this problem does illustrate one strain in the often
ambiguous way in which economists have historically used terms such
as "good" (n.) or "wealth." Those who agree with a utility (or
"psychological") oriented definition of these terms, i.e., those
who agree with Symes that goods should be classified solely on the
basis of the "mental impressions" or "satisfactions" they excite
for given individua!s, have had no difficulty in explaining cases
of Veblen goods, "snob goods" or "bandwagon effects." Two things
that are "physically identical" need not, under this view, command
the same price, even in markets characterized by perfect knowledge
and free access to sellers. If it is the case that consumers attach
more prestige of ownership (or prestige of consumption) to one
rather than the other, then the two items are ab definitie "differ¬
ent" goods.
Yet this psychological schema for the classification of goods
renders economic theory tautologous, and, therefore, untestable.
Since only patterns of consumer demand are identifiable in the
19
world, preference maps being empirically indeterminate, any
failure of economic laws (or better, of economic predictions) can
always be dismissed as a consequence of a supposed mis-specification
of the particular good(s) being considered. If demand curves slope
up over some range of consumption, it is not, according to this
view, because our theory is in need of further qualification, but,
rather, because we have failed to notice important "psychological"
distinctions in physically homogeneous consumer goods.
The alternative to a psychologistic theory of goods is one
specifying the homogeneity of goods in terms of some set of physical
or observable properties of the goods themselves, or of the markets
in which they are exchanged. Although certainly more attractive
from an operational standpoint, this view of the way in which econ¬
omic concepts should be tied to observable phenomena possesses de¬
fects from the perspective of "pure theory." A physical standard
for the classification of goods might well prove as an embarrass-
to the purist in matters of theory since it would probably lead to
the conclusion that our basic economic relationships were not
"universally" applicable (i.e., that they were not unconditionally
true). It would also seem to suggest, if not imply, however, that
individual preferences do not really "count," at least as the only
criterion for determining a consumer's "better-offness." If the
homogeneity of "goods" is determined by their physical aspects, we
are forced to ignore any purely social and/or psychological dis¬
tinctions which consumers might find of importance. Symes fully
realized this latter aspect of a strictly physicalistic view of
economic goods and discussed the problem of determining the consum-
20er's welfare under this type of classification schema.
The Proper Concerns of Economic Science
Symes was not, however, content to rest upon his definition of
economics as a study of psychological or mental objects. He
extended his attack upon orthodox methodology to the traditional
limitation and definition of economics to "the science dealing
with wealth."
In Symes' interpretation, restricting economics to "wealth
maximization ruled out the consideration of other motivations for
21
human action: motives of Health, of Power, of Honor and of Fame."
Such an arbitrary limitation on the scope of the science also led
to the neglect of those wealth-connected activities of production,
consumption and exchange, which were the true object to be explored
and explained by an "Industrial Science" (i.e., by economics, or
the study of "industrial activity" properly conceived).
Yet even more important for Symes than the question of the
scope of human motivation was his contention that wealth was not
itself the motive power of human action. Wealth, according to
Symes, was only psychologically associated, in certain cultures,
with the basic goal of all human endeavors--happiness. He observed
that: "Wealth is not pursued for its own sake, but on account of
the pleasures it may bring, or the pains it may advert. The pos¬
session of even an enormous amount of wealth will never impel to
exertion if it is believed its possession would not conduce to
22
happiness."
This distinction between wealth and happiness was not merely
analytic or "philosophic" in Symes' treatment of the subject. It
had very real implications for the application and meaning of econ¬
omic theory. Happiness was associated with matters of custom, ha¬
bit, charity, propriety, friendship and security quite as much as
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it was with the maximization of wealth. The description of all
human behavior as a quest after increasing amounts of wealth was,
for Symes, an empirical absurdity. Orthodox economists had
attempted to evade the issues involved in a dispute over the max¬
imization of wealth vs. a maximization of happiness through the
introduction into their theories of ad hoc hypotheses designed to
cover those "special cases" in which motives other than the desire
for wealth "predominated." Symes, however, pointed out that this
maneuver necessarily violated the spirit of a priori methodology
and thus debased the orthodox approach to economic inquiry:
The very fact that writers on economic science
are under the necessity of going outside their
premises is an admission that these premises
are incorrect. But this going outside should
in no case be permitted. In investigations of
this kind, when the a priori method is rigidly
insisted on as not only a proper method, but
the only method applicable, no matter foreign
to the premises, far less what is expressly ex¬
cluded, as is the case in the subject before us,
should be imported into the discussion.23
The circle of refutation was thus complete. Wealth maximization
was neither necessary nor sufficient for the maximization of happi¬
ness. Yet other factors which were associated with happiness were
excluded by the axioms of the classical system. To change the axioms
or to insinuate extraneous material into the chain of inference
flowing from them was to abandon the orthodox approach to an explan¬
ation of human behavior, or to replace the "deductive" and a prioris-
tic procedures of the Classicals with different techniques. That
type of methodological reorientation, from abstract rationalism to
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a concern with actual institutional constraints, was, of course,
what Symes had sought after from the outset.
The Social Constraints on Maximizing Behavior
Another, more positive, contribution which flowed as an indi¬
rect consequence from Symes' discourse on wealth and happiness, was
a recognition of the importance of rule-bound behavior to social
stability and social organization. Symes argued that individual
wealth maximizers might gain, in the short-run, from anti-social
acts, but that the conditions required for long-run wealth maximi¬
zation by the many individuals composing a social system required
the existence of legal restrictions on the behavior of each indivi¬
dual and the wi11ingness of each individual to abide by certain non-
24
legal codes of 11 right conduct."
Although similar arguments had been advanced at least as far
back as the time of Thomas Hobbes, Symes' perspective on the analysis
of human actions, as conditioned by specific systems of formal and
informal constraints, once again illustrated the concern shown by
British Historical economists for analysizing the details of the
legal and cultural framework of which individual "maximizing" be¬
havior is a product. Although Symes' orthodox contemporaries would
have undoubtedly agreed to the necessity for some type of formal and
informal constraints on individual action as a way of preserving and
defining "social stability," they only infrequently chose to consi¬
der the particular character of the behavior which would be elicited
by specifically different institutions and customs. The only type
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of social parameters popular in orthodox analysis were those imposed
by nature (i.e., the scarcity of the best grades of land) or those
which arose from broad historical or biological trends (the histor¬
ical decline of profits on stock or the Malthusian laws of popula¬
tion). All more mutable institutional arrangements, with the possi¬
ble exception of legal restrictions on international trade, or, in
rare instances, the conditions of land tenure, were considered as
"givens," seldom mentioned or explicitly recognized as assumptions
of the analysis. This characteristic of classical theory, which
most Historicists confusingly referred to as a priorism or the de¬
ductive method (and which Bagehot more correctly identified as "the
extravagant claims" of the Classicals) lay at the core of Orthodox
analysis. The assumption that economic theory was neither "generi-
cally specific" nor "space-time specific" led the Classicals into
25
methodological blind alleys from which they would never escape.
The Formulation and Testing of Economic Theories
Symes' concern with the empirical content and significance of
economic hypotheses was further illustrated in his analysis of the
Classical doctrine of "disturbing causes" and in his critique of the
motivational model of economic explanation. The "doctrine of dis¬
turbing causes" may be crudely summarized as a general insistence
on the necessary truth of economic theories, viz., the assertion
that any "failure" of an economic theory to predict "accurately"
necessarily was due to unexpected fluctuations in the values of
those variables assumed constant in the ceteris paribus clause of
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the theory. Although Classical economists had generally found it
unnecessary to specify the variables which were to be impounded in
ceteris paribus before applying their theories to "real world"
cases, they were never at a loss to explain failures of their
theories (in yielding accurate predictions) on the basis of an
"implicit" and seemingly endless list of such disturbing influences.
A statement which seems to suggest this very doctrine in a way
which would render it easily available for abuse is found in J. S.
Mill's Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, and is quoted by
Symes both in his early Westminister Review article on political
economy and in his Outlines of an Industrial Science, as follows:
... we must make proper allowance for the effects
of any impulses of a different description (other
than the desire for wealth), which can be shown
to interfere with the result (of our predictions)
in any particular case ... (our economic laws) will
so far fail of being applicable to the explanation
or prediction of real events, until they are modi¬
fied by a correct allowance for the degree of in¬
fluence exercised by other causes.27
Symes' criticism of this methodological perspective is both com¬
prehensive and of a somewhat complex nature. It is based upon the
three separate issues identifiable in the above quote from Mill and
upon expressions of similar views found in the writings of other
Orthodox economists.
The first and most basic issue to be confronted in any intelli¬
gible rendering of the doctrine of disturbing causes is the question
of how to identify all the potential sources of disturbance which
could possibly affect the predictions yielded by a given theory,
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and then how to sort these possible disturbing causes into those
which are potentially significant and those which would have only
28
a neglible impact on the predictions of the theory. The dis¬
tinction by Symes between all conceivable disturbing causes and
those which were actually of potential significance is similar to
Stigler's decomposition of Ricardian value theory into an "analytic"
cost-of-production theory and an "empirical" labor theory. That is,
the proposition that alterations in the value of some variable
could conceivably affect the character or values of our predictions
is considerably different than the proposition that any change in
the value of a "significant" independent variable will result in a
"relatively large" change in the value of the dependent variable.
What is the magnitude of the relative variability which we choose
to consider as "significant" is, of course, a matter of convention
or of personal taste.
Combined with the question of which exogenous variables can
really act as "disturbing causes" empirically, Symes also consid¬
ered the effects of different cultures and varying paths of indivi¬
dual development on the relative strengths of different motivational
influences. While Orthodox economists were guilty of a sin of
omission as well as a certain ambiguity in interpretation in fail¬
ing to provide an explicit listing of variables which they consid¬
ered to be significant disturbing causes, they had also been guilty
or an error of commission by assuming that the "same type" of mo¬
tive (i.e., that of wealth maximization) would always lead human
beings to act in similar and a prioristically identifiable patterns.
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The asserted universal connection between types of motives and the
expected types of actions resulting from these motives was decisively
refuted by Symes. In intercultural cases, Symes noted, a motive as
specific as love and devotion to one's aged parents had led dutiful
offspring to the quite different behavioral responses of slaughter¬
ing their parents, exposing them to the elements, or meticulously
attending to their health and protection, depending on whether the
individuals considered were the cultural products of Sparta, the
land of the Hottentots or the various nations of modern Western
Europe. Symes also noted less dramatic intracultural cases in which
the "different tastes" of different individuals would lead to diff-
29
erent behavior patterns being associated with "identical" motives.
As another point in his indictment of the Classical's doctrine
of "disturbing causes," Symes argued that a mere enumeration of all
the possible background variables connected with the applicability
of a theory was, by itself, insufficient to transform the theory in¬
to a useful tool for formulating predictions. If the relative
weightings to be attached to each of the significant economic and
non-economic [sic] variables in any decision situation remained un¬
specified, any theory would still remain useless in rendering
quantitative predictions. The admission of any influence beyond
the crude concept of wealth maximization thus entangled the Ortho-
30
dox economist in an inexorable web of difficulties. Not only
would he then (1) have to explicitly identify all other motivational
factors, but he would also be required to (2) separate these into the
significant and the unsignificant, (3) note modifications in this
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list for each of the different cultures or individuals to which the
theory was applied and (4) provide explicit estimates of the rela¬
tive magnitudes of the partial derivatives of the functional rela¬
tionship with respect to each (motivational) independent variable.
As a conclusion to his rejection of the doctrine of disturbing
causes, Symes questioned the entire sequence of economic explanation,
leading as it did, from motives to acts, or from a priori intuitions
about motives to conclusions concerned with "hypothetical" tendencies.
Symes suggested, in refutation of the traditional form of analysis,
that it was impossible to "get at the motives except through the
phenomena," and that it was thus a pure conjecture to associate any
given motive with any given type of action. Symes, in fact, ap¬
proached the modern behavioralist view of social science and, in
several passages from his writings, endorsed a complete abandonment
of the "motive-talk" of Nineteenth Century economic studies. In his
essay on economic method, for instance, he stated that:
Motives are multitudinous, variable and often
inscrutable. The individual looking within
his own heart finds it difficult to tell the
precise motive that influences him in a given
course of action; and if it be difficult in
the case of an individual where his own feel¬
ings are alone concerned, the difficulty is
immensely increased in the case of an aggre¬
gation of individuals existing under condi¬
tions different from his own, or of mankind
at large. It is clear therefore that i f we
have first to determine the particular mo¬
tives that may have produced the phenomena,
the inquiry will become complicated if not an
interminable one.31
Thus, not only would a psychology of individual action be most com-
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pi ex, and perhaps indefinitely difficult, but a social science
which, of necessity, would treat of the actions and interactions of
many individuals would be faced with the compounding of this diffi¬
culty to the point of impossibility. Although Symes' intersubjective
approach to the study of social phenomena would eventually become
popular during the Twentieth Century, he himself eventually lapsed
back into an analysis of economic actions in terms of motives and
32
intentionality.- Perhaps little else could be expected, for Symes
general methodological orientation became increasingly psychological
(or, perhaps better, psychologistic) as the years passed; and psy¬
chology, under the influence of German and French literary figures,
was itself becoming more and more of a "mental is tic study."
The Problem of Induction
Symes' discussion of problems involved in the concept of unde¬
fined "disturbing causes" and in the use of a model involving moti¬
vational causation was closely linked to his views regarding the
proper uses of "inductive" and "deductive" techniques in economic
investigations. Having examined the Classical economist's obsession
with the motives "causing" certain human actions and his "artificial"
separation of "economic" from "non-economic" motives, Symes launched
a frontal attack on the heart of Classical methodology:
So untenable ... is the hypothesis (of wealth
maximization) ... that the very writers who
have adopted it continually ignore it. They
start with a philosophic abstraction of hu¬
manity, but they put it aside and accept the
concrete man as soon as their premises are
stated ...
The hypothesis in question is not of itself suf¬
ficient to explain the phenomena without the aid
of other hypotheses. Indeed ... (it) in¬
volves a whole series of hypotheses. Those who
adopt it assume not only to have accurately de¬
termined the human motive which is at work, but
its precise force and direction ...
The deductive method (according to Mill) pre¬
vails in geometry, there accordingly he thinks
he finds the analogy he is in search of. Geom¬
etry, he says, assumes an arbitrary definition
of a line. A line it defines to be that which
has length without breadth; whereas, he says, we
all know that a line has breadth, more or less
... The definition is not strictly correct, but
sufficiently so for all practical purposes, and
is therefore justifiable. In the same way, he
maintains, it is justifiable in economic science
to assume the exclusive influence of ... (cer¬
tain) ... motives. But there is really no anal¬
ogy between the two cases. In the one we have
simply the definition of a term, and it is quite
immaterial whether the definition be strictly
accurate or not ... In the other case it is not
the definition of a term which is assumed, but
an hypothesis which materially affects the whole
inquiry.33
For Symes, the extreme abstraction involved in the a prioristic
model of an economic man constituted an inappropriate form for econ¬
omic inquiry. It was both less fruitful than other more "inductive"
techniques in producing specialized (or "applied") economic hypo¬
theses, and it resulted in the construction of analytic systems
supportable only through the introduction of non-intuitive auxiliary
34
hypotheses. Symes further maintained that "deductive" procedures
such as those involved in the speculative contemplation of the prob¬
able responses of an "economic man" provided no means for determin¬
ing the "completeness" of hypotheses (Mill's own concern in
formulating the “rules of induction"), and that these procedures
ignored the fact that "... in Political Economy the effects (that
is, the observable behavior of individuals) are more accessible
35
than the causes."
Although Symes proposed as an alternative to the "deductive"
method of Orthodox economics his own special form of "induction,"
the meaning he attached to that term changed as the years passed.
In his Westminister Review article of 1871 Symes had written that
"all economic phenomena are within the reach of ordinary observa-
36
tion," but by 1876 he was including within "ordinary observation"
not only "the external facts of human activity" but also "the in-
37
ternal facts of human consciousness." In his later writings, Syme
adopted a position concerning methodological procedures which was
much like Cairnes', i.e., one expressive of the belief that econo¬
mists, and other social scientists, had available to them a special
source of information in introspection and the examination of other
people—that they were, in this respect, more fortunate than the
physical scientist, who dealt with mute phenomena. Symes gradually
reworked his views concerning other aspects of economic method to
conform to his changed characterization of economics as a purely
"mental science." Yet certain inconsistencies remained between his
new view of the "mental is tic" character of economics and his per¬
sistent desire to retain induction and the study of institutional
constraints as an important part of the science.
Because of the prominence of the concept of "induction" in
Symes1 methodological views, it is important to be as clear as
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possible regarding the meaning of the term. It is certain, first of
all, that Symes did not mean to oppose induction to deduction in the
same manner as had the Baconians. His main concern was that econom¬
ics become more empirical and less dependent upon contrived and over¬
simplified models of human behavior. He thus advocated deduction,
in the sense of inferential reasoning, "once the facts have been
correctly ascertained" through the use of "induction," and he sum¬
marized his position concerning this question by stating that "De-
oo
duction properly begins where induction ends." Symes' attempt to
replace deductive by inductive techniques, in at least the formative
stages of economic investigations, was, however, foredoomed to fail¬
ure. It ran afoul of Kuhn's Law: that scientists will never reject
a prevailing methodology, "paradigm" or research program unless pre-
39sented with a clear-cut and productive alternative. Since Symes
remained somewhat vague about the character of those techniques to
be applied in "inductive investigations," and since he was remiss
in not illustrating the ability of this program to yield new and
"interesting" types of economic questions, his crusade in behalf of
induction became as futile as a Quixotic quest.
Economic "Experimentation"
Symes' abuse of methodological terminology was further illus¬
trated by the manner in which he used and, obviously, misinterpreted
the term "experimentation." While incensed at J. S. Mill's denial
of a role for the experimental method in economics, Symes himself
was no more aware of the standard usage of this term than were later
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Neoclassicals. His view of what constituted an economic experiment
was stated, in part, in the following passage:
Experiments enough are already made to his (the
political economist's) hand, and all that is re¬
quisite is that he should collect and apply them
... indirect experiments of the very greatest
value occur frequently, with every change of the
business cycle or in legislation. And ... we 4n
can extend these in any direction we think proper.
This view of informal and uncontrolled "experimentation" is
examined further in the conclusions to this dissertation, but it
might be mentioned at this point that the view ignores problems
arising from the quality or accuracy of observations as well as
difficulties involved in separating out unique events from uniform
casual sequences in those situations in which conditions are unre¬
peatable and where the underlying distribution of possible alterna¬
tives is unknown.
The Anti-Positivist Base of Political Economy
While the broad strokes of Symes' methodological writings re-
\
semble those of Cliffe-Leslie (to whom he acknowledges a debt in
his Outlines of an Industrial science),^ his position on the rela¬
tionship between morals, public policy and economic speculations was
more extreme than anything imagined by Leslie or any other early
British Historicists. Regarding this topic his criticisms were
both relevant and devastating to the welfare position often implied,
but seldom openly defended, by Orthodox writers:
Demand and supply is not essentially just, for
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it recognizes no moral distinctions. It is not
universally and invariably beneficient, for it
ignores the difference between wants and desires
There is nothing just or beneficient in one man
outbidding another for the possession of an ar¬
ticle, or in one underselling another in order
to secure a purchaser or a market. In either
case the successful competitor attains his end
at the expense of his rival; and in neither
case is it intended that others than himself
should derive any benefit whatever from the
transaction.42
Like many of Symes' other criticisms of Orthodox methodology,
his statements concerning the ethical judgments implicit in conven¬
tional economic analysis apply with much the same force today as they
did in the time of the Classical economists. In both the welfare
analysis of Classical economics and the more modern Paretian wel¬
fare test, there exists a presumption, implicit, but still present,
that the explanation of how competitive markets would organize ex¬
change and production in any area of human endeavor is sufficient
justification for preferring their adoption over competing non-
market forms of organization. The realization that the ethical
question is separate from (although partially dependent upon) the
positive analysis of economics does not, of course, prejudge any
case against market decision-making. Yet many modern defenders of
a free-market system have sought to obscure, so far as possible, the
fundamental valuative character of their social and political pre¬
ferences. The many attempts which have been made to "derive" an
ideological position from a positive theory of social action may be
no more than a consequence of the superficial impression made by the
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positive-normative distinction upon the modem consciousness. In
economics, however, the attempts to intermingle ideology and science
have a long and "respectable" history dating from the "absolutist"
views of the orthodox Classicals.
The fact that collectivist economists have been burdened with
the same historical baggage as the advocates of market-systems, e.g.,
through the Classical and Hegelian roots of Marxist methodology, is
but scant comfort to the honest social scientist. What we have seen
historically, and what we see yet too frequently today, is a battle
between two ideological movements, each claiming the honorific title
of "scientific" for its program of social reconstruction, and
neither interested in pursuing bona fide empirical research into
social questions.
The issue involved in the separate "approval" or "disapproval"
of a distributional mechanism, apart from the approval or disapprov¬
al of the existing property distribution (i.e., the recognition, by
Symes, of the fact that "market control" or "state control" might
43\
themselves be goods or bads in an individual's utility function ) was
an advance in welfare theory not repeated until the recent writings
of Mishan and Boulding. In both economics and political philosophy
alternative social systems have been, and still generally are,
judged on the basis of the existing distribution of property in
those societies under their control. That the mechanism through
which property may be gained or lost is an additional consideration
requiring further valuative judgments was an issue overlooked in the
new welfare theory of Samuel son and Bator and only recently intro-
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duced into political philosophy by Robert Nozick of Chicago.
Symes' Own Views Concerning Public Policy
Even though Symes correctly criticized the Classicals for allow¬
ing the merger of positive and normative elements in their economic
discussions, his realization of their error did not exempt him from
44
the same mistake. In many of his economic writings Symes displayed
a moral ferver quite unmatched by other British Historicists, and too
often he allowed his ethical sensibilities to run amuck. In addition
to intertwining policy arguments with discussions of economic metho¬
dology and theory, Symes frequently seemed unable to distinguish
conditions of monopoly and fraud from the more normal workings of
unregulated markets. La Nauze has excused Symes' rather blatant
45
display of the medieval spirit as crude empiricism," interpreting
Symes' comments as an empirical generalization about the actual
workings of markets in the Australia of his day rather than a theory
of market operations. La Nauze1s speculations in this regard, while
interesting, fail to come to grips with Symes' virtual identifica¬
tion of disinterested market exchanges and immoral acts. According
to Symes1 perspective on economic transactions, any exchange not
based on charity and altruism, that is, any exchange not based on a
due consideration for the personal attributes and situation of the
other party, is necessarily dishonorable and contrary to " a scrupu-
lous sense of duty." More modern economists would no doubt find
such moralizing to be out of place in a serious work on economic
methodology, to say nothing of the view which they would take of
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such an ethical stance. Yet the introduction of this normative
element into Symes' writings was not an abridgement of his personal
standards for social inquiry. It was, rather, the necessary con¬
sequence of his belief in the inseparability of the positive and
ethical dimensions of human acts.
Symes, it should also be noted, was further infatuated with a
47Golden Age interpretation of the pre-capitalistic order, a view
which, although popular in late Victorian literature of the Romantic
School, has no correspondence to the known historical facts. In the
happy days before the rise of the monied class, Symes fantasied
“the strong arm of the law" prohibited fraud of even the most
trifling variety. The goods that were produced were of only the
highest quality (whatever that may mean) for the worker's pride
in his product (and the system of guilds) would allow nothing in¬
ferior to come to market. Just prices, just wages and a fair dis-
48tribution of the revenues from sales necessarily prevailed under
the pre-capitalistic order. The social and political order was
supported on the firm base of the sturdy yeoman farmer class, and
social peace as well as ordered prosperity prevailed within the
. . 49
nati on.
The central problem of Nineteenth Century economic life,
"excessive competition," arose with the increasing dominance of
market forms of economic organization and the accompanying incen-
50tives to “greed" and "shoddy workmanship." The enclosure move¬
ments of the Seventeenth Century completed the destruction of the
Old Order by establishing a "monied monopoly" in land and under-
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mining the social dominance of small proprietors.
It is hardly surprising that even that staunch defender of
socialism and collectivist ideology, V. I. Lenin, was repelled by
the odor of moldy medievalism which arose from the "Progressive
Movement" in Australia. With Symes acting as the primary force
behind this movement, any other intellectual perspective would
have soon been eliminated.
Subjectivism, Holism and Methodological Individualism
While it is frequently entertaining, though seldom very en¬
lightening, to pick apart a man's political beliefs, one can some¬
times discover in such beliefs, the reflection of a more general,
and more interesting, perspective on society and social investi¬
gations. The integrated character of some men's political and
social views is well represented in the case of Symes. It is the
purpose of the following pages to illustrate the ties between
Symes' general social philosophy and his political and policy views.
We have already examined in some detail how Symes' characteri¬
zation of economics as a psychological study drove him to a posi¬
tion of extreme subjectivism as regards the determinants of econ¬
omic acts (vi z., the position of motivational causation, already
endorsed by Orthodox economists). There is one respect, however,
in which Symes continued to deviate from a pure subjectivist
stance, even in his later writings. To fully appreciate both the
significance of this deviation and the rather perverse social views
which were engendered by it, some review of the history of social
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thought on both the Continent and in Britain is, however, required.
Since at least the time of Locke, British philosophy was domin¬
ated by a form of subjective-psychologistic-empiricism which had as
its political and social counterpart the doctrine of limited indivi¬
dualism and as its methodological corollary in the social sciences
the doctrine of "methodological individualism." The political phil¬
osophy of British liberals, simply stated, was based upon the notion
that individuals were the product of their experiences and that
their experiences were "subjective" or "mental" in character. Since
every person's experiences were unique and "private" (or, at least,
personal) and depended upon the different associative connections
established by the different sequence of occurrences in each life¬
time, everyone's tastes and values would be, to some degree, differ¬
ent from any other person's tastes and values. It therefore seemed
best to Locke and his successors to leave each individual in charge
of his own decisions and acts so far as possible, thus maximizing
the "social good" by allowing each individual to maximize his own
peculiar notion of his individual good.
Society, in the Lockian view, was merely an association of
freely acting individuals bound together by "articicial" or con¬
tractual ties. The "rights of society" could be no more than an
expression of the terms on which individuals had chosen to associ¬
ate with each other. Expressed differently, there was no "society"
as a separate entity which could be invested with rights superior
to or different from the rights possessed by its individual mem-
, 52
bers.
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Symes' own perspective on society and the optimal social
structure was quite different from the Lockian-subjectivist view.
From the standpoint of German Holism, which he had first absorbed
during his student days at Heidelberg, Symes declared that "soci¬
ety" had rights and desires quite as much as any individual, and
that it was the function of the State to achieve Social Ends rather
53than private ends. Although quite popular on the Continent, and
expressed with considerable clarity in writings such as Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, the Holistic view of social relations had
made no significant inroads into England. It was no more than
hinted at by J. S. Mill in his doctrine of "social oppression" and
"social freedom" as presented in his On Liberty (1859), and it was
not until the appearance of writings like Thomas Hill Green's Pro¬
legomena to Morals (1883) that the English consciousness truely be¬
came aware of this rather peculiar perspective on social organiza¬
tion .
In Australia, however, Symes writings served as the catalysis
for an early introduction of "social concern" and "social thinking"
(i.e., for a distinctively "social" perspective on matters of pub¬
lic policy). Through his organ, The Age, Symes championed crusades
for national protectionism on the basis that such policies would
hasten the process of national economic development, and he cam¬
paigned for agrarian reform as a means of restructuring the bal¬
ance of social and political power within Australian society. The
modern prophets of doom and despair who bemoan the fate of the
"lonely crowd" and the social rootlessness of an industrially
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oriented society were "anticipated" in ludicrous detail in Symes'
writings.
The methodological analogy to "social policy making," i.e.,
methodological holism, was also referred to in Symes1 writings. Yet
despite his explicit rejection of any individualistic stance, Symes
never succeeded in freeing his social speculations from the form of
micro, or individualistic, investigations. Although the unit of
analysis from the viewpoint of methodological holism is properly
the entire national economy or, at least, broad "sectors" of the
economy, Symes' was usually much more concerned with questions of
property relations and the ethical and behavioral dimensions of
these relations. While his policy stances generally concerned
"National Issues," his ever-pervasive ethical viewpoint on all so¬
cial questions continually enmeshed him in the micro aspects of
"social problems." Rather than the broad sweep of history and the
trends of social development, Symes ultimately chose to analyze
problems of alternative property structures and the "justness" of
exchanges.
Morals, Property Structures and Economic Theory
Symes argued that the creation and distribution of economic
goods necessarily involved the sanction of some (existing or de¬
sired) system for the enforcement of contracts and for the estab¬
lishment and protection of property rights. As we have already
seen, however, the selection of any given property system was a
moral decision, and economics was thus, in Symes' view, unredeem-
ably ethical in character. As he himself traced the line of this
deduction:
... when we come to treat of wealth from the
standpoint of society, we are brought face to
face with the question of adjustment or dis¬
tribution, a question which is quite foreign
to the premises of the deduction!*st, but is
inseparable from the consideration of ...
society.54
The division of labor necessitates exchange,
but there could be no exchange ... if the
state did not enforce contracts, or if it
permitted agreements to be broken with im¬
punity. This shows the inseparable connec¬
tion that exists between Industrial and
Social Science.55
(Industrial science) is subordinate to Social
Science as the latter is subordinate to
Ethics. Social Science is the key-stone of
the arch of which Ethics is the foundation.
It is the Social Sentiment that gives ex¬
pression and force to the Ethical Sentiment
that we owe the ideas of property and con¬
tract. There could be no contract without
exchange, and there could be no property un¬
less society sanctioned appropriation.56
Although Symes' explicit recognition of the valuative base of
property relations, and thus of markets themselves, was a major ad¬
vance over the methodological views of Classical absolutists, his
argument was not without its defects. That economic analysis rests
upon the prior assumption of some particular property rights system
does not mean that the entire study is irredeemably normative. It
is only necessary to conditionally "accept" some property structure
for the duration of any given analysis and for the purposes of the
analysis alone. If the consequences of any given property structure
should prove, on net, to be undesirable, then there is nothing which
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would prevent the analysis of other, alternative, structures. The
net benefits resulting from any given property system are, however,
recognizable only as a result of some such economic analysis, and
the benefits are only "desirable" in relation to the benefits pos¬
sible under any of the constellation of other alternative systems.
This conditional approach to a welfare comparison of alternative
property structures is, in fact, the standard approach of many
57
modern theorists, and the detailed consideration of the behavioral
consequences of alternative property systems has proved to be a pow-
58erful tool in predicting consequences of any given system.
Symes1 Place in the History of Economic Thought
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it may seem odd
that Symes was so completely neglected by his contemporaries and is
still neglected by historians of economic thought, but there is, in
fact, some justification for the attitudes of both these groups.
While Symes demonstrated wel1-developed analytic abilities in his
attacks against many of the Classical s' methodological positions, he
was frequently inconsistent in the positions he himself advocated,
especially between his earlier and later periods. Neither was he
as anxious as Jones, Leslie, or even J. S. Mill, to illustrate his
various doctrines by reference to empirical evidence; and under the
circumstances, words, without collaborating factual studies, were
extremely cheap to come by and rather expensive to "sell." Finally,
Symes undoubtedly offended many British Historicists and some late
Classicals by espousing unpopular, and often ill-considered, politi-
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cal views in a rather inflammatory language. Leslie, who had
written admiringly of British free-trade policies,and who saw the
cause of many economic woes in the custom house, was surely quite
upset by Symes' arguments in favor of economic protection. Further,
Symes' advocacy of land reforms (mainly in the nature of dividing
up large holdings for the benefit of a ressurected yeoman class)
could have hardly been appealing to the English economists who had
noted many virtues and few defects in the system of primogeniture.
The more modern prejudice against the serious consideration of
methodological issues, especially in the context of an history of
economic thought, has already been referred to. It seems highly
unlikely that any major virtue apart from his methodological views
can be discovered in Symes1 writings.
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in his Concept of Mind (New York: Hutchison's University Library,
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choice between two or more physically describable procedures.
19. The theoretical consequences of "Veblen" or "snob goods"
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Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumer Demand," reprinted in
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in a comment by Imre Lakatos contained in Imre Lakatos and Alan Mus-
grave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (New York: Cam¬
bridge University Press, 1970), pp. 97-100. This view was origin¬
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Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd enlarged edition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 77, mainly with reference to
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URiung, ffThe Ftructure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-
Exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, 13 (April, 1970),
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CHAPTER VI
WALTER BAGEHOT, POPULARIZER OF HISTORICAL ECONOMICS
"Walter Bagehot (1826-1877), banker, economist, political
thinker and commentator, critic and man of letters, was Victorian
England's most versatile genius," such was the appraisal of Norman
St. John-Stevas in his definitive study of Bagehot1s life and works
Yet both St. John-Stevas, who edited the critical edition of
Bagehot's Collected Works, and those of Bagehot's friends and
associates who memorialized his passing with lengthy eulogies did
all within their power to discount his interest in the "dry science
of economics and disassociate him from the "hard" and "unfeeling"
attitudes of Victorian political economists. Robert Griffin, for
many years Bagehot's associate in business, prefaced his essay on
"Bagehot as an Economist" with the remark that: "... I can only
echo what has been said in protest against the common idea of
Bagehot as being primarily an economist, instead of his being pri¬
marily a man of letters of strong genius and imagination, who hap¬
pened, amoungst other things, and subordinate to other things ...
1
to take up [sic] with 'Political Economy'." Sir Robert Giffin,
for many years Bagehot's closest friend (and not to be confused
with Robert Griffin), commented in a similar vein that: "So far
from becoming absorbed in economic science as he grew older, though
his later writings tend to be almost all economic, Bagehot to the
last gave me the impression of only passing through one mental
stage, which, being passed through he would leave political economy
2
behind." The final blow to Bagehot's fame as a "true" economist
was, however, delivered by the hand of John Maynard Keynes, who
wrote in the Economic Journal of September, 1915, that while "...
some of his (Bagehot's) contributions to the subject (of economics)
are generally acknowledged to be of the highest degree of excellence
3
it would be just to say that he was not an economist at all."
Such evaluations of Bagehot's interests in and qualifications
for economic studies seem difficult to justify, however, when faced
with the evidence of his extensive writings on various economic
issues and institutions, his active participation in the Political
4
Economy Club of London, and the fact that "He was working on his
Economic Studies (which he had hoped to revise into a comprehensive
treatise on economic methodology) ... when he contracted the chill
5
which was to lead to his death."
The appraisals of Keynes' and Bagehot's contemporaries have
had, however, a decisive negative impact on the treatment accorded
his works by later historians of economic thought. Not one of the
major references to the history of British economics devotes more
than a few paragraphs to Bagehot's writings,^ and the overall assess
ment of his work is remarkably uniform between the various texts.
He is usually quoted on the historical and spatial relativity of
Classical economics and mentioned as the author of Lombard Street,
7
"a classic study of the English money market," and Physics and
g
Politics, "Darwin applied to the political development of nations."
His meta-economic contributions remained unnoticed by all except
Schumpeter, however, and the dominant opinion was clearly that
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nothing of importance remained to be said of his work. Although
Bagehot attracted continued interest in literary circles, nothing
concerning him appeared in an economic journal since Keynes' article
of 1915, a lapse of over sixty years.
While the neglect of Bagehot by present day historians of
economics is both mysterious and in many ways inexcusable, the atti¬
tudes of Keynes and of Bagehot's contemporaries can be more easily
explained as either warped expressions of friendship or enthusiasm
over the "new economics" of the Marshallian era. At the time of
Bagehot's death in 1877, the reputation of economics, even in Bri¬
tain, had reached its lowest ebb. Political economy had become
identified in the public mind with the historical pessimism of the
Malthusian theory of population and a belief in the approaching
stationary state, as opposed to the more popular Victorian creed of
unlimited and inevitable Progress. The subject was also widely re¬
garded as an intellectualized apologia for the "discredited" and
"outdated" policies of laissez-faire. The moralists attacked it as
a new justification for greed, the socialists believed that it was
a device used by reactionaries to retard needed political and econ¬
omic reforms, and the historical and evolutionary economists laid
bare and sought to undermine its "unscientific" methodology. In an
intellectual climate of this sort, one would only refer to his worst
enemy as "primarily an economist," and Bagehot's memorialists, mind¬
ful of social realities, were careful to disassociate his memory
from the stigma which would inevitably result from a due emphasis on
his interests in this lowly and somewhat degrading study.
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By the time of Keyne's article in the 1915 Economic Journal
public and academic opinions toward economics had changed, but the
new conditions were no more favorable for an accurate reappraisal
of Bagehot's contributions to meta-economic research than had been
the conditions of the previous century. Marshall's reformulation
of Orthodox theory into a well-defined "engine of analysis," sup¬
ported by folksy generalizations and illustrations, had gained the
eye of the British public. It would not, in fact, be an exaggera¬
tion to credit Marshall with being decisive in reestablishing econ¬
omics as a recognized and "popular" field of scientific inquiry.
The new Marshallian orthodoxy required, however, that future re¬
search into economic questions be based upon the theoretical system
and methodological rules laid down in the Principies, centering upon
such partial equilibrium constructs as the evaluation of consumer's
surplus and relying upon casual observation and informal statistical
studies to determine "the facts." Students were encouraged to be¬
come more and more systematic in presenting their ideas within and in
terms of the Marshallian framework, to search out new "examples" to
"illustrate" the usefulness and applicability of this framework and
to publish works expressing their results in as lucid and non¬
technical a style as possible. Methodological investigations were,
however, taboo in this new orthodoxy, having been judged by Marshall
as both superfluous to the main objectives of economics as a science
and as often destructive of the unity of the discipline. Keynes'
The Scope and Method of Political Economy was the prescribed antidote
for anyone infected by the virus of methodological dissent, for it
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was generally believed that Keynes had carefully dissected and
demonstrated the absurdities of the various non-Orthodox views.
Bagehot's speculations regarding the functioning of a market
economy and the proper methodology for economic science were out
of step with the newly created Neoclassical orthodoxy in numerous
respects. Instead of the static equilibrium models of economic be¬
havior favored by all Marshallians except Marshall himself, Bagehot's
views were more suggestive of the "process" analysis later systema¬
tized by the Austrian School. His concern in "The Postulates of
English Political Economy" (the only section of the Economic Studies
fully completed and published at the time of his death) focused upon
methodological controversies concerning the applicability of the
Classical system to institutions and cultures outside the bounds of
Nineteenth Century Britain, and was thus objectionable, if not
offensive, to the Marshallians who believed, instead, in the basic
historical continuity of economic theory from the time of Smith to
the early Twentieth Century. Finally, Bagehot's economic writings
were marred by being too often fragmentary, only suggestive of the
further paths to be taken by economic inquiry, rather than system¬
atically developing a case for a distinctively non-Orthodox methodol¬
ogy. Rather than a logical and wel1-structured writer, Bagehot was
a keen observer with a prophetic cast of mind. St. John-Stevas has
observed that "... Bagehot preferred to throw out his theories by
way of allusion and digression, glancing at rather than developing
Q
them. He enjoyed, as he himself tells us, 'to play with his mind'."
The effect of Bagehot's tendency toward loose speculation rather
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than organized development of his position, was further aggravated
in the case of his Economic Studies, that work in which he had
"... intended to establish the aims and frontiers of economics
by the unfinished state of the manuscript at the time of
his death. His mature views on economic methodology were originally
available only in scattered and fragmentary comments in his published
and unpublished papers, and a number of years passed before even the
bulk of these papers were published under the title originally in¬
tended for his completed treatise.
Despite the fragmentary and disorganized state in which
Bagehot's meta-economic writings were left for his successors, they
still contained important insights into the problems of economic
methodology, some of which were not lost on future Historical econ¬
omists and others of which had a significant impact on both the
Historicists and their Orthodox brethren. Bagehot's contributions
to methodological inquiry may be classed into two broad categories.
First, he summarized the doctrines of Jones and other early Histor¬
ical writers in a style noted for its lucidity and its appeal. The
rather sudden revival of interest in Historical economics during the
1880's was in no small part the consequence of Bagehot's Economic
Studies, even though that volume was not nearly so polished or "com¬
pleted" as it would have been had Bagehot survived.^ Second, Bagehot
added to the published discussions of earlier Historical writers
(i.e., Jones, Whewell and Leslie) a number of new and sometimes
significant methodological doctrines (i.e., the pragmatic redefini¬
tion of the limits of political economy to serve the purposes of
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empirical research and policy formulation).
His analysis of Orthodox doctrines and Orthodox writers was much
more constrained than that of Jones, Whewell or Leslie, and was thus
more conducive to fruitful conciliation between the two Schools. (As
represented by the fact that even Marshall found merit in the Economic
Studies.) His extensive practical experience with the complexity of
actual markets also led to a better appreciation for the limits of
economic inquiry and for the flexibility required of any potentially
successful theory of social behavior. He was thus less doctrinaire
than either the extreme Orthodox economists (i.e., Cairnes) or the
utopian Historicists (i.e., Leslie) and was more willing to express an
idea as a speculation to be discussed and debated, rather than as a
point of dogma to be preached and defended against the heretical.
Although the most common and least interesting of Bagehot's
economic ideas were obviously the result of a summary reading of
Smith, Ricardo and Mill, his more original and important concepts
may have been a psychological derivative of his extensive and inti¬
mate familiarity with the financial institutions of his day. His
empirical orientation, although not as developed and systematic as
might ideally be desired, was vastly superior to the "casual empiri¬
cism" of Marshall's weekend strolls through local factories or
Cairnes1 outright rejection of the theoretical relevance of economic
relations observable in the world.
Criticisms of Classical Economics
Like many other critics of the Orthodox position, Bagehot was
concerned with the declining interest in and the widespread doubts
being expressed about Political Economy in the England of his day:
... the position of our political economy is
not altogether satisfactory: it lies rather
dead in the public mind; not only does it not
excite the same interest as formerly, but
there is not exactly the same confidence in
it. Younger men do not study it, or do not
feel that it comes home to them .
Bagehot believed that the declining popularity of political
economy was the result of a variety of factors, many of which were
closely associated with the central flaws in the Orthodox stance
on methodological issues. He provided a detailed analysis of each
of these factors of interest both for its own sake, as a histori¬
cal interpretation of the causes for the declining reputation of
political economy during the Victorian period, and for the light
that it casts upon Bagehot1s own positive suggestions for the
reform of the methodological techniques used in economic investi¬
gations .
One of the primary reasons for the growing unpopularity of
political economy in the later Nineteenth Century, according to
Bagehot, was its past association with the doctrines of free trade
and 1aissez-faire. Although these policies had originally been fa¬
vored by the majority of British intellectuals, they had engendered
a reaction among the large class of professional state administrators
and the growing number of those social reformers who were anxious
1 3to use the State in order to promote their own particular causes.
Bagehot noted that while programs involving state action had often
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immediately observable "results" which could be toted before the
democratic majorities, the policies of laissez-faire had only long¬
term and indirect consequences. The case for increasing state
intervention was thus direct and superficially plausible, while the
case for 1aissez-faire rested upon long chains of abstract reasoning
not easily understood by those untrained in the subtleties of economic
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thinking. By throwing their lot in with libertarian political and
economic notions, political economists had jumped aboard a sinking
ship. By overstepping the bounds of positive theory they had under¬
mined popular support for their constructive and much needed research
in the area of pure social science. While Bagehot himself fully
recognized the existence of a positive core within Classical Political
Economy, many other writers were neither so discerning nor so toler¬
ant of the study. In their crusades for social betterment even many
of the later British Historical economists were willing to discard
the significant positive insights of the Classicals along with their
political creed.
A second reason cited by Bagehot for the growing dissatisfaction
with political economy was the popular belief that its subject matter
was the proper concern of every adult human being. Since it was a
science which dealt with "human things," political economy inevitably
excited "a great curiousity among the multitude of little cultiva¬
tion," who proceeded to pass judgement upon its researches without
the slightest bit of training in its methods. Those who read the
works of political economists were often confused by "... reading
words which were constantly used in common life ... about things
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resembling ... those of that life ..." but with "... reasonings and
... conclusions ... [which did] ... not seem to apply to real life
1 5
at all." "Uncultured moralists" often compounded public confusion
over the significance of economics by emphasizing the moral aspects
of social relations while excluding the possibility of a purely pos-
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itive science of human action. Through such indirect paths to an
"understanding" of the substance and significance of the subject, the
man in the street would too often arrive at one of two equally mis¬
leading conclusions: either he would come to believe that the sup¬
posed science was confused and useless in dealing with the practical
problems of the real world, or, alternatively, if he had a moralistic
bent, he would view it as a new faith which sought to justify avarice
and evil doings.
The cultivators of political economy were not themselves blame¬
less for the declining reputation of their science, however, and
Bagehot was not wont to let them off easily. They had too often
used the conclusions, the technical language, and the authority of
the discipline as a tool in the promotion of their own ideological
views and had thus lent credence to the view of economics as a study
of social ethics.^ Bagehot urged economists to publicly acknow¬
ledge that their science was merely an incomplete and hypothetical
analysis of social conditions, purely positive and without any di-
rect consequences for the ultimately valuative questions of social
decision-making. He also recognized, however, the continual temp¬
tations for this type of political chicanery and the frequent oppor¬
tunities open to those political economists who were unscrupulous
enough to engage in social myth-making. At least one of his comments
regarding the ease and consequences of such inappropriate and ill-
conceived practices is classic in both its content and its warning
for all practitioners of a social science:
... so much are the practical impulses of man
stronger than his theoretical tastes, that the
cultivators of an abstract science are always
in great danger of forgetting its abstract na¬
ture; they rush and act on it at once. In the
abstract physical sciences there is an effectual
penalty,--a person who acted on abstract dynam¬
ics would soon break his head; but in mental and
physical [sic] sciences, unhappily, there are no
instant tests of fai1ure,--whatever happens, a
man can always argue that he was right.18
A fourth and final reason offered by Bagehot for the declining
popularity of economics was the growing "abstractness" and "dryness"
of the subject. By this he meant not only that the theories of po¬
litical economy were becoming more complex, so that they were ulti¬
mately intelligible only to specialists in the field, but also that
the practitioners of the science were less and less willing to offer
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illustrative examples of their theoretical points.
Bagehot interpreted the reluctance of Orthodox political econo¬
mists to "verify" or illustrate their theories as evidence that these
theorists realized their theories were not so "absolute" or universal
as they had traditionally claimed. In Bagehot's view, the Classical
theorists feared to search for "verifications" of their speculations
in the new knowledge of other cultures because they were well aware
that the analyses and conclusions of political economy applied only
to those industrial forms of society closely resembling Nineteenth
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Century Britain.^
It should be noted that Bagehot's beliefs regarding the use of
intercultural data to falsify the Classical System was not necessarily
an expression of "cultural relativism." To claim that a theory is
applicable to one society but not to another because the histories
or racial characteristics of the peoples of the two cultures are
"different" is not the same as the claim that the applicability of
a theory depends on the conditions which currently prevai1 in differ-
ent societies. The former claim is a metaphysical assertion of a
supposed connection between certain "obvious" differences which exist
in the populations or histories of two societies or cultures, and the
asserted (but untested) significance of these differences for the
applications of different social theories. (In this sense the claim
is similar to the question, "Does History matter?". And the appro¬
priate response is, of course, " 'Matter* for what purpose? What is
the real question being posed?") The latter argument is, however,
concerned with test conditions or the "institutional" scope of a
theory; it constitutes an equally valid and important consideration
whether the theory being tested is a physical theory or a social
theory. Although we might ideally desire theories which are "univer¬
sal" or "absolute" in the sense that they require less and less se¬
vere restrictions on the domain of their applicability, such theories
are usually arrived at only as the result of a prolonged process of
scientific controversy and experimentation. They do not arise
"instantaneously" through a recognition a priori of "important"
features distinguishing individuals or societies.
One of the central goals of Bagehot's economic writings was to
trace the true limits of economic inquiry and defend the theory, thus
qualified, against those too voracious critics who attempted to re¬
duce it back to moral philosophy. Bagehot's analysis of probable
causes for the depressed reputation of political economy in Victor¬
ian England are important as a neglected and original interpretation
of the development of the discipline in Nineteenth Century Britain.
Yet more important still were his specific criticisms of Classical
methodology and his more positive recommendations for reform in the
goals and procedures of the subject. The remainder of this chapter
is therefore devoted to a detailed analysis of Bagehot's contribu¬
tions to these latter areas. We hope that the following will prove
sufficient both to illustrate Bagehot's unrecognized virtues as an
economic methodologist and to provide an introduction to the summary
criticism of Classical Orthodoxy which is presented in the concluding
chapter of this dissertation.
The Nature and Subject Matter of Economic Science
Bagehot, much like Cairnes, was adamant in his belief that po¬
litical economy was a purely positive study, without the slightest
intermixture of normative elements. What was cause and effect in
social phenomena was properly its concern. What was good or bad,
right or wrong, could only be dealt with by the "higher" and "more
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difficult" study of ethics. The guide to state management which
Adam Smith had hoped to provide the world was banished from the
legitimate concerns of the subject along with Ricardo's science of
the proper relation of classes in a developing economy and Mill's
concern with the (normative) rules of income distribution and the
evolution of society toward an ultimate coopertarian utopia.
Although Bagehot himself had quite definite views about poli¬
tics and the evolution of societies, he was unwilling to resort to
political economy as a justification for his views. For him there
was no "art of political economy," no "practical" or "applied" sub¬
ject concerned with social policy, which stood beside and sometimes
united with the science. Bagehot may have even wished to limit
economics to a study of the behavior of men without regard for their
motives (as had Symes at an early stage in his intellectual evolu¬
tion), but the evidence for or against this interpretation of his
thought is itself so contradictory that it is impossible to draw
22
any definite conclusions regarding his "true" position.
The Scope of Political Economy
Bagehot's proffered delimitation of the term "political economy
set the tone for his discussion of the applicability and limits of
economic theory. He defined economics as "the science dealing with
business activity," thus confining it to a much narrower sphere than
the Orthodox concern with "wealth maximization" or Neoclassical in¬
vestigations into all those things having to do with the "maximiza¬
tion of utility." Economics, in Bagehot's view, was not even so
broad as the study of business activity as a whole but consisted
only of those specific aspects of business behavior directly concern
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ed with cost minimization and profit maximization.
In so far as nations are occupied in "buying
and selling," in so far will political econ¬
omy, the exclusive theory of men buying and
selling, come out right and be true of them
As far as people are what we now always call
"men of business," money, the thing they look
for and the thing they want, is their sole
object; and in that sense of the phrase, po¬
litical economy may be fairly called the sci¬
ence of business.24
It is somewhat notable that Alfred Marshall would later adopt a sim¬
ilar but not identical definition of economics as the study of all
human actions which could be related to "the measuring stick of
money."
Evolution and the Scope of Economic Inquiry
Bagehot's restriction of economic inquiry to those types of
behavior that were associated with advanced industrial forms of so¬
cial organization led him to also impose certain limits on the spa¬
tial and temporal scope of economic theory. Economics was by no
means as universally applicable as the Classical economists had
believed, at least not in the same sense which they had attached to
the term "universal." Although it was not limited to an explanation
of business and commercial phenomena which were uniquely British,
"it is only true of ... states of society in which commerce has
largely developed, and has taken the form of development, or some-
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thing near the form, which it has taken in England." In further
elucidating his position regarding the proper scope of political
economy, Bagehot considered the issue of social evolution and left
open the door for the expanded applicability of political economy
to societies beyond the bounds of Western nations:
There is nothing capricious, we should ob¬
serve, in this conception of political econ¬
omy; nor, though it originated in England,
is there anything specially English in it.
It is the theory of commerce, as commerce
tends more and more to be when capital in¬
creases and competition grows ... as the
world goes on, similar characteristics are
being evolved in one society after another.
A similar money market, a similar competing
trade based on large capital, gradually tends
to arise in all countries. As "men of the
world" are the same everywhere, so the great
commerce is the same everywhere. Local pe¬
culiarities and ancient modifying circum¬
stances fall away in both cases; and it is
of this one and uniform commerce, which
grows daily, and which will grow, according
to every probability, more and more, that
English political economy aspires to be the
explanation.26 (emphasis added)
Bagehot's age of "the Great Commerce" was remarkably similar to
the Comtian concept of the "positive stage of society" in which the
customs, prejudices and religions peculiar to each region of the
world were to be superseded by "scientific attitudes" (including a
scientific religion) and by scientifically designed social institu¬
tions. Comte did not, however, identify his ideal society with a
steady progression toward a competitive free-market capitalism as
did Bagehot. Instead he was rather enamored with the glories of
neo-mercanti1ism or, perhaps more accurately, neo-feudalism.
Although Comte's influence on British social theorists is not
to be discounted (indeed, much of British social thought in the 1870
might be fruitfully re-examined as a debate between Comtists and
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anti-Comtists), it seems somewhat more reasonable to interpret
Bagehot's outlook in the light of the political and evolutionary
theory contained in his Physics and Politics. While his discussion
in the Physics and Politics was historical (or historicist) in the
sense of attempting to discover a law of social development, it was
decidedly not Comtian.
In Physics and Politics Bagehot reinterpreted and expanded the
Social Darwinism of writers such as Herbert Spencer into a doctrine
which purported to describe the world-wide economic and political
evolution of societies. In Bagehot's view, British policies of
laissez-faire and industrialization resulted in a superior form of
social organization, one which would eventually be emulated by the
rest of the world or would absorb other cultures through conquest
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and trade. The question Bagehot considered in his Physics and
Politics was not how each society would separately evolve or whether
they each would evolve along similar paths if left to their own de¬
vices. The question was rather the more practical one of "survival
of the fittest" on a scale of national cultures and social organi¬
zation. It was only because the "business form" of social organiza¬
tion was the most capable of providing an environment calculated to
entice other peoples to adopt its methods, and because the level of
productive activities resulting from it could better support the
troops of conquering armies, that political economy would gradually
become applicable to the remainder of the world. As long as the
tradition and status-bound institutions of pre-capitalistic society
were dominant in a country, there was no hope for a rational analysis
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of the country's economic system. "Equilibrium" in such pre¬
capitalist^ societies was strictly a function of the balance of
power between the various social castes. Supply and demand was re¬
placed by the results of force and weakness.
The Unity of Science
For Bagehot, scientific laws were arrived at in the same basic
way in both physical and social sciences, and economic laws were of
the same stature (at least potentially) as the laws of physics. He,
however, agreed with the majority of economists in his day and our
own in classifying economics as a non-experimental science and in
emphasizing the complexity of social phenomena as against the relative
simplicity of physical phenomena. Although the doctrines of social
complexity and of the inaccessibility of controlled experimentation
are key to the construction of any his tori cist methodology (in
Popper's sense of the term), the twist which Bagehot gave to his
statement of these doctrines exemplified the best of what Popper
later labelled the "critical spirit." It was thus that Bagehot de¬
cisively separated himself from those who wished to use historical
criticisms of Classical economics as props for a new anti-economic
ideology.
The special liabilities under which social scientists supposedly
labored, instead of becoming an excuse for the abandonment of inter-
subjective procedures in social inquiry, became, for Bagehot, a goad
to magnified efforts. Bagehot viewed the inaccessibility of con¬
trolled social situations and the reputed complexity of the phenomena
as a justification for a more vigorous and thorough pursuit of social
knowledge through a comprehensive and exacting application of the
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methods of the physical sciences. The only basic difference be¬
tween economics and physics was that more was to be expected and de¬
manded of the economic scientist. Since his problem was more diffi¬
cult and he was deprived of a major tool for its solution, the social
scientist could be expected to struggle more vigorously against the
mysteries of society, not to take refuge in the mythologies of essen¬
tial ism or dialectics.
Bagehot and the Baconian Method
Although advocating the unity of scientific method whether ap¬
plied to social or physical problems (a position known as "natural¬
ism"), Bagehot remained largely free from confusions in the metho¬
dology of the physical sciences which haunted discussions in the
philosophy of science from the time of Francis Bacon to the mid-
Twentieth Century. Many anti-naturalists, including some notable
authors writing within the last twenty years, have opposed "scien¬
tism" (the "illegitimate" extension of the rules and techniques of
physical investigations to social inquiry) because they believed that
the methods described by Francis Bacon in the Sixteenth Century
(observation and induction, without the actual formulation of hypo¬
thesis) were accurate descriptions of the procedures of the physi-
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cist. Conversely, many naturalists favored an adoption of the
methods of physics because they wished to reduce social investiga¬
tions to the collection of historical facts and eliminate universal
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theories from the field of social investigation. Among the many
justifications stated for this perverse form of naturalism were
historical-cultural relativism (considered on pp. 192-193 of the
present chapter), racial relativism and the belief that the state¬
ment of universal social theories runs counter to the philosophic
doctrine of "freedom of the will."
Bagehot rejected the Baconian view of science, labelling it as
the "all-case method" or the method of examining all "the facts
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which a complete historical and statistical inquiry would develop."
Instead of blindly accepting the authority of Bacon, he attacked the
relativistic strain in the Historical tradition, noting that it en¬
dorsed "exactly that (procedure) which Lord Bacon himself followed,
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and owing to the mistaken nature of which he discovered nothing."
Against Bacon's view, Bagehot quoted the judgement of W. S. Jevons,
who had just published his monumental study of scientific method.
According to Jevon's judgement of Bacon's methodological recommenda¬
tions, "It is difficult to imagine a less likely way of arriving at
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great discoveries."
Bagehot's more substantive criticisms of Baconianism were both
telling and demonstrate an appreciation for the issues far advanced
beyond his contemporaries. He argued, on the one hand, that the tech¬
niques of the "all-case method" were practically useless in the dis¬
covery of new scientific hypotheses; that such hypotheses, whether in
political economy or in physics, were the product of what Popper has
since called "the creative imagination." Hypotheses, according to
Bagehot, are not drawn out of the facts but are tools in organizing
the facts.
On the other hand, Bagehot disputed the capabilities of the
Baconians for carrying out their own proposed program of historical
research. Against a program designed to determine "all the facts,"
Bagehot noted that many of the facts of commercial life were pur¬
posely kept secret by men of business, that they were, in any case,
in a constant state of flux and, finally, that it was physically im¬
possible to know everything (all "the facts") about any set of human
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events. In a primitive form Bagehot also anticipated a part of
Popper's refutation of historicism. He stated that if we can only
know that which has already happened and must be content to formulate
hypotheses only with regard to known facts, then it is logically im¬
possible to say anthing about the future. That is, the goal of sci-
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ence as a predictive tool must be abandoned.
The Failures of Orthodox Methodology
Although the all-case method was a false path for scientists to
pursue, Bagehot believed that they were no better off following the
"single-case method." The "single-case method," as advocated by
Cairnes and other Orthodox economists, was simply to take one obser¬
vation, or one's own intuitions and general impressions, as the only
empirical input into a theory. Elaborate theoretical structures were
then constructed on the basis of this casual empiricism without re-
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gard for or recourse to any further "verification."
Even though little direct discussion of the consequences of the
one-case method is offered in Bagehot's writings, it is easy to
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connect his comments on the limited applicability of Classical po¬
litical economy with his antipathy toward the single-case method.
Classical economics was limited in its predictive and descriptive
powers to the types of phenomena prevalent only in Britain because
the theorists who constructed the Classical System had relied too
exclusively on a single-case method. Had they broadened their ini¬
tial observations to include data from non-British sources, they
might have been successful in constructing a more general system,
applicable to both business and non-business societies. At the
very least, they would have earlier recognized the limits of the
theoretical system they had constructed.
The Empirical Content and Historical
Development of the Sciences
Bagehot's own description of the process of scientific inquiry
hinges upon the degree of "abstraction" represented in the hypotheses
of any particular science. The decision of central importance to the
success of any scientific endeavor was the decision over the degree
of detail which must be embodied in an hypothesis in order to yield
"correct" predictions. Since all possible aspects of any phenomena
could not possibly be accounted for in any formulation simple enough
to be dealt with by the human mind, it was necessary to decide both
on the degree of complexity or simplicity in any given study and on
the particular variables which would be included in or excluded from
the study.^
According to Bagehot, the hypotheses first formulated in any
area of scientific inquiry would necessarily be highly simplistic
(that is, devoid of detailed content), and their predictive power
would be correspondingly crude. As a field developed, however, the
central explanatory hypotheses which formed the core of the subject
could be made increasingly complex with an accompanying improvement
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in the accuracy of their predictions. In economics in particular,
the simplistic theories of David Ricardo and James Mill required
modification for changes which had occurred in the institutional
structures and for application to those non-British cases which did
not conform to the model of purely economic (or business-type) be-
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havior.
In summary, then, it was Bagehot's view that the main tools of
scientific inquiry were abstraction--the isolation of the more im¬
portant aspects of any class of phenomena--and deduction from a set
of premises, established with due regard for properly formed general
izations with the aim of arriving at testable hypotheses. Bagehot
likened the pursuits of the scientist to the investigations of a
detective seeking clues to the solution of a crime. Both scientist
and detective had to decide which aspects of the case were important
to its eventual explanation and which could remain unexamined, both
would subsequently draw conclusions on the basis of the particular
clues they had chosen and both would then test the truth of their de
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ductions against other phenomena occurring in the world.
Specialized Problems of Economic Research
Even though the methods of abstract reasoning were similar in
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both the physical and social sciences, Bagehot foresaw sociological
and linguistic difficulties in their application to social phenomena
which were not present, to the same extent, in the investigation of
physical phenomena. Many individuals untrained in the techniques of
abstract science could easily set themselves up as experts in a study
dealing with "human things," and such untrained minds would inevitably
object that the model of an "economic man," used in political economy,
was an incomplete, and therefore illegitimate, representation of the
43characteristics and motives of human beings. The use of ordinary
terms in technical senses (as already mentioned on p. 190 of the pre¬
sent chapter) also resulted in frequent confusions among amateurs
and the unprofessional critics of the Classical system.
Economics as a social science, intimately involved with the
everyday activities of large bodies of men, was also at a disadvan¬
tage in the existence of separate groups of professional observers
and professional theorists. Although businessmen would frequently
have the best grasp of the subtlety and variety of "the facts,"
they distrusted the abstract theorizing and meddlesomeness of pro¬
fessional intellectuals. What theories they needed they believed
they could easily concoct for themselves, and they often had little
comprehension of the crudity of their own theoretical constructs.
Professional economists, on the other hand, had access to a multitude
of well-developed speculations about the economic system but pos¬
sessed few facts useful in the correction or corroboration of their
theories. Both groups viewed the other's knowledge as inferior, in
type, to their own; and both found the other's speculations to be
less than perfect answers to the questions they held in common.^
In the physical sciences there were also men who were primarily
theorists and men whose main pursuits involved the application and
testing of theories formulated by others, but a theorist was always
anxious to demonstrate the testable consequences of his theories and
would sometimes perform or direct the preliminary experiments him¬
self. The applied scientists would always be eager to either suggest
ways in which an old theory might be reformulated, in order to avoid
the problems which resulted in its falsification, or to formulate
new hypotheses explaining the anomalous test results. In the phys¬
ical studies the division of labor between those primarily familiar
with the facts and those primarily involved with theory formulation
unambiguously aided in the development of the science as a whole,
while in the social sciences it probably served as an impediment to
rapid or significant advances in the development of a body of well-
tested theories.
The problem of organizing research in economics today is some¬
what different, although its significance has not changed from the
time of the Nineteenth Century. While businessmen have become more
convinced of the usefulness of economic theories, professional
economists have themselves divided into two hostile, or, at least,
indifferent, camps. Those who consider themselves as theorists
only infrequently formulate their theories with regard for their
testability, while those whose main concerns are with the testing
of theories have perennially ignored the qualifications on test
conditions which are built into the hypotheses they are testing.
We have too frequently been left with econ-metaphysics on the one
hand and with non sequitur arguments arising from conclusions logi¬
cally untied to test results on the other. Leontief has recently
objected that the theoretical superstructure of economics is grow¬
ing at a rate unmatched by the empirical base against which it must
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be tested. He might have as well noted that the "tie rules"
connecting economic theory to the observable world have never been
standardized or clarified.
The Religion of Political Economy
Although Bagehot always defended political economy as a legiti¬
mate scientific pursuit (a position not particularly popular in his
own day), he was careful to note those characteristies of the enter¬
prise which rendered its procedures less than perfect and which were
liable to abuse by the many economists who perceived themselves in
the role of priests defending the faith rather than scientists pur¬
suing knowledge. Most of these imperfections which allowed for
dogmatic thinking have already been mentioned in different contexts,
but we repeat them here in a more systematic form as a summary state¬
ment of what went wrong in Classical methodology.
According to Bagehot, the accuracy of economic predictions was
closely related to the degree to which the empirical specifications,
stipulated in the empirical interpretation of the formal theory,
accurately reflected or corresponded to relations or institutional
structures which actually existed in the world. The predictions of
political economy could only be predictions of tendencies, however,
207
since "perturbing causes" analogous to "tensions" or "frictions" in
physics would always cause a deviation of some magnitude between the
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observed and predicted values of the dependent variables.
Because all human behavior was not motivated by profit maxi¬
mization, the empirical specifications of the interpreted Classical
theory were seldom true of the world (although they would become
more true, both extensively and intensively, as industrialization
and market relationships invaded more areas of human behavior and
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extended geographically over all the nations of the globe).
When Classical theory was used to predict events outside of the
narrow spatial and temporal confines of Nineteenth Century Britain,
it would usually fail, and this failure would provoke perverse re¬
actions both on the part of economists and on the part of the general
public. Economists of the Orthodox variety had always claimed that
their theories were true of man and society without restriction, and
they would frequently seek justifications for any failure of these
theories in "disturbing causes" or in the intuitive and a prioristic
nature of economic inquiry (i.e., "if it seems right, it can't be
wrong"). The public, on the other hand, would eventually conclude
that either the predictions of economics were grossly in error, and
thus that the subject itself was without foundation, or that a sub¬
ject that constantly resorted to an unlimited collection of "disturb¬
ing causes" in order to explain away its failures was of no great
practical importance and possessed no meaningful lessons for either
the pursuit of business or the formulation of public policy.
Neither economists nor the public tended to view the "failures"
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of the Classical theory as a result of the misapplication of the
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theory to phenomena which it was never intended to explain.
Economists would be led to defend it in ways in which it should not
be defended and the public to condemn it for things for which only
its practitioners were to blame. While the common man of the Victor¬
ia n period thus came to believe that economics was "unrealistic,"
economists themselves soon arrived at the conclusion that "realism"
(or a regard for any kind of intersubjective observation procedures)
was superfluous to the main pursuits of their studies. The formation
of a faith in economics (of a self-contained and self-consistent sys¬
tem of justifications operating without empirical testing) was thus
complete.
The Artificial Boundaries of Economic Inquiry
A final meta-economic problem considered in Bagehot's writings
was the question of the proper relationship between economics and
the other branches of social science. This issue had been a point
of bitter contention between economists before Bagehot's day and re¬
mained as an unsettled issue for many years after his death. Yet his
own solution to the problem was both perceptive and is, in fact, not
far different from the position arrived at today:
...the boundaries of political economy are arbi¬
trary, and might be fixed here or there; but this
is already implied when it is said that political
economy is an abstract science. All abstractions
are arbitrary: they are more or less convenient
fictions made by the mind for its own purposes.
An abstract idea means a fact or set of facts mi -
nus something thrown away. The fact or set of
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facts were made by nature; but how much you will
throw aside of them and how much you will keep
for consideration you settle for yourself. There
may be any number of political economies, accord¬
ing as the subject is divided off in one way or
in another, and in this way all may be useful if
they do not interfere with one another, or attempt
to rule further than they are proved.49
To suggest that the various fields of social inquiry were not
separated by natural divisions, divisions in some way necessitated by
the character of their respective subject-phenomena, or that "ab¬
straction" (for those who believed in such things) was not a rigorous
process much like "the rules of thought" was, in Bagehot's age, the
purest form of intellectual heresy. The advanced character of his
own view was, however, a reasonable corollary of his concern for and
lifelong involvement with the intricacies of business activity (of
which economics was to serve as an explanation). Just as a little
knowledge of a subject sometimes leads the arrogant to claim exper¬
tise, so much knowledge, mixed with a more settled nature,. leads to
increased humility and an appreciation for the complexity of the
world and for the necessity of maintaining flexible opinions about it.
While Comte, Cairnes and their followers were locked in endless
squabbles about the "natural" boundaries of this or that branch of
social science, Bagehot suggested that the boundaries of economic
inquiry depended in any one instance upon the question proffered for
investigation. The boundaries of any science were thus appropriate
or inappropriate only so far as they aided or impeded the progress
toward desired knowledge.
Economists in the Twentieth Century have certainly taken a more
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flexible view of the limits of economic inquiry than did the Ortho¬
dox writers of Bagehot's time, but they have still been deficient
in artificially restricting the type of variables to be included
within the scope of their investigations. Like Bagehot in his more
inflexible moods, they have wanted to restrict economic investigations
to "economic variables," leaving matters of social interaction and
political behavior to other disciplines. A less conventional and
more comprehensive view of economic studies has grown up in the last
decade, however, in the writings of George Stigler, Gary Becker and
the economists of the Virginia School; and as a result of their
seminal research into new areas of economic inquiry, we may yet see
Bagehot's vision of multitudinous political economies become a real¬
ity.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the many faults that Bagehot discovered in the general
sub-structure of political economy and the many objections he raised
to its methods and claims of absolute truth, he was never to lose
sight of the importance of the study or of the vital role it had to
play in the development of social relations:
It will be asked, Why do you frame such a sci¬
ence, if from its nature it is so difficult to
frame it? The answer is, that it is necessary
to frame it, or we must go without important
knowledge. The facts of commerce, especially
of the great commerce, are very complex; some
of the most important are not on the surface,
some of those most likely to confuse are on the
surface: if you attempt to solve such problems
without some apparatus or method, you are as
sure to fail as if you try to take a modern
military fortress--a Metz or a Belfort—by
common assault; you must have guns to attack
the one, and the method to attack the other.50
While the bulk of Bagehot's economic and meta-economic comments were
clearly drawn from contemporary and historical sources, his treatment
of these concepts was often original and always entertaining. Yet
Bagehot was far from being completely unoriginal. He considered
many meta-economic doctrines which were new to his time and provided
an analysis of these concepts superior to any others offered until
well after the time of Marshall. Bagehot's comments on the limited
scope of the Classical system, the relationship between the "practical
man" and the economic theorist and on the proper boundaries of econ¬
omics vis-a-vis the other social sciences each establish his claim to
a reputation much superior to that which he presently enjoys.
Schumpeter once stated that, "His (Bagehot's) vigorous pen re¬
peatedly touched methodological subjects," although, "Without
51questioning the validity of Ricardian procedures." The foregoing
pages have shown, to the contrary, that Bagehot more than dabbled
in methodological issues and that one of his central concerns in
economics was to reform the traditional methods of the Classicals.
It is unfortunate that many of the Orthodox economists did not read
him more seriously or with greater care, and that many later Histor¬
ical economists absorbed only his negative doctrines while neglecting
his points of positive reconstruction.
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219
respect between businessmen and economists and considered it as one
of the main barriers to the advancement of the science:
Men of business can no more put into words
much of what guides their life than they
could tell another person how to speak
their language. And so the "theory of bus¬
iness" leads a life of obstruction, because
theorists do not see the business and the
men of business will not reason out the
theories: far from wondering that such a
science is not completely perfect, we should
rather wonder that it exists at all.
Economic Studies, op. cit., p. 10.
... political economy--effectual political
economy, political economy which in complex
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those who are in contact with its facts have
usually little sympathy with and little cog¬
nizance of its abstractions.
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As we have seen, Bagehot was frequently critical of the
Cl assicals for the way in which they had employed the concept of
"disturbing causes" as a defense for the "universal applicability"
and "absolute truth" of their theories. Unfortunately, however,
Bagehot apparently saw no fundamental defects in the related treat¬
ment of economics as "a science of tendencies." We quote the key
passage from his writings:
It is on account of its abstract character that
political economy is often and justly described
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as a science of "tendencies" only; that is,
the object of it is, to work out and ascer¬
tain the result of certain great forces, as
if these alone operated, and as if nothing
else had any effect in the matter. But as
in matter of fact many other forces have an
effect, the computed results of the larger
isolated forces will never exactly happen:
they will only, as it is said, tend more
or less to happen; that is, they happen
more and more nearly in proportion as the
resisting and perturbing causes in each case
happen to be less and less.
Economic Studies, op. cit., p. 85.
It is a non seguitur to imagine that the less-than-universal
applicability of a theory implies that the theory can only predict
tendencies, but this was apparently the fallacy into which Bagehot
had fallen.
47. Bagehot's recognition that the Classical theory nowhere
fits the actual existing conditions is spelled out in the passages
on pages 88, 90 and 7 of the Economic Studies.
48. The effects of advancing too comprehensive claims for the
predictive power of economic theory are traced out in two lengthy
quotes from Bagehot's writings:
It has often been put forward, not as a theory
of the principal causes affecting wealth in
certain societies, but as a theory of the
principal, sometimes even of all, the causes
affecting wealth in every society; and this has
occasioned many and strong doubts about it.
... the greatest confusion arises if you try to
fit on uneconomical societies the theories only
true of, and only proved as to, economical ones.
In my judgment we need, not that the authority
of our political economy should be impugned, but
that it should be minimi zed; that we should
realize distinctly where it is established, and
where not; that its sovereignty should be up¬
held, but its frontiers marked: and until this
is done, I am sure that there will remain the
same doubt and hesitation in many minds about
the science that there is now.
If economists had distinctly set before themselves
that they were dealing only with the causes of
wealth in a single set of societies, they might
have effectively pointed their doctrines with
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facts from those societies; but so long as the
vision of universal theory vaguely floated be¬
fore them, they shrank from particular illus¬
trations. Real societies are plainly so many
and so unlike that an instance from one kind
does not show that the same thing exists in
other societies,—it rather raises in the mind
a presumption that it does not exist there; and
therefore speculators aiming at an all-embra¬
cing doctrine refrain from telling cases, be¬
cause those cases are apt to work in unexpected
ways, and to raise up the image not only of the
societies in which the tenet illustrated is true,
but also of the opposite group in which it is
false.
Economic Studies, op. cit., pp. 19,20.
49. Ibid., p. 21.
50. Ibid., p. 12.
51. Joseph Schumpeter, A History of Economic Analysis (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1954) , p. 824.
CHAPTER VII
JOHN KELLS INGRAM:
THE TRANSITION IN BRITISH HISTORICISM
Perhaps the best known, though least understood, of the British
Historicists was J. K. Ingram. Ingram was the author of the first
systematic history of economic thought to be published in the English
language,^ he was a Professor of Literature at Trinity College, an
ardent believer in his own Irish heritage, and a follower of the
2"Positive Philosophy" of Auguste Comte. Ingram's History of Pol it-
ical Economy, which first appeared as an article in the Ninth Edition
of the Encyclopedia Britannica (1887), has been cited as an authority
by virtually every subsequent account of the field, while Ingram him¬
self has gained the distinction of being one of the few "non-orthodox
writers to regularly attain at least passing notice in all the major
3histories of economic thought.
Despite the widespread acknowledgement of Ingram's work, how¬
ever, the assessments of his views have regularly followed a uniform
and quite superficial pattern. His History is frequently the only
of his economic writings mentioned by past historians, and his views
are either considered as the paradigm of the Historical School in
Britain, which they decidedly were not, or as a pale reflection of
German Historicism, which they also were not. Of the many sources
dealing with his perspective on economic investigation, only Ekelund,
who attempted to place him within the intellectual milieu of his
5
time, and Scott, who discussed more fully his meta-economic
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doctrines, can be considered as having truly contributed to our
understanding of and appreciation for Ingram's purposes and pro¬
cedures .
Ingram's Approach to the History of Economics
Since Ingram is primarily known for his work in the history of
economic thought, it seems appropriate to investigate his views re¬
garding the procedures to be followed in that type of study and the
nature of the lessons to be gained from it. It is clear, first of
c
all, that Ingram would today be classed as a "relativist." He held
that economists are both led to the questions which they will pose by
the press of social events and that, in addition, the answers which
they will proffer for these questions will be largely dependent upon
the prevailing modes of intellectual thought, the stage of develop¬
ment reached by their respective societies and their own particular
psychologies and past histories.
In Ingram's view, the history of social science could not be
represented as a gradual advance toward a more and more correct body
of social theory (in terms of the explanatory scope and freedom from
individual pecularities of its component hypotheses). Rather, the
history of any study should be understood as the development of a
series of justifications for the existing social situation, and,
ideally, a primitive anticipation of the subsequent social state.
"Theory" is thus a reflection of the age in which it is created, and
it is only at a very advanced stage of social development that one
may hope to arrive at something approaching a truly "scientific"
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study of society.'7
Since a social base adequate to support the scientific study of
social phenomena did not come into existence until the end of the
Nineteenth Century, Ingram concluded that it was a conceptual mistake
to condemn past theories for speculations which were later seen as
inappropriate to subsequent developments of society. Rather, past
theories are properly viewed as the historical precipitate of earlier
social stages: as, "elements in an ordered series, to be studied
mainly with respect to their filiations, their opportuneness and
o
their influences ..." (The "opportuneness" of a theory depended
upon whether it accurately reflected and justified the "spirit of
[its] age," while setting the stage for the passing of that age to
the next.) Even those theories held dear by himself and his contem¬
poraries were, for Ingram, conditional upon and applicable to only
the conditions and the stage of social, economic and moral develop¬
ment attained, or nearly attained, by the British nation during his
91ifetime.
While it is all too easy to applaud Ingram's seemingly self-
critical methodology in an age obsessed with "absolute truth" and
"absolute certainty," it should be recognized that his epistemologi¬
cal relativism (i.e., his seeming refusal to engage in a prioriStic
speculations about "all possible cases") approached the conception
which Popper later described as his toricism (viz., a concern with
purportedly fundamental and irreversible changes in social structures
and in the character of "cultural influences" which occur in the
course of a society's "evolution"). We will see in following
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sections of this chapter that these "relativistic" doctrines in
Ingram's philosophy were by no means isolated abberations, but
were, instead, components of a complex of views which Karl Popper
has described as "historicism."
It is, however, important to distinguish this historicist form
of relativism from the quite different practices described in the
chapter on Cairnes. So far as any "relativism" requires the replace¬
ment of social theorizing by theorizing about the sociology (or
social psychology) of social theory (ies) or so far as it rejects
theories which are uni versa! in form (in logical construction) along
with theories which claim to be universal in application, then to
that extent, and to that; extent alone, is it fairly characterized as
"historicist." The other types of "relativist" doctrines have, how¬
ever, no necessary connection with these historicist views. It was.—
an unfortunate twist of intellectual history that these different
senses of the term became associated with each other in the writings
of Nineteenth Century economists and social theorists.
the Epistemology and Methodology of Social Knowledge
In his consideration of questions surrounding the construction
of "a theory of society," Ingrain repeatedly voiced extensive object¬
ions to the dominant position held to by the English economists of
his day. Yet he was also among the first to sharply condemn Pro¬
fessor Bonamy Price of Oxford for suggesting that social theorizing,
and most particularly economic theorizing, was fraudulent, that
politicians and citizens were better advised to follow the dictates
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of "common sense" than to rely upon the speculations and pronounce¬
ments of economists:
That economic phenomena are capable of sci¬
entific treatment is a proposition which I
do not intend to spend time in demonstra¬
ting ... Nor do I intend to waste words in
showing that, if there be a science of so¬
ciety, no other branch of investigation can
compete with it in importance or in dignity.10
A more fatal suggestion (than that of Prof-
fessor Price) could not, in my judgment, be
made ... the prevalent methods of economic
research and exposition are open to grave
criticism but how can this be remedied by
throwing ourselves on the undisciplined
and random inspirations of so-called common
sense? ... What security can there be in
this as in other branches of inquiry against
endless aberrations and confusions, but sys¬
tematic observation and analysis of the
phenomena, resulting in a body of ascertained
and realized truth, and what is this but
science?!1
Like Leslie, and other more sophisticated Historical economists,
Ingram declared himself unopposed to the use of deduction in economic
investigations provided only that i t did not lead willy-nilly into aprior-
istic and metaphysical speculations about general human motives ("the
desire for wealth"), did not obscure those peculiar features of dif¬
ferent societies which might play an important role in the analysis
of economic problems which arose in these societies, and did not com¬
pletely displace the complementary methods of "historical research"
and "induction" in those cases where these methods would prove more
fruitful.^c
Ingram's views concerning the character and function of a theory
or "law" seem both conventional and unexceptional in the context of
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his age, although he did commit the then-common error warned against
by Bagehot, Whewell and a host of more modern writers (viz., the
confusion of scientific laws and empirical generalizations): "Sci¬
ence is simply the ascertainment and co-ordination of laws; a law
is the statement of a general fact; we explain a specific fact by
14showing that it is a case of a more general fact." It is over the
question of the proper object of social inquiry that Ingram departed
most sharply from the later Classicals and from most Western econo¬
mists of the present day.
In accord with Comte, Ingram distinguished "static theories"
which deal "with laws of coexistence" from those "theories of social
15dynamics" which dealt "with laws of succession." This distinction
was repeatedly related to a "justification" by way of analogy between
the biological and social sciences: "As in biology we have, alongside
of the theory of the constitution and actions of an organism, the
further theory of its development in time; so in Sociology we have,
besides the doctrine of the constitution and actions of society, the
doctrine of the constitution and actions of society, the doctrine of
l fiits evolution from a primitive to a higher condition." Although
this rather flimsy analogy may seem, superficially, as nothing more
than an ad hoc imposition in support of a highly suspect extension
of social inquiry, we shall see below (pages 233 and 236) that the
parallel between the developmental history of an organism and the
laws of social dynamics was actually an integral part of Ingram's
systematic and well-structured views concerning the methodology
appropriate to sociology. It is not clear that Ingram's analogy
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between "the constitution and action of society" and the "constitu¬
tion and action of an organism" can be fitted so well in his more
general perspective. Yet it can be safely asserted that Ingram,
like previous Historical economists, was insistent upon the impor¬
tance of including institutional and customary constraints as vari¬
ables of significance for use in and application to "real world"
17
cases.
It is somewhat ironic that while Ingram's prescriptions for
the reform of static theory are both definite and emphatic, his
own efforts in this area were limited to his brief but impressive
1 8
History of Slavery and Serfdom (also first published in the Ninth
Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, and later revised into a
book) and his even more brief, and much less impressive, "Govern-
19
ment Valuation of Ireland." If Ingram was not himself a "pure
theorist," then he was, almost exclusively, a historian of thoughts
rather than events.
In Ingram's consideration of "dynamics" or dynamic laws of so¬
cial change we meet with what Popper has identified as the core of
phil osophic historicisrn--the belief in laws determining the path of
social change or development (the belief in "a science of history")
and the assumption of a unique type of "understanding" which arises
from the study of "historical science." For example: "It is now
universally acknowledged that societies are subject to a process of
development, which is itself not arbitrary, but regular; and that no
20
social fact can be really understood apart from its history." And
al so:
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... the method of Sociology must be not only
inductive, but historical; and by the latter
name it may best be characterized. By this
is meant, not merely that it finds the mater¬
ials for its studies in the general field of
human history: we mean further that it in¬
stitutes a comparison of the successive states
of society in order to discover the laws of
social filiation— a process similar in prin¬
ciple to the biological comparison of organ¬
isms of different degrees of developmental
While Comte's "dynamical element" of social investigation was
frequently referred to in Ingram's writings, it is apparent that he
never developed this aspect of his thought to any great extent. The
role of "dynamics" was that of a crutch used to support his more
central concern with the essential unity of all social science. It
in no way served as an underlying structure for Ingram's speculations
as it did for writers such as Hegel, Marx or many of the Continental
phi 1 osophers.
As just indicated, Ingram's most pervasive and fundamental
criticism of late Classical economists was concerned with their
"artificial" separation of the "study of wealth" from all other
factors affecting social life. The close tie which was established
in his mind between "dynamics and a necessary unity" of social in¬
vestigation is illustrated in his remarks to Section F of the Royal
Statistical Society:
... nothing is plainer than that in the course
of the [sic] human evolution the several social
elements did follow separate and independent
processes of growth. The present economic state,
for example, of the nations of Western Europe,
as a group, or of any individual one amoungst
them, is the result of a great variety of con¬
ditions, many of them not in their own nature
economical at all. Scientific, moral, religious,
political ideas and institutions have all concur¬
red in determining it. But if they worked in this
manner in the past, it follows that they are work¬
ing so in the present. It is therefore impossible
rationally to conceive or explain the industrial
economy of society without taking into account the
other co-existing social factors.22
This same association of "dynamics" and the unity of social sci¬
ence occurs repeatedly in Ingram's writings, and lengthy passages are
devoted to this topic in his History of Political Economy, his Work
and the Workmen and his Hi story of Slavery and Serfdom. Yet despite
such adamant declarations as, "This question as to the relation of
economic studies to the general body of human knowledge, is really
the most radical and vital that can be raised respecting them, and
on it more than on any other depends, in my opinion, the future of
23
these studies," Ingram was ultimately willing to soften his posi¬
tion regarding the requirement for a unitary Science of Society. In
his address to the R. S. S., he distinguished between those research
programs which were ultlmately unified and those which required each
social scientist to become a Renaissance man, fully qualified in a
24
variety of studies. While abandoning the later path to those few
of superior intellect (i.e., Comte),L Ingram endorsed the notion
that "... a separate class of savants be appropriated to each (of
the sub-divisions of sociology)." In order to avoid excessive
specialization, it was necessary, however, that the research carried
out by each of the separate classes of workers be only "temporarily
and provisionally" isolated from the general course of social know¬
ledge. One of the central tasks of the Science of Society remained
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as the continuing synthesis of the knowledge gained in the sub-fields
26
of ethics, government and political economy.
Biological analogies were again resorted to by Ingram in his
attempt to justify a unified social science. For, as we are reminded,
"the study of society ... is in so many respects kindred to biology,"
and the job of the sociologist, it appears, is closely analogous to
27
that of the medical doctor."
Ingram's Empiricism
Another derivative of Ingram's attachment to the unified science
of Sociology was his hostility to many of those anti-empirical atti¬
tudes popular among the late Classical writers. J. S. Mill and J. E.
Cairnes, it will be recalled, had justified a resort to the concepts
of "tendencies" and "abstract cases" (i.e., that of a purely "economic
man") by maintaining that social phenomena were of an especially com¬
plex character. Because of the difference between social and physi¬
cal phenomena, it was necessary to mentally isolate each possible
motivation from all others and deal exclusively with its effects.
While Ingram assented to the complexity of the process of social
development (something quite different from the static phenomena
which Classicals like Cairnes had considered) and to the necessity
28
for some degree of specialization in its examination, he was com¬
pelled to attack "the a prioristic or deductive view" in order to
maintain his own position concerning the essential unity of social
sciences. Although Ingram criticized the "deductive view" both for
its "abstract character" and for its "too extravagant" claims to
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universal applicability, the concentration in his arguments seem to
29
center upon the former of these points. Ingram's fundamental
concern seemed to be the Classical s' method of reasoning from an
empirically false premise. Both the hypothetical construct of an
"economic man" and any argument which relied upon the generalized
concepts of "man" or "man's nature" were, for him, both unscientific
30
and "pernicious."
Ingram suggested as the optimal replacement for the a priorism
of orthodox economics a careful historical study of the actual de¬
velopment of both social institutions and social mores within each
31
existing society. Here again, however, we are faced with the two-
edged character of these suggestions: on the one hand they imply
the quite reasonable view that differing legal codes and differing
social customs may well exercise a quite considerable impact on the
success or failure of particular economic policies, while on the
other hand they assert nothing less than one of the basic Histori-
cist contentions that "the main agency in the social movement ...
[is] the accumulated influence of anterior on subsequent generations
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of mankind," or to put the same point differently, that there is
really no such thing as two events of the same type. Thus, there
is no such thing as an ahistorical science of society. A certain
uneasiness must necessarily accompany any interpretation of Ingram's
writings which does not attempt to account for his purely histori-
cist-evolutionist views along with his more constructive empirical
and historical arguments. Yet the rationalization of these two
elements of his thought is not so difficult if considered in the
light of the moralistic social theory of his day and his own pre-
33
disposition toward the construction of an objective social ethics.
Ingram as an Ethical Theorist
We have so far concentrated on what might be characterized as
Ingram's views on the epistemological character (the "scope and
method") of social theory. Yet this aspect of Sociology was, to
him, only a necessary propaedeutic for the achievement of ultimate
results aimed at by "the Science of Society," i.e., the development
of an objective social-ethics. In order to fully appreciate Ingram'
perspective on the aims of social science, one must first turn, how¬
ever, to the general outlines of the Comtian system upon which he
built. Comte, according to Ingram, portrayed Sociology (the master
science of society) as possessing the following features:
(1) it is essentially one science, in which all
the elements of a social state are studied in
their relations and mutual actions; (2) it in¬
cludes a dynamical as well as a statical theory
of society; (3) it thus eliminates the absolute,
substituting for an imagined fixity the con¬
ception of ordered change; (4) its principal
method, though others are not excluded, is that
of historical comparison; (5) it is pervaded by
moral ideas, by notions of social duty, as op¬
posed to the individual rights which were de¬
rived as corollaries from the jus naturae; and
(6) in its spirit and practical consequences it
tends to [sic] the realisation of all the great
ends which compose "the popular cause"; yet (7)
it aims at this through peaceful means, replacing
revolution by evolution.34
This blending of normative and positive (in the sense of Wertfrei)
elements is perhaps the most striking feature of this summary
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statement of Comte's views. It was perhaps the basic intermixture
of the "is" and the "ought," combined with the Victorian belief in
a progressive development of social morals, that served as the
foundation for Ingram's confusion of history and historicism. The
connection may be constructed as follows: if one truly believes
that the moral constitution of a nation is a major, if not the most
important, factor in its growth and development, and if one also be-
lieves in a necessary dynamics of moral Progress, resulting from
equally determinate changes in social form and economic organization,
then one is inexorably led (as were Marx, Hegel and a host of lesser
figures) to the notion of a value-laden and value-determining
"science." This entire complex of interrelated, if not inferentially
connected, concepts also implies that it is desirable for a social
scientist to concentrate his attention not upon the individual (no
matter how important) but upon the underlying "movements" and con¬
vulsions of "social development." In Ingram's words, "The ensemble
must preponderate [sic] over the individual; and the constructors of
theories must be regarded as organs of a common intellectual and
social movement." Ingram's own writings in the history of economic
thought are, to some extent, reflective of precisely that perspec¬
tive in that they consider the individual peculiarities of the
"great" economists as essentially unimportant to the path of the
disciplined development.
In Ingram's view, the essential character of an author's econ¬
omic writings was a derivative of the age in which he wrote. Thus
the Greeks and Romans had engaged in little economic theorizing
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beyond what was required to explain the operation of their immediate
36
households, the medievals* economic pronouncements were originally
derived from theological considerations and only slowly evolved
37
toward a metaphysical or "natural law" perspective, and the Mer¬
cantilists exploited this same metaphysical perspective on the Natural
38
Order to justify the equally metaphysical notion of "the Nation."
During an early phase in their development the Classicals preserved
the idea of "the Natural" as a source of external appeal against the
all-powerful state authority which the Mercantilists had helped to
39
create. At a later period, however, after their allies in the
manufacturing and retailing industries had gained the upper hand,
they were anxious to claim that the New Order of conditional 1aissez-
faire was based on mental certainties and unchanging a prioristic
"laws of political economy" rather than upon the anarchical "invisi-
40
ble hand." It was in the late Classical period, however, that
Ingram found the roots of a "mature scientific view," for it was
during this period that English and Continental Society became en¬
gaged in the final transformation from the Age of (destructive)
Criticism, necessary to clear away the traditional forms of the
Middle Ages, to a Positive Age of "rational and scientific" recon-
. .. 41
struction.
From Ingram's perspective it would be mistaken to say that the
Greeks, Romans, Mercantilists or early Classicals had erred in either
their goals or their methods. Rather, they had each fulfilled their
necessary roles in the sequence of social development. Due to their
efforts society could now progress beyond the stifling customary
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arrangements of the Middle Ages and beyond the Age of Negativism
(i.e., the Enlightenment) to a newer, scientifically planned and
42
run social order. It was the purpose of the Comtian Sociology
and of its important branch, Political Economy, to plot the course
along which this Positive society would develop and thus to hasten
43
its realization.
In economics the reflection of the developing Scientific
Society was the growth of an Historical Spirit, that is, the reject¬
ion of the metaphysical or a prioristic concepts of a "human nature"
or an "economic man" in favor of a study of institutional structures
and institutional changes. Even though the initial reaction against
the "excessively abstract" theorizing of the Classicals had taken
the form of a resort to the pure "historicity" of the facts of econ¬
omic development (i.e., to a mere accounting of the "life history"
of each "social organism") Ingram himself was not at all satisfied
that a simple accounting of economic history was exhaustive of the
contributions that economics could make to the study of social phen¬
omena. In the later editions of his History of Political Economy he
summarized in highly sympathetic tones the state of economic inquiry
in the late 1880's:
The continued influence of the historical school
is evident in the large output each year of his¬
torical, statistical and descriptive works and
in the large proportion of time and energy de¬
voted by economists to studies of this kind ...
The economist who devotes most of his time to
such studies, however, constantly uses theory
and is conscious of its importance. His atti¬
tude toward theoretical studies is at least tol¬
erant, sometimes encouraging. He is less apt to
be an extremist than were the earlier adherents
of the historical school.
Most economists of the present day cannot be
classified as adherents of any school. They
recognize the importance of both historical
and theoretical studies and their place in the
development of the science, and many of them
divide their energies between the two. They
also recognize the importance of both induction
and deduction and of the abstract and empirical
methods. They are open-minded to new doctrines,
but at the same time critical. They are syn¬
thetic as well as analytic.^
And in his address to the Royal Statistical Society Ingram cautioned
against any attempt to completely overturn the foundations upon which
political economy had historically arisen:
I am far from thinking that the results arrived
at by the hitherto dominant economic school ought
to be thrown away as valueless. They have shed
important partial lights on human affairs, and
afforded salutary partial guidance in public
action. The task incumbent on sociologists ...
is to incorporate the truths already elicited
into a more satisfactory body of doctrine, in
which they will be brought into relation with the
general theory of social existence--to recast the
first draughts of theory, which, however incom¬
plete, in most cases indicate real elements of
the question considered--and to utilize the valu¬
able materials of all kinds which their predeces¬
sors have accumu 1 ated.46
Ingram's conservative impulses, when considering the complete
abolition of economic theory, did not, however, carry over to his
attitudes concerning the social significance of scientific inquiry.
The explicitly Wertfrei limitations placed upon economic investiga¬
tions by virtually all of the Classical writers were, for him, no
more than the necessary accouterment of their "abstract" and ex¬
cessively general mode of theorizing. In his "The Present Position
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and Prospects of Political Economy," for instance, he stated of
Senior's writings that:
... when Senior is led to make some observations
of the utmost importance and interest, on the
very doubtful advantage to a labouring family of
the employment of the mother and the children in
non-domestic work, he thinks it necessary to a-
pologize for having introduced such remarks, as
not, perhaps, strictly within the province of
political economy. And when he finds himself
similarly induced to observe on the evils of se¬
vere and incessant labour, and the benefits of a
certain degree of leisure--subjects so momentous
to working men, and closely connected with their
material as well as moral condition--he pauses
and corrects himself, admitting that he should
not only be justified in omitting, but perhaps
was bound to omit, all considerations which have
no influence on wealth. This is the very pedan¬
try of purism; and the purism is not merely exag¬
gerated, it is really altogether out of place.4/
And in summarizing his position in commentary on Cairnes' Logical
Method of Political Economy, he stated that;
... this systematic indifferentism amounts to an
entire paralysis of political economy as a social
power capable of producing or confirming in the
mass of the community just convictions on the most
important of all subjects. How, it may be well
asked, are sufficiently fixed and convergent opin¬
ions on such matters to be generated in the public
mind? How are the scattered lights, supplied by
the several partial and one-sided studies of human
affairs, to be combined, so as to convey social
truth to the understanding, and impress its prac¬
tical consequences on men's consciences?48
For Ingram, then, social theory and political economy were tools
not only for the discovery of iruth but also for its promulgation or,
more accurately, its propagandism. This attitude toward the function
of social science may be, as Popper has contended, the psychological
49
derivative of the notion of a Scientific History, but regardless
of the truth of that contention, it does seem to be true that a be¬
lief in a normative social science leads its practitioners to a
position of political activism. In a general sense, Ingram had
already attained to the role of political prophet at the time of his
address to the Royal Statistical Society. For he stated on that
occasion that:
I believe that the most effective weapons against
... economic errors will often be found in reasons
not based on material interests, but derived from
a consideration of the higher ends of society, and
the ideal of the collective life of the race. And,
a fortiori, when we have to deal with the larger
economic subjects, now rapidly increasing in ur¬
gency, which are more immediately in contact with
moral conceptions, these questions of the ultimate
ends of the social union cannot be left out of
sight.50
It was not, however, until 1880 that Ingram took his first decisive
step away from activities which were primarily academic and toward
those which were wholly political. In his speech to the Trade Union
Congress of that year, he proceeded from an exceedingly brief intro¬
duction concerned with matters of economic methodology to a justi¬
fication for normative social theory as the necessary consequence of
any investigations into social matters. Although the passage surrmar
izing this transition from the Wertfrei investigations of the social
scientist to the concerns of the social reformer is somewhat lengthy
it is worthy of quotation:
Every particular social problem is only a case of
this general one, how to subordinate all social
forces to the highest permanent well-being of the
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entire community. Now, the more we study this
great question, the more we shall find that no
material expedients--however useful in their
proper place—will suffice for its solution.
That solution must be essentially moral. The
end in view can be attained only by means of a
generally accepted code of social duties, con¬
tinuously applied and brought to bear on prac¬
tice by the systematic solicitude of society.
The essential basis of this action is the es¬
tablishment of stable intellectual convictions
respecting the conditions of healthy social
life--in other words, a scientific Sociology.
Duties, in fact, are social functions freely
performed, and, they cannot be fixed with the
degree of definiteness necessary for practical
discipline, without a study of the functions as
they arise out of the natural constitution and
historical development of the social body. The
ideas appropriate to each function must thus be
elaborated, in order to determine the corres¬
ponding duties. This is the high practical des¬
tination which lies before Sociology, and which
gives it an importance and interest transcending
that of every other department of human know¬
ledge.^
The remainder of the address contains an expression of those
social attitudes which Ingram associated with an advanced Positive
Society. While these doctrines are of little interest from the
standpoint of economic methodology or of economic theory, they do
reflect the totally unjustified and arbitrary manner in which his-
toricist-evolutionist economists have claimed for their own values
the authority of a purported scientific analysis. In Ingram's case
it is also remarkable that those social goals and institutions which
he associated solely with Comtian Sociology were practically indis¬
tinguishable from the goals and institutions conjured up in the
utopian writings of "orthodox" economists such as J. S. Mill and
52
Alfred Marshall. Entrepreneurs, he tells us, are worthy of respect
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not for their organizational abilities or their skills in anticipa¬
ting shifting consumer demands, but rather because they are properly
"social administrators" holding a position which is "really a public
53
office. Labor unions are to be encouraged, not as bargaining
agents for workers, but as agencies to promote their moral ascenden-
54
cy. And, of course, the hope of future Progress depends solely
upon the continued enlightenment and elevation of the labouring
55
class. It appears that the ultimate inspiration of Ingram's social
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program was actually the condescending and morally righteous statism
of late Victorian social theorists, rather than any purportedly sci¬
entific analysis of "social dynamics."
Relativism, "Progress" and Social Determinism
A final aspect of Ingram's historical methodology which has only
implicitly been referred to in the preceding pages was his seeming
preoccupation with a series of "social stages" through which any
society must inevitably advance. In his History of Slavery and
Serfdom, for instance, he stated that slavery was "a necessary step
in social progress." (A statement which was followed by a lengthy
justification for both slavery and national warfare as brutal but
necessary elements in national development.) In his History of
Political Economy this same theme is repeated, if somewhat more
subtly, with protection being justified as necessary to the early
58
period of a country's development. Ingram's conviction in the
necessity of such practices and institutions was so firm that he was
even willing to proclaim that, "If the thought of the period, instead
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of being compelled by contemporary circumstances, could have been
guided by sociological prevision [sic], it must have entered with
zeal on the same path [of Merchantile and Protectionist policies]
59
which it empirically selected."
The element of "relativism" in Ingram's thoughts was thus re¬
inforced, and it in turn reinforced not only a rejection of univer¬
sally formulated theories describing human behavior but also any
universal code of ethics or universally "correct" political poli¬
cies. The fervor which Ingram felt for the arising Positive Soci¬
ety would, in his view, have been as justfiably felt by a Roman
landlord bidding for a new slave or a craftsman petitioning for
the protection of his profession, provided only that the time was
correct.
Cone!usion--The Position and Importance
of Ingram in the British Historicist Tradition
As we have seen, Ingram shared with Jones, Bagehot and Leslie
many of the same hostilities toward both Orthodox doctrines and in¬
dividuals and some of the same programs for methodological reform
of an "Historical" character. Yet in a very significant sense his
writings form a watershed between the views of the early British
Historical School and the evolutionary-historicists and early Neo-
classicals. Like Marshall, he had a profound suspicion of lengthy
mathematical investigations into social phenomena, although he was
willing to admit the use of mathematics as a teaching tool.^ From
his Comtian convictions he derived a belief in the importance of
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"social dynamics" and historical science (in the Popperian sense of
"historical"). From his English contemporaries he absorbed the doc¬
trines of social organicism and the distinction between military and
fil
industrial societies. Combining this already eclectic social faith
with the German view of social policy, still new to the England of
the 1880's, Ingram was to anticipate many features of the reformed
"orthodox" position, a paradigm which would prove stifling to the
future progress of economic research but which served as fertile
ground for the social reform movements of the late Nineteenth and
early Twentieth Centuries.
Despite his extensive criticisms of past Orthodox economists,
Ingram was more than willing to grasp the olive branch once it was
extended. In one of his last writings we find him describing the
"great thaw" experienced in the economics of the 1880's and the rise
of "a more humane and genial spirit (which) has taken the place of
the dryness and hardness which once repelled many of the best minds
CO
from the study of Economics." In the later versions of his Hi story
of Political Economy, he was willing to treat "orthodox" authors such
as Marshall with a healthy measure of respect, if not with full ac¬
ceptance, and to comment favorably upon the element of "open-minded¬
ness" which they had added to economic studies.
From the theoretical and policy positions which Ingram ultimate¬
ly arrived at, it was but a small step to the complete disintegration
of British Historical economics into the diverging branches of econ¬
omic history and evolutionary historicism. Once that step was taken,
in the writings of later authors such as Ashley and Cunningham, the
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unique features which had distinguished the Historical tradition in
British economics from both the German Historical School and from
orthodox British economics simply ceased to exist. The Cunninghams,
Harrisons and other like-minded historicists eventually formed the
theoretical component of the collective-evolutionism which over¬
whelmed British social, ethical and political theory in the last
decades of the Nineteenth Century. The Ashleys and Toynbees, on the
other hand, devoted themselves to "pure" historical research, either
of a literary-descriptive or "statistical" form. "Theory" among the
former group became identical to a sophisticated form of social pro¬
phesy, while among the latter group it was referred to only in demon¬
stration of its inherent falseness.
That any coherent presentation of a social view relies upon some
sort of "static" reasoning (upon a "social theory") was consistently
ignored by everyone except the Orthodox economists. It was thus upon
the Orthodox methodological foundations that subsequent economic
speculation grew and supported itself. The consequences of this ra¬
ther disappointing turn of intellectual history are traced in some
detail in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. The attempts
both to reinforce the orthodox perspective through the introduction
of new and more subtle arguments and to contract out of the dead¬
end into which it inevitably led economic inquiry are also considered
in this concluding chapter.
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Footnotes to Chapter VII
1. J. K. Ingram's A History of Political Economy was first
published as an article, "Political Economy," in the Encyclopedia
Britannica, 9th edition, Vol. XIX (Edinburg: Adam and Charles
Black, 1885), pp. 346-391. It later appeared in book form in a
number of printings and editions of which the following were re¬
ferred to in the preparation of this chapter: (New York: Mac¬
millan, 1888); 2nd edition (New York: Macmillan, 1907); Second
Amplified Edition with an introduction by Richard T. Ely and an
added chapter by William A. Scott (New York: Macmillan, 1915). The
Second Amplified Edition is the source for all following references
unless otherwise specified.
2. There is no entry on Ingram's life in either Pal grave's
Dictionary or the Dictionary of National Biography. Luckily, how-
ever, Ely does provide us witTTa brief but informative sketch of
his character and interests, of which the main passages are quoted
be!ow:
He was an able mathematician and a fine phil¬
ologist. He wrote on Shakespeare and Tennyson,
and was himself a poet of distinction ... Sev¬
eral of his associates after his death said
that he was probably the most learned man in
the world.
... political economy was one among his many
intellectual interests. Nor was political
economy his main interest. His main interest
was religion. The Religion of Humanity as
founded by Auguste Comte and developed by the
Positivists.
History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. xiv.
Although Ely does inform us of the little-known fact that
"Ingram was one of the founders of the Statistical and Social Inquiry
Society of Ireland ...," the effect of this information is somewhat
diminished by the additional information that "As such he wished to
encourage the use of statistics to promote social reform." (History
of Political Economy, op. cit., p. xiii.) The basically normative
goals which motivated Ingram*s economic and social investigations
were also noted by Ely in his introduction to the History of Political
Economy:
... the chief animating motive in Ingram's life
was his enthusiasm of humanity [sic]. His pas¬
sion was the general welfare ... Ingram's acti¬
vity in all the societies with which he was con¬
nected shows that his desire to promote human
welfare was with him the chief consideration,
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and that science with him did not embrace an
end in itself ...
History of Political Economy, op. ci t., p. xv.
3. References to Ingram include the following: John Fred Bell,
A History of Economic Thought, 2nd edition (New York: The Ronald
Press Company, 1967), pp. 349-350; L. H. Haney, History of Economic
Thought, 4th Enlarged Edition (New York: Macmillan, 19497"; Wesley
Clair Mitchell, Types of Economic Theory, Vol. II, edited and with
introduction by Joseph Dorfman (New York: Augustus Kelley, 1971),
pp. 38-39; Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought, 3rd edition
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,1954 ), p# 311; and Henry William
Spiegel, The Growth of Economic Thought (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 197177 pp. 401-403.
4. Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert F. Hebert, A History of
Economic Theory and Method (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 198-
203.
5. William A. Scott, The Development of Economics (New York:
D. Appleton-Century Company, 1933), pp. 514-517.
6. The ambiguities surrounding the term "relativism" (and the
corresponding term, "absolutism") have already been discussed at
length in the chapter on Cairnes and will again be returned to in
the conclusion to this dissertation. The following quote from
Ingram's History is, however, sufficient to establish his place with¬
in the "relativist" camp under most definitions of that term:
The rise and the form of economic doctrines have
been largely conditioned by the practical situa¬
tion, needs and tendencies of the corresponding
epochs. With each important social change new
economic questions have presented themselves; and
the theories prevailing in each period have owed
much of their influence to the fact that they
seemed to offer solutions to the urgent problems
of the age ... every thinker, however in some re¬
spects he may stand above or before his contem¬
poraries, is yet a child of his time, and cannot
be isolated from the social mechanism in which he
lives and moves. He will necessarily be affected
by the circumstances which surround him ...
The movement of economic thought is constantly
and powerfully affected by the prevalent mode of
thinking, and even the habitual tone of sentiment
on social subjects generally ...
Hi story of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 3.
The noted author of a relativist history of economic thought
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published during the 'Forties also recognized the relativist strain
in Ingram's writings and identified him as one of the founders of
this approach to the subject:
... the view prevails that the connection between
reality and thought, economic life and economic
theory must be comprehended as a process of action
and reaction. It was, above all, John Kells
Ingram and Lewis Haney who developed this thesis
... (emphasis in original)
Werner Stark, The History of Economics, in its
Relation to Social Development (London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1944), p. 5.
7. The extremity of Ingram's epistemological relativism, as
opposed to that weaker form of relativism involved in the interpre¬
tation of the history of social thought, is illustrated by the fol-
1 owing:
It is of highest importance to bear in mind these
relations of economic research both to external
circumstances and to other spheres of contempor¬
ary thought because by keeping them in view we
shall be led to form less absolute and thus just-
er estimates of the successive phases of opinion.
Instead of merely praising or blaming these ac¬
cording to the degree of their accordance with a
predetermined standard of doctrine, we shall view
them as elements in an ordered series, to be
studied mainly with respect to their filiations,
their opportuneness, and their influences ...
Hi story of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 4.
8. Ibid., p. 4. See also J. K. Ingram, "The Present Position
and Prospects of Political Economy," contained in Essays in Economic
Method, R. L. Smyth (ed.), with an introduction by T. W. Hutchison
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 51 for similar comments regarding
the economic writings of Adam Smith. In Hi story of Political Economy,
op. cit., p. 106, Ingram criticizes Smithes-^system" for being
... too absolute in its character; it does not sufficiently recog¬
nize the fact that ... man, as a member of society, is a child of
civilization and a product of history, and that account ought to be
taken of the different stages of social development as implying al¬
tered economic conditions and calling for altered economic action, or
even involving a modification of the actor." A relativistic critique
of Montesquieu's Sociology also appears in the History of Political
Economy, ojd. cit., p. 90.
9. History of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 4-5. This his¬
torically motivated attitude of humi 1 ity toward the "absolute valid¬
ity" of one's theories is in some sense a healthy antidote to the
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professional diseases of intellectual arrogance and narrowminded
opposition to theoretical innovations. On the other hand, if one
is not willing to forcefully assert the truth of his speculations,
he is equally unlikely to test their truth in the manner and variety
required by the enterprise of critical science.
10. "The Present Position and Prospects of Political Economy,"
op. cit., p. 43 (hereafter referred to as "Present Position").
11. Ibid., p. 44.
12. Ingram's beliefs concerning the role of deduction in "Socio¬
logical" inquiries are summarized in "Present Prospects," 0£. cit.,
pp. 59-60. This basic position is further clarified, with warnings
against "excessive deduction," in A History of Political Economy, op.
cit., pp. 132, 207. Of these sources there is at least one passage
which bears quotation, not only for the light it casts on Ingram's
basic attitudes towards induction, but also for his rather typical
Nineteenth Century confusion of "deductivism" and a priorism and his
emphasis on the need to test the deductive consequences of a theory
against observations:
Deduction has indisputably a real and not incon¬
siderable place in Sociology ... though economists
of the so-called orthodox school recognize no other
method ... (it is really) ... available only in
simple cases. Social phenomena are in general too
complex and depend on too manifold conditions, to
be capable of such a priori determination. In so
far as the method can be used, the vital condition
of its legitimate employment is the ascertainment
of the consilience of the results of deduction
with those of observation; and yet such verifica¬
tion from fact of the conclusions of theory, though
essential to the admissibility of this process of
inquiry, is too often entirely overlooked.
"Present Prospects," op. cit., p. 58.
13. See, for instance, Chapter V of this dissertation and
Appendix B.
14. "Present Prospects," oj?. cit., p. 45. It is curious to note
that although Ingram apparently regarded a law as no more than a
"generalized fact" (viz., an empirical generalization), in his dis¬
cussion of the relationship between economics and statistics he
warned against considering facts apart from theories: "This search
(after 'the realities of the material life of society') must, of
course, be regulated by general principles, and must not degenerate
into a purposeless and fortuitous accumulation of facts ..."
("Present Prospects," op_. cit., p. 71.)
249
15. The distinction between dynamic and static laws is presented
quite clearly in "Present Prospects," 0£. cit., p. 50, but it is also
referred to in a prefatory note which Ingram composed for R. T. Ely's
Introduction to the Study of Political Economy:
It has been shown that Economic science, like
Sociology ... must be--to employ the useful
terminology of Comte--not statical only, but
also dynamical. It must not assume one fixed
state of society and suppose that it has to
deal only with laws of coexistence, ignoring
those of succession. It is now universally
acknowledged that societies are subject to a
process of development, which is itself not
arbitrary, but regular; and that no social
fact can be really understood apart from its
history.
W. A. Scott, The Development of Economics, op.
cit., p. 516.
16. "Present Prospects," 0£. cit., p. 50.
17. This is at least one reasonable interpretation of Ingram's
continual expressions of concern regarding the use of a prioristic
methods in explaining the "complex" phenomena of social action. See,
for instance, "Present Prospects," ojd. ci t., pp. 55, 58.
18. J. K. Ingram, A_ Hi story of Slavery and Serfdom (London:
Adam and Charles Black, 1895).
19. J. K. Ingram, "Government Valuation of Ireland," printed
as a supplement to his "Work and the Workmen" (London: Longmans
and Company, 1880).
20. The quoted passage is found in the preface to Ely's
Introduction to Political Economy, reprinted in Scott's The Develop¬
ment of Economics, op. cit., p. 516. This similar, if not more ex¬
treme, passage is from Ingram's "Present Prospects," 0£. cit., p. 60:
"There is, indeed, no more important philosophical theorem than this:
that the nature of a social fact of any degree of complexity cannot
be understood apart from its history."
21. "Present Prospects," ojd_. cit., pp. 60-61. Ingram apparently
believed that even Ricardo had seen the necessity for Historical Laws
(for Laws of Social Dynamics) in his analysis. Although this necess¬
ity was one "... which from his own point of view it was impossible
to supply." (A History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 121.)
With perhaps more justification, Ingram also claimed to have dis¬
covered "dynamical elements" in Smith's writings; although he
cautioned that Smith had also been infected by "the Nature hypothesis"
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of an earlier age. (History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 91.)
22. "Present Prospects," op. cit., pp. 50-51.
23. Ibid., p. 48.
24. Ibid., p. 49.
25. Ingram's praise for Comte's intellectual abilities and ac
complishments was lavish to an extreme. See, for instance, A History
of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 159, 191, 192 and "Present Pros¬
pects,11 op. cit., p. 5T7
26. "Present Prospects," o£. cit., p. 50.
27. Ibid. Ingram's argument by analogy between the practices
and reputations of medical doctors and the practices and reputations
of social scientists was hardly propitious. It is somewhat amusing
that one of the central points of this analogy was precisely that
no one would think of trusting himself to the care of a medical doc¬
tor specialized in the care of only one organ or bodily system and,
thus, no one should trust those social scientists (the Orthodox
economists) who dealt solely with one class of human motivations.
28. "Present Prospects," ojd. cit., pp. 43,59.
29. Ibid., pp. 56-58, 60-62, 66-68.
30. Ibid., pp. 56, 58.
31. The "static" part of Ingram's proposed reform of orthodox
methodology is summarized in the following excerpt from his address
to Section F of the British Statistical Society:
The phrase desire for wealth represents a coarse
and crude generalization; ... the several impulses
comprised under the name assume altered forms and
vary in their relative strength, and so produce
different economic consequences, in different
states of society; and therefore ... the abstract¬
ion embodied in the phrase is too vague and unreal
for use in economic investigations of a really
scientific character ... All these economic mo¬
tors require to be made the subjects of careful
and extensive observation; and their several forms,
instead of being rudely massed together under a
common name, should be discriminated as they in
fact exist.
"Present Prospects," 0£. cit., pp. 56-57.32.Ibid., p. 60.
33. Ibid.
34. A History of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 191-192.
35. Ibid., pp. 4-5; "Present Prospects,' ' ojd. ci t., p. 70.
36. A History of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 9, 15, 21 .
37. Ibid., pp. 24-27.
38. Ibid., pp. 40, 42.
39. Ibid., p. 90.
40. The reference is, of course, to the ultra-Orthodox classi
cals such as J. E. Cairnes and N. W. Senior,. See, for instance, A
History of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
41. The idea that the role of the early Classicals was to act
as destroyers of the older Medieval and Mer:antile policies (i.e.,
that were primarily "negative" thinkers tied to an age of criticism)
was reiterated at several points in Ingram's writings. See, for
instance, his History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 31, 62fn,
102, and his "Present Prospects," op. cit., p. 68.
Of these various sources the foil awing passage from his
History of Political Economy summarizes, perhaps most concisely,
Ingram1s attitudes toward tne historical role of the classicals
and the continuation and extension of their influence into the late
Nineteenth Century:
The tendency of the orthodox xchool was undoubt¬
edly to consecrate the spirit of individualism,
and the state of non-government. But this ten¬
dency, which may with justice be severely con¬
demned in economists of the present time, was
then excusable because inevitable. And, whilst
it now impedes the work of reconstruction which
is for us the order of the day, it then aided
the process of social demolition, which was the
necessary, though deplorable, condition of a new
organization.
A History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 62.
42. The idea of a "scientifically constructed society" is but
one variety of what Karl Popper has characterized as "utopian social
engineering." See Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of His toricism (Lon¬
don: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 67. For a more recent
discussion of this and related issues, see Alan Donagan's "Popper's
Examination of Historicism," in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Book
I, P. A. Schilpp (ed.) (La Salle: Open Court Publishing, 1974),
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pp. 905-924, especially pp. 915-916. We refer in the next footnote
and in the conclusion to this dissertation to the link which regu¬
larly arises between a belief in historical prophesy cum "scientific
planning" and political activism. This link is quite apparent in
the historicist-normative character of both Ingram's and Comte's
Sociology. Of the modern era, Ingram stated:
Now, however, that synthesis (of the forces of
science and industry) is becoming appreciable;
and it is the effort toward it and toward the
practical system to be founded on it, that gives
its peculiar character to the period in which we
live. And to this spontaneous nisus of society
corresponds ... a new form of economic doctrine,
in which it tends to be absorbed into general
sociology and subordinated to morals.
"Present Prospects," 0£. cit., p. 32.
And in his conclusion to the History of Political Economy, he pro-
cl aimed:
It will be seen that our principal conclusion
respecting economic action harmonises with that
relating to the theoretic study of economic
phenomena. For, as we held that the latter
could not be successfully pursued except as a
duly subordinated branch of the wider science
of Sociology, so in practical affairs we be¬
lieve that no partial synthesis is possible,
but that an economic reorganization of society
implies a universal renovation, intellectual
and moral no less than material. The industri¬
al reformation for which western Europe groans
and travails, and the advent of which is indi¬
cated by so many symptoms (though it will come
only as the fruit of faithful and sustained
effort), will be no isolated fact, but will form
part of an applied art of life, modifying our
whole environment, affecting our whole culture,
and regulating our whole conduct—in a word,
directing all our resources to the one great end
of the conservation and development of Humanity.
A History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 300.
43. In illustration of his historical methodology and historical
determinism, Ingram states that:
When our object is not the explanation of any
past or present fact, but the prevision ... of
the future, and the adoption of a policy in re¬
lation to that future, our guide must be the
historic method, conceived as indicating, from
the comparison of successive states, the gen¬
eral tendency of society and the agencies
which are in the course of modifying existing
social systems ... We can by judicious action
modify them in their special mode of accom¬
plishment or in the rate of their development,
but cannot alter in their fundamental nature
... An attempt to introduce any social factor
which is not essentially conformable to the
contemporary civilization will result, if not
in serious disturbance, at least in a mere
waste of effort.
"Present Prospects," 0£. cit., p. 61.
See also the material appearing on pages 239 and 240 of this chapter
44. A History of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 199-200, 207-
208; "Present Prospects,11 op. Fit., p. 71.
45. A History of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 255. I must
admit to an error in the inclusion of this quotation within the body
of this chapter. Upon more careful examination I have discovered
that it is properly attributed to William A. Scott rather than to
J. K. Ingram. I do, however, still believe that it expresses Ingram
sentiments at the time of his death in 1885. As evidence for that
position I offer the following material, found in one of his last
writings and the quotations referred to in the immediately preceding
footnote:
There has been (in recent years) what Professor
Gide, the ablest representative of the new School
in France, has well described as un grand degel--
"a great thaw." A more humane anT”gemal spirit
has taken the place of the old dryness and hard¬
ness which once repelled so many of the best minds
from the study of Economics, and won for it the
name of "the dismal science."
William A. Scott, The Development of Economics,
op. cit., pp. 516-517.
46. "Present Prospects," ojd. cit., p. 69.
47. Ibid., p. 52.
48. Ibid., pp. 53-54. In the conclusion to his A History of
Political Economy Ingram speaks even more clearly of the close con-,
nection between economics and social ethics in the coming age:
Economics must be constantly regarded as forming
only one department of the larger science of
Sociology, in vital connection with its other
departments and with the moral synthesis which is
the crown of the whole intellectual enterprise ...
Especially must we keep in view the high moral is¬
sues to which the economic movement is subservient,
and in the absence of which it could never to any
great degree attract the interest or fix the at¬
tention either of eminent thinkers or of right-
minded men.
A History of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 296-
297.
49. See Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, op. cit.,
pp. 14-17, 49.
50. "Present Prospects," o£. cit., p. 54.
51. "Work and the Workmen," 0£. cit., p. 4.
52. Marshall, as mentioned in the chapter on his writings, saw
a utopia of "social chivalry," while J. S. Mill believed in an age
of cooperation and "ethical socialism" bordering on syndicalism and
reinforced by organizations seeking the social refinement and edu¬
cation of the working classes. In such an atmosphere Ingram's rathe
absurd utopian visions are understandable, if not wholly justifiable
53. "Work and the Workment," ojd. cit., pp. 5, 7.
54. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
55. Ingram's attitudes toward the social role and significance
of the working classes in the Positivistic Age are, in part, rep¬
resented in the following passages:
One thing is plain, that the working classes will
more and more become the great laboratory of pub¬
lic opinion. This would be inevitable from the
fact that they compose the mass of society, and
suffer most from the imperfections of the social
system, even if they were not, as they now are,
invested with political power. Hence the impor¬
tance to other classes as well as to themselves of
their being directed in their judgments by a true
social doctrine--which, discountenancing all vio¬
lence and oppression, will at the same time fur¬
nish just standards founded on rational ideas, by
which the mode of discharge of every social func¬
tion, whether public or private, can be tried and
estimated.
... it is almost implied that the great question
is not how to improve and ennoble the workman's
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life, but how to enable the ambitious and ener¬
getic to escape from it. I think current ideas
on this matter require a good deal of correction.
The causes which determine the rise of some to
the rank of directors of industry, whilst others
remain in the position of workmen, are not always
easy to trace; most frequently, accidental ele¬
ments of situation or opportunity are involved.
But so far as personal qualities are operative,
it would be a great mistake to suppose ... that
a rise of this kind is always or ordinarily con¬
nected with superiority of nature. A man who re¬
mains a workman all his life may be, and often is,
in all the essential qualities of manhood, of far
greater intrinsic value than another who raises
himself to wealth and rank.
"Work and the Workmen," o£. cit., p. 18.
56. It is of some passing interest that Ingram was concerned
that the trends toward collectivism, which he favored in the main,
should not lead overly far into state socialism of the traditional
sort. See, for instance, his History of Political Economy, op. cit.,
pp. 122, 298 and his "Work and the Workmen," ££. cit., p. 8. Ingram
also opposed cooperative schemes as utopian and divert!ve of the
working movement's true aims ("Work and the Workmen," op_. cit., p. 8.
57. A History of Slavery and Serfdom, op. cit., pp. 3-5.
58. The theme of the necessity of a slave-owning stage in the
development of civilization and of the morally relative character
of such institutions is again discussed in A History of Political
Economy, op. cit., p. 16.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., pp. 176-178.
61. For Ingram's use of these various concepts and categories
of classical sociology see, for instance, A History of Political
Economy, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 15.62.W. A. Scott, The Development of Economics, op. cit., p. 517.
